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1 INTRODUCTION - STUDY OBJECTIVES
The Treasury requested tenders for an empirical evaluation of the impact on the
New Zealand economy of the privatisation of NZ Rail Limited, now Tranz Rail Ltd.   
Their terms of reference were to:
·  determine the nature and extent of the economic welfare gains and
losses resulting from the privatisation
·  identify which groups have gained or lost,
·  estimate the quantum of the gains or losses, and
·  analyse in depth the decision and consequences of the privatisation.
The aim of the review is to determine whether the privatisation of NZ rail was in the
public interest and to provide input to examinations of welfare changes associated
with privatisation more broadly.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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2 METHODOLOGY
The terms of reference were that the full study should be conducted in 2 stages and that both
stages should be based upon the methodology of cost-benefit analysis. In addition, there
should, in the first stage, be a strategic and industry analysis that places the evaluation of
privatisation in a perspective that enables the key determining features of the measured
outcomes to be identified. The methodology of “cost-benefit analysis” is more or less that
which is described in the Review of Methodologies for Estimating the Welfare Impacts of
Corporatisation and Privatisation (the Review).
2.1 The Approach
In conducting its evaluation, ISCR adopts the cost benefit approach to evaluation, bearing in
mind that the evaluation is ex post, whereas standard cost-benefit analysis is conducted on an
ex ante basis. The ISCR evaluation follows the broad guiding principles of the Review, but
not slavishly.  It is not proposed to expend effort on financial ratio analysis excepting in the
problematic event that it can lead to interpretable performance benchmarking. In addition, the
nature of the market (the extent of competition, for example) will be carefully taken into
account in the design of the specific measures and techniques used in the productivity and
cost-benefit calculations.
While the ISCR methodology of the cost-benefit calculation is well illustrated by the study of
Boles de Boer and Evans (“The Economic Efficiency of Telecommunications in a
Deregulated Market: the case of New Zealand”, The Economic Record, 72, 24-35, 1996), it
was necessary to develop specific aspects of the work to fit the key characteristics of the rail
transport industry.  In particular, the specific political, regulatory and competitive
environments within which NZ railways functioned prior to privatisation have been  quite
different to Telecom New Zealand. The strategic and industry analysis will lay the basis for
the particular method of implementation in the evaluation.
In order to address the overall goal of the study, the evaluation is a little more explicit about
the need to understand the alternative competing modes of transport than is suggested in the
scope of Stage 1. Alternative modes affect the regulatory and competitive environment and
these, in turn, importantly affect strategic decisions and performance. They also affect the
specific techniques used in cost-benefit analysis (see Evans’ comments on the Review).
It was agreed that at the conclusion of Stage 1 ISCR would report to The Treasury its
assessment of what can be achieved and what is appropriate for the measurement of the
incidence of costs and benefits of privatisation. It would then consult with the Treasury in
order to determine an agreed approach to the assessment of the incidence of benefits and
costs.
2.2 This Report
This is the final report for the stage one review and provides ISCR conclusions and
recommendations on a structured approach to stage two.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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3 PRECIS - STAGE 1
Market Share As a result of deregulation overall freight and passenger market
share steadily declined until 1993 when NZ Rail Ltd. was sold to
Tranz Rail Holdings.  For a variety of reasons it is difficult to assess
market share, however between 1983 and 1993 about one half of
rail’s long haul market share went to their competitors.
Financial Partly because of the market consequences, rail’s financial
performance was a disaster.  Revenues were halved and by 1989
large operating losses and interest on investments generated a debt
of $1.2 billion that could not be sustained.
Restructuring Restructuring entailed significant investment, layoffs of rail staff
and a dedicated focus on the core business of rail that required high
quality management and sharp incentives for them.
1989 Position The crisis came to a head in 1988
·  its market position had been drastically reduced by
competition.
·  it had an uncompetitive cost structure
·  it lacked the strategy and the capability to succeed.
·  it had diversified into property to a small extent and this
had detracted from its focus on its core business.
 
  Ownership In late 1988 it was decided that NZ needed a viable rail system and
if it was to survive, the core rail business should be privately held.
In 1989 a plan to ready the company for privatisation was put into
place.
 
  Core Rail Business Organisational, financial and cost restructuring in 1990 led to the
creation of a “saleable” core rail business, however for a number of
reasons rail’s deteriorating performance in their product markets did
not stabilise until 1993.
 
  Privatisation The sale of NZ Rail Limited to TranzRail for $400m coincided with
an improvement in both market share and financial performance.
These improvements came from a successful marketing strategy
targeted at the long haul of bulk commodities and in the distribution
of door-to-door goods.
 
  Performance Passenger services have shown a turnaround in demand volumes
and financial performance, while operational efficiency has been
improved significantly.  This has been achieved through shedding
(mainly staff) costs, implementing service enhancing customer and
operational systems as well as targeting technology investments.
 
  Counterfactual In the 110 year period prior to 1993, rail’s performance under a
number of corporate organisational forms did not lead to a viable
business.  If public ownership had continued past 1993, then, given
management of rail since 1880 and the deregulation of all modes ofThe Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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transport since 1984, the counterfactual would be at best captured




  Stage 2 Recommendations
 
  Stage 2 Proceed with stage 2
 
  Data Data and information are available and are of very satisfactory
quality for studies of this sort.
 
  Segmentation Use a segmented multiple output market approach for outputs
 
  Counterfactual
·  Start with the 1993 surplus and deterioration from that date
onwards until break even is reached
·  Breakeven from some date such as 1998.
Privatisation Decision Evaluate the economic efficiency of the 1988 decision to invest
capital, restructure and privatise the company.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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4 A BRIEF HISTORY
Railways Dept The business now conducted by Tranz Rail Holdings Limited and
its subsidiaries can be traced back to the construction and
development of the original railway network in New Zealand
beginning in the late 1870's.  The Railways Department controlled
all freight and passenger railway operations in New Zealand for
much of the first three quarters of this century, and from 1962 it
also operated a ferry service between the North and South Islands.
Railways Corp In 1982 the Railways Department and the InterIsland ferry service
were formed into a Government-owned corporation named New
Zealand Railways Corporation. Following a 1983 operational
review by Booz Allen, the Corporation internally restructured the
railway and ferry operations to conduct business more efficiently.
The goal of the restructuring was to lower costs and compete
strongly for freight business by means of investing in modern plant,
developing the property side of the business and reorganising
management accountabilities into lines of business.  Also
diversification from core business was proposed.  Much of the
restructuring was driven by the deregulation of ports, sea and,
particularly, the road transport of freight and passengers.
NZ Rail Limited In 1990 New Zealand Rail Limited was incorporated as a limited
liability company wholly owned by the Government.  The
Government transferred all of its rail and ferry assets and related
liabilities to NZ Rail Ltd. and restructured the rail balance sheet by
writing off approximately $1.2bm of debt accumulated during the
1980’s.  Other non-core assets (mainly property) remained with the
Railways Corporation for disposal.  The Government retained
ownership of the land on which the rail assets were situated and
leased the land to New Zealand Rail Limited.  The creation of NZ
Rail in 1990 was accompanied by a further internal reorganisation
of management.
Tranz Rail NZ Ltd. New Zealand Rail was purchased in September 1993 by Tranz Rail
Holdings.  Tranz Rail’s principal shareholders included affiliates of
Wisconsin Central Transportation Corporation; Berkshire Partners
LLC; and Fay, Richwhite & Company.  In 1995 New Zealand Rail
Limited became Tranz Rail Limited and in 1996 the Company went
public, listing on the New Zealand Stock Exchange.  The listing was
accompanied by a “re-branding” of the internal lines of business
into business units and a tight focus on service and customers.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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5 BACKGROUND AND ENVIRONMENT REVIEW
This section is most important because the fortunes of Rail in the 1980’s were almost entirely
at the mercy of a range of market forces at work in New Zealand.  Rail had always served
varying mixtures of commercial and social goals and through its history was unable to take
charge of its own destiny.
This history, and especially the period from 1980 onwards, is a significant factor in the
approach that was taken to its privatisation.  Left on its own to survive in a deregulated
environment rail had to restructure what was left of the past and make a commercially viable
business.  As will be seen, deregulation of the freight market had a major effect, and was
almost the sole determinant of the performance of the Railways Corporation.  In fact, it very
nearly led to the Corporation’s collapse.
This section therefore describes the background, and the sources of the changes that took
place in rail from 1983.  The sources of change fell broadly into three categories, as follows:
·  political economy which shook the industrial structure of New
Zealand in the 1980’s and initiated widespread economic
restructuring.
·  less regulation of industry combined with open, competitive
product markets.
·  excess resource levels within the rail business, relative to the




  State Involvement Traditionally, in New Zealand, the State has had a very active and
major role to play in the nation’s economic affairs.  Particularly
since the 1930s, the economy had been heavily regulated.
Intervention included among other things, state provision of goods
and services, the detailed regulation of economic activity (including
decisions on production and pricing) and import and foreign
exchange controls.  Government ownership was also extensive and
included banking, insurance, health, education, transport, energy
and utilities (Evans et al, 1996).
 
  Slow Change From the 1960s, and particularly from Britain’s entry to the EEC in
1973, the economy was viewed as under performing and agitation
for a change in direction grew. The National Government during the
1970s in finance and in the early 1980’s in transport made tentative
moves towards deregulation.  Deregulation during this period was
particularly slow and according to Bollard & Buckle (1987) the
outcome was a mix of regulatory reform and further intervention.
During the latter part of National Government rule in the 1980s,
regulatory measures were enforced in financial systems and a price
freeze was applied.  Although the foundation for land transport
deregulation had been laid while the National Government was in
power, their later term, to 1984, cannot be seen as a period of
deregulation.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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  1984 Election The 1984 general election brought the National Government’s
three-term rule to an end.  The Labour Government, successors to
National, brought not only a change in political leadership but
established a range of major reforms.  Their aim was to achieve a
competitive environment in which markets could operate freely
from intervention by government, (Evans et al:1996), and
redistribution would be managed through the tax, health, education
and social welfare programmes.
 
  The reform period is described by Evans et al (1996). It included the
introduction of the revised competition statutes with the Commerce
Act 1986; and major restructuring of the state sector (Boston &
Holland:1987).  Regulatory reforms were implemented in the
energy and transport sectors as well.
 
  SOE’s Restructuring the State sector meant that there were major reforms
to Government departments and trading departments were
converted into State Owned Enterprises (SOEs).  The 1986 State
Owned Enterprises Act required each SOE to function as a business
with clear commercial objectives, and established a Board of
Directors who were accountable to the Minister of Finance and
another shareholding minister .  By 1987 there were 14 SOEs  and
by 1992 27 had been formed.  According to Evans et al (1996) there
existed differences between SOEs and privately owned firms, that
led or would lead to performance problems of SOEs relative to
privatised companies.  Awareness of these provided the impetus for
privatization which commenced in 1987 with the partial
privatisation of The Bank of New Zealand.
 
  Further legislation aided reform.  In April 1988, the State Sector Act
was passed and a year later the Public Finance Act 1989, which
gave government departments clearer management goals and
greater management independence to carry out their agreed
functions.
 
  The 1990’s The year 1990 saw yet further political changes with the end of the
fourth Labour Government and the beginning of the fifth National
Government.  With the foundations laid by Labour for a deregulated
economy, National continued in much the same way, though at a
slower rate.  In 1991 the Employment Contracts Act was
introduced, which abolished compulsory unionism, facilitated
employer-employee individual contracts and ended centralized
wage setting.
 
  Overall, the period from 1984 until the early 1990’s saw dramatic
and wide reaching changes to all sectors of the economy which have
contributed to a much less regulated economic environment.
 




  Pre 1984 New Zealand’s economic position, leading up to the 1984 election,
was not strong.  Public and private sector foreign debt combined,
rose from 11 percent of GDP to 95 per cent between March 1974 to
June 1984, and similarly net public debt increased from 5 percent of
GDP to 32 per cent during the same period.  Annual inflation was
high throughout the whole period of December 1973 to March
1983.  Consequently in April 1983, New Zealand’s AAA credit
rating was downgraded to AA+ on sovereign external debt (Evans
et al, 1996).
 
  These factors led to the reforms described above.  According to
Boston and Dalziel (1992) it was almost universally accepted that
inconsistent macroeconomic policies in the 1970’s and early 1980’s
had contributed largely to the economic crisis in 1984.  However,
economic growth throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s has been




















  source: Statistics NZ and NZIER.
 
 
  1987 Crash Following the stock market crash of 1987, economic growth for
1988 fell dramatically and in the following two years New Zealand
faced negative growth.  The graph indicates New Zealand’s GDP
growth over this period to the present day.
 
 
5.3 Road Transport Deregulation
  Deregulation of the road transport industry in New Zealand began
in 1983 with the removal of road transport licensing.  Prior to this,
the industry had been heavily regulated since the nineteenthThe Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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century, with government owning and regulating major transport
operations in all modes.  In order to protect Government railways
against increasing road competition and for the asserted reason of
establishing price stability in the freight transport industry, a
restriction on the length of haul for road freight was introduced in
1936.  The restriction, which applied to almost all goods, began at
30 miles and was increased to 150 km in 1977.
 
  Licensing Quantitative licensing also regulated the heavy freight transport
industry by simply restricting the issue of licenses, making it
difficult for those wishing to enter the industry.  New entrants not
only had to prove that there was a need for their services, but also
that they would not disadvantage existing operators. Operational
efficiency was affected by reduced competition from regulatory
“tagging” of freight movements to a company, route, area and/or
commodity.  Under this regulatory combination, rail faced very
limited competition for long distance freight traffic.  Where
competition did exist between road and rail (i.e. less than 150 km
and for exempt goods), road transport rates were within limits
prescribed by the Ministry of Transport (MOT) that were
determined on a cost-plus basis.
 
  In New Zealand, the 1980’s saw rapid political and economic
change, as well as advances in global transport technology.
According to the MOT (1995), these changes “made Government
ownership and control of transport philosophically unacceptable and
operationally impractical” (Ministry of Transport 1995:8).
 
  Legislation In November 1983 the Transport Amendment Act (No 2) began the
deregulation phase in New Zealand’s road freight transport.  There
were two notable changes to the operation of the industry, firstly the
quantitative road transport licensing system was replaced with a
qualitative system on June 1 1984 so that the main issue of concern
was the fitness of the applicant to run a trucking service, and
secondly the 150 km restriction on road carriage began to be phased
out.
 
  Although the route, distance and price constraints had been
removed on 1 November 1983 under the Transport Amendment Act
(1983), where road haulage was in competition with railways
beyond 150 km distance, operators were still required to pay for a
permit from the Ministry of Transport.  This phased withdrawal of
the 150 km restriction meant that operators were still charged for a
permit but on a per tonne-day basis.  When these permits were
completely phased out in October 1986, entry to road transport
became totally unrestricted.
 
  In parallel with this, the removal of import restrictions facilitated




  Ports and Shipping As part of the general economic reform and the reduction of the
level of intervention, the Government identified the need for major
reform in both ports and the shipping industry.  The port operationsThe Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
15
were viewed as costly, inefficient, overstaffed and plagued by
industrial disruption.   Two priorities were established as a result of
the On Shore Costs Study (Ministry of Transport:1984).  These
were to change the way in which various statutory authorities
operated on and around the waterfront, and to normalise
employment procedures.
 
  The Ports Reform Bill, introduced in 1987, provided for the
corporatisation of the regional harbour boards and the Ports
Companies Act 1988 led to the formation of separate port
companies in each port.  The New Zealand Ports Authority was also
abolished during 1988.  In 1989 ownership of the port companies
was initially transferred to the new regional local government
bodies but since then four port companies have been listed on the
New Zealand Stock Exchange.
 
  Waterfront reform The second priority of normalising employment arrangements
began with the 1989 Waterfront Industry Reform Bill which
abolished the Waterfront Industry Commission that administered
the labour pool for waterside employees engaged by various
stevedoring companies or container terminal operators. The original
expensive pool system that still exists in Australia was replaced
with normal employer/employee relations associated with
permanent company employment.  Other reforms such as the 1991
Employment Contracts Act affected all industries equally.
 
  Air Transport Although air transport was deregulated about this time it can be
regarded as a separate market from rail.  There would however be
some substitution between these markets in passenger transport,
particularly for inter island passenger transport.
 
 
5.4 Competitive Product Markets
  Market Changes Immediately following deregulation of rail’s product markets,
significant changes took place within the transport industry, some of
which were expected, some quite unexpected.  As will be seen the
impact on rail business was dramatic.  Because of the lifting of
restrictions on road, a price war between road and rail freight
operators broke out and freight rates declined for both modes of
transport.  Deregulation now permitted truckers to enter and leave
the road transport industry reasonably freely, so rates were
established by customers who used rate quotes to play one freight
operator off against another, encouraging the lowest cost/most
efficient operators to set the market price.  Indeed, such is the cost
structure for trucking that it comes close to being a perfectly
contested market.  Entry and exit are both at low cost.  The analysis
in this report treats road transport as a fully competitive industry
from 1988.
 
  Although competition and price declines occurred during the 1980’s
these intensified during the 1990’s, coinciding with the increased
importation of second hand trucks.
 The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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  Market Impacts Coupled with the price reductions, competition in long distance
traffic arose, i.e. traffic beyond 150 km.  As will be seen, both
tonnes and tonne-kilometres of freight carried by rail started
declining and both declining trends continued to the mid 1990’s.
Frith & Guria (1995)  suggest that during the period after
deregulation there was a shift in rail towards longer hauls with
evidence for this shown in increasing average haul distances.
 
  A more detailed analysis of the market and financial impact of
deregulation is described in section 4.2 of this report.
 
  To a somewhat lesser extent, coastal shipping also competes with
rail.  The New Zealand shipping industry has undergone a number
of changes during recent times. It has also faced different types of
intervention, for example, at one time Government regulation of
coastal shipping forced operators to use locally surveyed vessels,
and to employ New Zealand crews at local wage rates.  One notable
difference between land transport and sea however, is that shipping
has not always been subject to quantity regulations.
 
  Shipping Efficiency The restructuring of the ports and shipping industry has resulted in a
more competitive coastal shipping sector.   Staffing numbers of
coastal vessels dropping between 20-40% between 1989 and 1992
allowed real shipping rates to also drop and an increase in the
number of operators in the coastal shipping industry in the 1990’s
resulted.  It is estimated that there are about 10 different New
Zealand shipping operators involving around 19 vessels transporting
a range of general cargo, passengers, vehicles, petroleum products
and cement along New Zealand’s coasts.
 
  With the introduction of the 1995 Maritime Transport Bill, foreign
vessels coming to New Zealand in the normal course of their
business are able to carry goods and passengers between New
Zealand ports, adding yet another competitive layer to the coastal
shipping sector.  The volume shipped around the coast remained
static and has had a peculiar, largely unchanged composition.
Nevertheless as its shipments of coal exemplifies, coastal shipping
does provide a competitive discipline in a number of product
markets for both road and rail transport.  As with road transport,
entry and exit does not entail significant sunk costs and thus
provides viable actual and potential competition.
 
 
5.5 Use of Technology and Labour
  Rail Operations At the same time as transport deregulation was being implemented
the Board of New Zealand Rail commisioned a number of strategic,
marketing and operations studies.  The initial diagnostic review by
Booz, Allen & Hamilton (1983) (BAH) provides a summary of the
situation Rail were in with regard to their use of labour and
technology as compared to modern transport practices.  They
concluded that NZ rail would be seriously challenged by the
deregulation of the market in November and that the infrastructure,The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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equipment, work practices and staffing were at levels well in excess
of that required to meet the levels of business existing in 1983, or
that which could be expected in the future environment when the
company was no longer protected from competition in long-haul
traffic.
 
  Investments BAH also recommended that Rail invest in new infrastructure and
that they target improvement of their economic advantage, namely
their ability to move a large volume of freight per train on average.
 
  Recommendations Specific recommendations were as follows:
 
·  Significantly increase train sizes (which necessitated
investment in couplers, draft gear and passing loops).
·  Reduce the wagon fleet by nearly two thirds (requiring
investment in larger wagons and improving wagon utilisation).
·  Reduce the locomotive fleet by nearly one half.
·  Adjust the workshops to match the reduced workloads as a
result of less equipment to maintain.
·  Reduce rail freight staffing levels by approximately 40% from
more than 20,000.
As will be seen the impact of the changes on infrastructure and
labour was immense.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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6 ORGANISATIONAL REVIEW
Overview At the time of privatisation, NZ Rail was a Government owned
limited liability company, organised into lines of business for
managerial accountability.  The lines of business or business groups
had been used internally in one form or another since it was
reorganised in 1984.  This managerial reorganisation was the first
of several leading up to privatisation but it was probably the most
important.  Before a post-1983 review is undertaken, it is
appropriate to consider the long political and organisational history
that Rail has had in New Zealand.
The Organisational Structure of New Zealand Railways in
its First 120 Years
It is of more than passing interest to consider the organisational
structures of New Zealand railways from its earliest days. The re-
organisational changes that have taken place, the reasons for them,
and the outcomes are of direct utility in establishing the
counterfactual to privatisation.
5 Structures While for much of the past 120 years New Zealand rail has been a
government department under direct instruction of a minister, there
were 5 attempts at establishing a corporate, or management board
form. These were:
1889-1894 Railways Corporation
1925-1928 Railways Board of Management
1931-1936 Railways  Board
1953-1956 Railways  Commission
1983- Railways Corporation
The precise structure of the first four organisational entities are
described by Orr (1981) who draws out principles from his, and
others, examination of these corporate episodes. The setting up of
corporate structures was typically symptomatic of the state of the
railways. For example, Orr reports,
“In 1880 the Civil Service Commission produced a scathing report
on the Railways Department and it led to the setting up of a Royal
Commission to investigate these criticisms. The Royal
Commission’s recommendations included reductions in staff,
wages, train mileages and railway construction –”
1980 Review By 1980 the familiar pattern of the previous 100 years had emerged.
Deteriorating quality and financial position of the railways would
precipitate a review that typically concluded that the railways
should be run more as a business at arms length from political
influence. Following the review some corporate form would be put
in place that implemented recommendations.  But progress was not
maintained in part because of continuing political decision making,
and this was reflected in the abandonment of corporate forms at the
change of government.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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Cross Subsidies There were periods where the railways was used to cross-subsidise
a number of activities and was starved of maintenance resources. It
was generally subject to politically managed price control.  The
actual profitability of its core business over this period is difficult to
determine because of the price control and various uneconomic
activities that the railways were called upon to provide. But what is
clear is that it struggled to be financially viable, even though from
1933 it had statutory protection from competition from road
transport. Also, the evidence is that the reviews and subsequent
corporate forms all had the objective of making rail a viable
business.
Organisational  New Zealand railways has had episodes of organisational
Restructure restructuring and revitalised investment, maintenance and staffing,
in between which it has had a very bureaucratic structure that was
under direct political influence. The fact that the corporate forms did
not continue is indicative of unstable objectives for New Zealand
Railways in public ownership. On the basis of aggregate financial
data for the railways Orr (1981, p24 and 22) concludes that the
corporate forms, relative to departmental forms, had been a success,
but that their success and tenure was limited by their continued
political dominance. The 1983 Railways Corporation was
established after the period of Orr’s (1981) analysis. Because it was
never converted to a State Owned Enterprise (SOE) under the 1986
State Owned Enterprise Act but remained directly accountable to
the Minister of Transport until its sale in 1993, history seems to
have been repeating itself.  In respect of performance only, Rail was
required to report to the SOE minister.
Political Influence The history of New Zealand rail suggests that the political
connection has materially influenced rail’s performance and
inhibited attaining business performance objectives, except for
particular episodes. It also suggests that the reviews and corporate
episodes were in response to emerging problems and that they were
focussed on attaining a viable business: there is no emphasis in
these reviews placed on expanding the political, or social tasks rail
was providing. This strongly suggests that where rail is not to carry
political tasks, but is to perform at its core business that its best
chance of success is for it to be separated from political control as
much as possible.
In short, history tells us that past indifferent financial performance
of New Zealand rail has occurred despite prohibitions on entry to
certain rail markets.  It resulted from price control and from poor
performance of the core business, independently of any non-
business tasks it was required to carry out. It also indicates that
corporate forms have improved performance but they have not been
sustainable under government ownership. There is no reason
whatsoever, to assume that the future under government ownership
would be any different.  The SOE model is the most determined
attempt this century by the government to establish well-functioning
state-owned businesses.  While the model is not fully tested, the
political connection and monitoring issues remain for these entities.
The history of rail will influence the choice of counterfactual to
privatisation.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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NZ Rail Corporation 1983 to 1990
BAH Report The 1983 Booz Allen report had highlighted the weaknesses of the
“pre-lines of business structure” where three senior officers
reported to the General Manager and were responsible for a range
of activities rather than specific outcomes.  BAH maintained that
the impending road transport deregulation required a structure with
less political involvement and a commercial focus.  The following
managerial structure was set up inside the Crown Corporation legal
structure that had existed from 1982.













Accountability The 1984 changes were significant in the context of a report such as
this because they overcame many of the managerial accountability
issues that can cause inefficient economic performance in public
enterprises.  In terms of the “performance improving formula” that
is applied to public corporations, the 1984 managerial changes
delivered improved internal performance from a business point of
view, 10 years ahead of the ownership changes.  The 1984 changes
not only allowed the business lines to focus on markets and their
own specific performance but also encouraged the management of
network operations to focus on the significant performance
improvements that were required by the Booz Allen report to be
delivered from that part of the business.
Unfortunately, management’s understanding of and reaction to the
deregulation of the freight market was inadequate. They could do
little for nearly 10 years to halt the decline in market share and
financial performance.
Transfer Pricing Market segment orientated business groups inside RailFreight
Systems were formed in 1988 to focus more sharply on the market
share losses in particular markets.  To improve performance
business groups transfer priced their services out to each other and
were accountable for their “contribution” to the Corporation.  While
transfer pricing arrangements are often expensive and distracting inThe Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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these circumstances, they were probably useful in directing
managerial behaviour towards meeting customer needs and placing
pressure on individual and group performance.  For market and
operational reasons, other internal changes were made to the
management structure in the period to 1990 but none were as
significant as the full corporatisation that took place at that time.
NZ Rail Corporation 1990 Onwards
The Core Business The 1990 corporatisation represented the culmination of a number
of reviews, that considered operational, financial and organisational
dimensions. The basic need to be more responsive to the market and
to have an efficient rail operation drove the changes.  With
privatisation a possibility, work had been undertaken by
government and company management to identify the “core”
business of the railways and it was these freight moving functions
that formed the basis of NZ Rail Limited.  InterIsland services as
well as both long distance and local passenger rail services were
also included in the new company.  Non core business such as
property, buses and parcels were left in the Railway Corporation as
was ownership of the land the rails sat on.  The legal restructure of
1990 followed with a financial restructuring that saw accumulated
debts of $1billion retained in the old Rail Corp, a write down of the
asset values into the new “books” of NZ Rail Ltd and an equity
injection of $360m into the company.
Business Groups By 1993 the structure of NZ Rail Ltd had narrowed into two market
groups and an operations group that ran the network as a cost
centre.  Individual business lines inside the Freight Group were
responsible for their direct costs and resulting financial contribution
to the overall group and transfer pricing as a measurement device
was scrapped.  Legally, NZ Rail Ltd. was unchanged, and until
1993 it remained as a crown owned company.   At the time of
privatisation in 1993 managerial accountability was organised as
follows:






Rail Passenger  Operations Corporate
Chief ExecutiveThe Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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CEO The NZ Rail Chief Executive was responsible to a Board of
Directors, appointed by the Government as shareholder.  With the
NZ Rail Ltd. structure there was much less direct political
involvement, however the rail business was still subject to intense
scrutiny by government agencies and could not function
independently, even as an SOE under the State Owned Enterprise
Act.
Private Owners Following the ownership change in 1993, the name NZ Rail Ltd
and this managerial accountability structure were retained by the
new owners until 1995 when a “re-branding” of the services
supplied by the business units was implemented to change the
company’s image.  At that time the name Tranz Rail NZ Ltd. was
adopted, followed by the IPO of Tranz Rail shares.  The basic
business units were retained for competitive reasons (see 4.2.2
below) and the Cook Strait ferry service was established as a stand-
alone business unit responsible for running that service.  Within
each business line, the service offerings were organised under the
following structure.  Each service is in effect a stand-alone
marketing unit accountable for its directly controllable financial
performance and with its own customers.  The operations group
continues to manage the rail network as a cost centre and rail ferry












Passenger  Operations InterIsland Line Corporate
CEO
Management Accountability and Culture
Incentives The impact of deregulation on rail from 1983 was significant in
terms of market and financial outcomes but deregulation also had a
major impact on how the business was managed.  It is fair to record
that management was seemingly unprepared for competition and
that it took them too long to seize control of their destiny.  In the
context of privatisation arguments and the lack of incentives on
public managers to set and achieve strategic goals, it is useful to
consider why it took so long for rail management to grasp the 1983
deregulation.
The following table summarises the structural evolution of rail and
considers a number of factors that are useful when reviewing
managerial accountability.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
24
Structural Evolution of Rail
Government Dept NZ  Rail Corp NZ  Rail Ltd Tranz Rail
Dates pre 1982 1983 - 1989 1990 - 1993 1994 -
Strategy unknown reactive prepare f or privatisationshareholder value
Legal Status ? Crown Corp Limited liability Private Company
Control Structure Minister is boss Minister still boss Treasury watches Markets monitor
Political Influence Very High High Arms length Limited
Internal Structure Functional Business groups Core Business f ocus Marketing Units
Management Focus Internal/technical Restructuring Survival Customers
Product Markets Controlled Entry Deregulation Contestable Competitive
Decision Making Controlled Controlled Limited delegation Full delegation
Political Input In the period prior to NZ Rail Ltd. formation in 1990 there was a
great deal of political involvement in the rail business and
management did not have the incentives to get on and manage it in
a commercial way.  In noting the significant deterioration in the
financial outlook, the company in the 1986 business plan stated:
“The general reasons for this situation have their origins in the
former trading department, and since 1982, a Corporation, which
was nominally commercially orientated, being subjected to
Government policy totally at variance with this objective”.
These political constraints included both the delegation of financial
authority and the New Zealand Railway’s Corporation Act 1981.  In
a repetition of four attempts since 1880, the 1986 Strategic Plan
mooted a charter that formally set out relationships between the
Corporation and the Government.  Included was a proposal to
increase the financial delegation limits to the Corporation and a
review of the New Zealand Railway’s Corporation Act 1981, which
included staffing procedures. The Corporation felt that the system
of wage fixing to which it was subject was inappropriate when it
was acting as a profit making organisation rather than a government
service department, and that the system was hindering the
implementation of policies relating to procedural changes and staff
reductions.
It is clear from interviews conducted as part of this review that the
frustrations with the involvement of politicians in Rail Corp were
felt as much at Board level as with the management.  From 1988
several directors became quite active in promoting privatisation as a
way of distancing Rail from those pressures.
Managers It is interesting to reflect on the senior managers who led rail
through the period from 1988 to post privatisation and the
considerable number of new managers who were imported to Rail,
almost all of them after the sale to private owners.  Only Tranz Rail
CEO Francis Small, who was pivotal to the restructure and sale, and
Murray King, who was equally influential, remain as senior
managers in 1998.  A number of managers were bought into key
positions after the sale. Since privatisation several senior managers
who were in Rail from 1988 have left while other managers such as
CFO Ron Russ have been brought in to manage specialist areas.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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7 MARKETS AND COMPETITION
Competition The existence of competitive pressure, in some form or other, on
rail is central to the analysis of effects of privatisation.  An active
and competitive product market is as important to the success of a
privatisation as is making the organisation transparent to the capital
and managerial markets.
Pre 1983 Prior to 1983 the market for moving freight was segmented by
regulation and Railways did not have to compete inside their long
distance market.  They did not bother about formal segmentation;
they just moved commodities for customers.  After deregulation
however Rail had to identify where its advantages lay and different
market pressures forced them to decide which segments to focus on,
and, as will be seen, they were forced to target their efforts to
survive.  Because of this critical fact, the targeted market segments
are identified and taken to the market analysis in stage 1 of this
review that is to be carried through to the stage 2 welfare analysis if
that stage proceeds. Stage 2 needs to be done at this level of detail
to identify the gains and losses from privatisation.
Segmentation A review of the freight market has identified that the market for
long haul freight movements, making up 70% of Tranz Rail
revenues, has 5 fundamental characteristics that identify
3 segments, as shown in the following table.  They are all long haul
markets but with different characteristics.
Tranz Rail’s tighter market focus in the 1990’s has seen them
manage in recognition of these segments.  Examples of this can be
seen in operational areas where;
1  it provides specialist trains by segment,
2  it established marketing units to manage the demands of
customers in each segment and
3  it improved data recording and analysis to understand and
respond to segment demands and performance.
 
  Quite clearly these segments are not rigidly structured but they have
evolved over time as Tranz Rail’s understanding of segment
characteristics has matured and as the market has evolved under
competition.  Also, as will be seen, the value and volume of
business in these segments have changed, as a result of changes to
technology, demand and relative prices.
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  Rail Freight Market Characteristics
 
 










 - minerals less
important




 - import mixed - often at 1
 - export important containers & >300km end to customer very small
 - agriculture break bulk premises
Door-to-Door
 - wholesale often at both
 - retail critical smaller loads 500 to 800km ends to higher
 - refrigerated customer (inc door rail)
 - Kombi door
 
  Passengers The passenger business is easier to analyse, it naturally segments
itself into simple passenger movements: long distance by rail,
suburban by rail and InterIsland by Cook Strait ferries.  Both
market and welfare analysis will be completed on that basis.
Because of the nature of these markets there is little substitution
between them.
 
  Market  Evolution The time dimension is also important in this analysis and the
evolution of Rail over the period of this review falls naturally into 3




Phase M arket Outcome T ranzRai l Outcome




Rail survival 89 to 93 med growth, costs fell
overall, some segmentation
focus on understanding the
market & survival
Privatised 94 to 97 higher growth, segmentation focus on volume growth and
valueby segment
 
  Deregulation affected market and financial outcomes in the period
to 1988 when Rail was in a financial crisis caused mostly by their
exposure to competition.  Political influence also played a part in
railway’s inability to deal with the competitive impacts.  In 1988
they did recognise their plight and determined the only way to
survival was to focus absolutely on the market segments that they
had advantage in and to restructure their finances and the
organisation in a way that enabled targeting customer requirements
in these segments.   Documented evidence from both business plans
and other papers show that the objective of privatisation was also
accepted by the company in that year.  Their objective was met in
1993 when NZ Rail Ltd. was sold and the privatised period 1994 to
1997 is obviously a phase in its own right.
 
  Coastal Shipping On a strict tonnage measurement basis, compared to rail and road, a
large amount of freight is moved by coastal shipping.  Coastal
shipping volumes have been stable between 12 and 14 million




tonnes 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Rail 8.9 8.6 8.3 8.7 8.5 9.4 9.6 10.3 11.5
Coastal
Shipping 13.6 14.5 13.3 13.8 14.3 14.3 13.2
 
  The tonnage carried on coastal ships could be seen as direct
competition to Rail particularly in the coal and other goods
categories.  While coastal shipping will offer price discipline for
rail, the nature of the freight moved by sea is quite specialised and
has a consistency in the mix of commodities moved over time.  It is
excluded from the market share calculations for Tranz Rail.
 
 
  Commodity Mix % - Coastal Shipping (tonnage)






  Motor Vehicles
  Containers


















  Note that more recent data than 1992 is not available
 
  It is well known that even the threat of entry can discipline market
pricing [Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982)].  There are not
significant sunk costs to entry and exit of coastal shipping. It carries
more tonnage of long-haul outputs than does rail albeit that there is
some specialisation in product (see petroleum).  Thus, coastal
shipping will provide an important ceiling on pricing of rail freight
and may explain why the real price of all rail products have moved
downwards since the mid 1980’s.  In an actively contestable market
it could be expected that market share would be volatile over time.
The stability of coastal shipping’s products suggests that there are
intrinsic characteristics, such as location, that provide
differentiation between rail and shipping.  Nevertheless rail pricing
is constrained by the efficiency of coastal shipping.
 
 
  1983 to 1988 - Deregulation
 
  Pre 1983 Prior to deregulation in 1983, Rail had the market for transporting
freight over longer distance substantially to itself.  Market segment
analysis of the 1983 to 1988 period is a little more difficult than in
later periods due to the shortage of data and the undifferentiated
approach to the market that Rail had at that time.  Market share
estimates and overall output measure comparisons are the best
information that are available for analysis of this period.
 
  Market Share Market share was, and still is, difficult to measure in the freight
business, mostly because of the lack of a common unit of output
across the industry but also because of the lack of record keepingThe Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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and the unwillingness to share information on the part of the
trucking industry.  The only data on trucking are surveys that are
carried out for specific purposes and do not easily permit
comparison over time.    Because detailed road transport data is not
available for this period, use is made of the Statistics New Zealand
Enterprise Survey, which reports industry revenue data rather than
output volume but is none-the-less an adequate indicator of relative
share.
 
  That data puts rail share of the total freight market at greater than
30% in 1980 and it portrays a short haul market dominated by road
transport that was, in revenue terms, about twice the size of the Rail
dominated long distance market.  By 1988, and still mostly in the
long haul business, rail had lost nearly a third of its freight business
in a very short time.  This is measured by share; the absolute
amount lost is clearly less.
 
  Using the cited Statistics New Zealand revenue data, analysis
reveals a decline in rail freight revenue (in constant $) versus an
increase in road revenues.  This simple comparison highlights the
dramatic real market share loss that rail experienced in the 1980’s.
 
  Outputs - Volume Overall freight market size (and share in later periods) have been
estimated using data on the tonne kilometers purchased from
NZLTSA as road user charges.  The data is adjusted for both truck
utilisation over time and the average tare weight of trucks to
calculate a net tonne kilometer that can be compared to rail NTK’s
(Number, Tonnes Kilometres). It is now accepted that the NZLTSA
data of road user charges understates the actual tonne-kilometers
travelled by trucks, with estimates of the understatement put as high
as 12% (this figure is from a study by the NZLTSA in 1997).
Although road user charges were implemented in 1984 detailed data
is only available from 1986 onwards.  It shows a sharp expansion in
market size took place in 1988 and that road transport share grew.





Market Size (m NTK) 10,700 10,800 11,800
Growth % - +1.3 +8.7
Rail Share % 28.5 26.9 24.8
Rail Growth % - -4.6 +0.4
  While rail freight volumes by market segment are not available
from that period, there was a real decline in both revenue per unit of
output  and tonnes of freight carried indicating that the market
pressure may well have been felt across all of Rail’s market
segments.  During this period, PPI adjusted, cents/NTK declined by
more than 11% per year and tonnage fell by 4% pa.
 
  From 1983 to 1988 both the rail passenger and the SeaRail freight
and passenger businesses grew by an average 4% in volume.
Despite this real revenues fell, by an average 9% in rail passengers
and were largely unchanging for the Searail business.  Within these
results, the number of commercial vehicles on the ferries doubledThe Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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over the period but in real terms revenues from that source declined
as price pressure was felt here as well as in the rail freight business.




  Market Surveys Market survey material from that time shows just how sensitive the
market was to freight rates; with up to 75% of customers stating
that they would move to other transport modes if rail rates were
increased by up to 10%.  Interpretation of these figures would no
doubt be confounded by the incentives of the customers being
surveyed.  Despite this there was a strong perception conveyed by
the market surveys that road was a better mode of transport with
shorter transit times, better “service” (door to door etc) and a higher
standard of care for the goods being carried.
 
 
  Segmentation Despite the increased competitive pressure it was not until the latter
part of the 1983 - 1988 period that Rail Corp started to take a
segmented-marketing approach to freight customers, especially to
determine what influenced customer decisions to use road, rail or
sea for freight movements.  Rail’s targetting of customers via
marketing units in the freight lines of business and by their newly
formed corporate strategy unit was a significant step.  As will be
seen, it eventually led to the business units being both “commodity”
and customer focussed and recognised that a small number of base
customers dominated (and continue to do so to an even larger
extent) rail’s revenues.
 
  Price changes were implemented in a targeted way within some of
the segments where rail felt they were able to improve revenues but,
while short term revenue improvements occurred, the changes were
not sustainable and downwards pressure on volume and price
continued.
 
  The market segmentation analysis from here on is structured to
provide a review of changes to market characteristics (train size,
speed etc); that in turn gave rise to changes in market outcomes
(overall volumes, shares and price levels).  The market outcomes
generate in turn a strategic response from rail, which is then
reviewed along with rail’s own outcomes (revenues, etc).  The
segmentation structure is demonstrated in the following flow of
goods diagram.
 
  This framework is appropriate for describing how inputs and
outputs varied in both value and composition during the period but
is most useful in describing how the market characteristics
identified earlier come together as segments that can be measured
for size and scope. Unfortunately rail did not see its markets in this
way in 1983 and data are not available to describe the segments
until 1988.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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  For confidentiality reasons this diagram cannot show the actual data on the
size and scope of each segment that has been used to compare and analyse
segment performance over time.
 
  Market Awareness It is however quite clear that the analytical work done in the
1983/88 period was the beginning of rail management’s
understanding of the sensitivities of the sources of freight market
share and financial performance.  The overall market and financial
information was assembled and analysed in an expanded corporate
strategy unit where an awareness was growing of just how fragile
the future of Rail Corporation was, given the way the market was
emerging and Rail’s deteriorating financial performance. (see
section 4.2.4).  Specific, market segment focussed processes were
developed in the newly formed business units where the detailed
business analysis was undertaken and the customer relationships
were managed.
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  Costs 1983 - 1988 It was not until 1986, when BAH conducted an in-depth analysis of
road transport economics, that rail had other than limited data
available on the costs of the road transport sector that they
competed with.  Deregulation and various tariff changes provided
for a continuous reduction to the real core costs of owning and
running a truck while the (increasingly) variable nature of the costs
of the truck business allowed firms to quickly adjust their cost
structures to changes in both market conditions and to technology.
Changes to the vehicle weight regulations, especially the increase in
gross vehicle weight to 44 tonnes, facilitated the development of
larger tonnage long haul trucks and trailers during this period.
 
  The following table highlights the variable nature of truck costs vs.
the high cost of wages that NZ rail suffered at that time.  Truck
operators, fuel, road user charges and drivers' wages were entirely
influenced by distance travelled.  Therefore truckers sought to make
as much of their costs variable to distance while rail was saddled
with more than half of their costs being fixed.
 
  Costs as % of Revenue
 
  Truck Costs   Rail Costs
  Costs   1984   1985   1987   1988
  Fuel   16.1   16.3   13.1   7.0
  Road Use
Charges
  8.4   10.9   11.2   0
  Maintainence   15.7   15.0   14.1   8.0
  Wages   25.8   23.7   31.5   56.0
  Dep’n/Finance   13.0   10.4   15.6   8.0
  Other   18.0   20.8   12.6   21.0
  Total   97.00   97.10   98.10   100.00
 
 
  Interestingly, from the limited data available, it seems that trucks
did not suffer the same decline in revenue per unit of output during
1984 – 1988 and it was not until the late 1980’s early 1990’s that
the real rate for trucks started to fall; whereas the real cents per
NTK of output for rail did fall an average 6% pa during the 5 year
period to 1988.  Trucking was expanding both market size as well
as its share and, based on the perception of better service it seems
that customers were willing to pay a premium for road transport.  It
is also possible that the reductions in real freight rates were a




  Quality of Service There is little evidence available to shed light as to whether or not
rail had any understanding of the factors that influence customers’
perceptions of their service quality.  Limited survey work was done
and this revealed that customers’ service concerns were limited to
price, knowing the location of their goods, and responsiveness.  The
issue of timing that was later revealed as important to all customers
and critical to some was not especially visible at that time.
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  1989 to 1993 - Rail Restructuring
 
  Two Factors In this period two factors directly affected both Rail Corp’s
competitive position and their performance.  One was the focussed
marketing effort that led to segmentation of the freight market and
which was substantially led by non-rail management people brought
in for that reason.  The other factor was the 1990 restructuring of
the “core” rail business into NZ Rail Ltd.  There is documented
evidence that, from early in 1989, the Board had decided on a
possible path to privatisation which would need market share
stability and a competitive position for rail if the business was to be
sustainable and the sale value maximised for the Government.
 
  Despite the market changes in the 1980’s that led to the growth in
other categories of revenue, freight still accounted for more than
60% of Rail’s revenue in 1989 and after the NZ Rail Ltd split in
1990, when property, buses and other non-core business revenues
stayed with the old Rail Corp, freight made up more than 70% of
NZ Rail revenue.  That is still the case 8 years later.
 
 
  Market Segmentation - Rail Freight
 
  Regulation By 1989 the direct regulation of road transport was all but complete
however a number of environmental factors did have an on-going
and significant impact on the freight movement business, more
especially on road transport.  Long distance road fees had been
removed in 1988.  Restructuring of truck, tyre and diesel tariffs had
resulted in a lower cost of ownership ... estimates show capital
prices were down 33%, diesel down 43% and operationally truck
utilisation was up 14% (source: BAH 1989 competitive analysis).
One of the direct results of this was the emergence of highly
efficient truck operators especially on the Wellington - Auckland
run.  Interestingly, Rail were advised by BAH that, given the last of
the structural changes, market equilibrium would be reached by
1991 and both market share losses and freight rates would stabilise
quite quickly at about the same time.  Quite clearly this did not turn
out to be the case.
 
  Tonnage Mix In a substantial portion of their market, Rail should have an
advantage over trucks, particularly where the need is to move large
loads of basic commodities over longer distances and handling is
minimal.  Its advantage of moving large loads over longer distances
with little handling in between is a characteristic of the rail freight
business and is captured in the market structure and segmentation
analysis described earlier.  That is what railways have traditionally
been meant to be good at.
 
  The mix of tonnage types is a good indicator of whether rail has a
strong focus on those segments where they have this advantage as
opposed to diversifying by moving other types of freight.  Analysis
shows that, over this period, their mix of goods moved is
increasingly dominated by bulk goods; coal, forestry goods and
minerals.  Overall their tonnage was stable at about 8.5m tonnesThe Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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during the period, though the volume of both export and
distribution goods declined by more than 10%.
 
 
  Length of Haul Another indicator of change in the basic market structure is the
distance over which the goods are hauled.  Although it is partly a
function of the tonnage mix, it may also reflect the traditional
economic advantage rail has in being able to move larger loads over
longer distances that is highlighted in the segmentation.  The Bulk
Goods segment, made up of Bulk Freight and Forestry was stable at
a little under 300km per haul, the Cargo Flow export business fell a
little to about 300km and the Distribution business which is
substantially door to door freight increased haul distance to more
than 600km.  Quite clearly the movement of bulk goods from
source to sink is a different business than distribution where most




  Train Size & Speed Two factors useful in understanding the “load size” aspect of the
market as well as the productivity of rail are train size and speed.  If
rail is moving more bulk goods in a world of declining real unit
revenues it needs increasingly efficient ways of doing that to stay in
business.  Bigger, faster trains are one simple way of achieving this
and rail seems to have moved quite quickly to capture gains from
faster train speeds.
 
  Although net train size had been increasing slowly from
approximately 260 tonnes in 1980 it does not seem to have
contributed to a significant change to the shape of the freight
market in the 1989/93 period.  Of more importance is the steady
and significant increase that is seen with freight train speeds.
Stimulated by the growing market need for timeliness and
efficiency, Rail Corp. used a combination of technology changes
(changing 4 wheel wagons for bogie wheels) infrastructure
developments (welded rails and more passing bays), to push speeds
up and improve train utilisation.  (See section 4.2.3 for a detailed
analysis of investment in performance)
 
 
  Costs Incremental or directly avoidable costs by segment, split out by
train running, terminal and replacement capital costs will also have
an important influence on how rail is able to compete in various
segments.  Each segment requires rail to focus on different costs,
for example while it appears that train running costs were reduced
through operational efficiencies such as faster bigger trains, over
this period terminal costs (handling costs that are labour intensive)
also seemed to be reduced through both operational processes and
investment in lower cost facilities.  These improvements appear as
increased capital replacement costs, but should lower overall
incremental costs.  Overall Rail Corp. invested successfully in both
operational and capital improvements.
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  Train running and terminal costs both fell overall but investments
particularly in improved wagons led to an increase in the capital
cost element.
 
  Service Quality During this period Rail introduced the TQM approach to the
management of service quality.  The emphasis was on gaining
acceptance of TQM as a company wide philosophy and senior
managers were “trained” in the approach.  TQM fitted with their
marketing strategy of customer focussed management and
reinforced their awareness of service as an important factor in
customers’ decisions to use rail.  They collected a limited range of
specific quality measures designed to allow service performance to
be managed.
 
  Service quality measures for freight were quite limited, with data on
derailments, temporary speed restrictions and timeliness of priority
freight as the only quantitative evidence of attention to service
performance.
 
  A range of data on the timeliness of passenger service was collected
during this period though the data are not complete and therefore
are of limited use.
 
 
  Rail Corporation - Strategic Market Segmentation
 
  1988 Reorganisation As was seen in section 4.2.1, late in 1988 Rail Corp had been
internally reorganised into market specific business groups
(primarily Railfreight, Passenger and InterIsland) with the
substantial Railfreight group further segmented into market
segment business areas and a freight operations group that ran the
network.  This management structure allowed the freight group to
focus on both the commodities carried and customers served by
each segment.
 
  Marketing analysis conducted in 1989 showed that Tranz Rail's
share of the market was dominated by the transport of a very small
number of commodities for a small number of customers.  They
were squeezed between the power of their customers and the threat
of road and coastal shipping transport as substitutes in the areas
where they could be expected to look for improvements in market
share.  In 1989 it was estimated that 200 customers produced 90%
of their revenue (this concentration had narrowed to 47% from 10
customers in 1995), and it was this understanding that Rail Corp.
needed to be customer centric, seems to have brought their
marketing strategy into sharper focus from that time.
 
  Account Strategy It was in response to this knowledge that Rail Corp., late in 1989,
developed and implemented a targeted customer strategy.  Their
strategic approach here was more to reduce ongoing market risk and
improve both net revenues and volume growth, than to continue to
directly cut costs further.  This is a very important change in focus
because up to this time they had mostly concentrated on making the
company productive and cost efficient.
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  Their customer strategy had a number of complementary tactics.
These are described in what follows.
 
  Pricing Strategy In 1989 Tranz Rail also introduced a structured pricing strategy
using a two tiered approach to pricing whereby the competitive
environment sets the base price and “linkage” to NZR sets the
ability to charge a premium.  They saw targeted price increases as
valid revenue opportunities and increased prices twice in 1989; 5%
early in the year and a further 6.5% later on.  They clearly felt that,
assuming stability was around the corner, and that they needed to
take charge of their competitive future to meet their medium term
privatisation objectives.  These price changes were inappropriate
for the market conditions.
 
  Yield Management After the restructuring in 1990 that established NZ Rail Ltd., an
innovative revenue yield management programme was developed to
maximise revenues of containerised traffic.  This seems to be the
beginnings of rail’s targeted competitive approach and this
particular innovation has developed into their current Distribution
line of business that has been able to compete and grow and charge
a premium rate over straight container loads.   This service offering
has a set of characteristics, including part load handling, secure
transport and storage that provide distribution customers with a
quality that alternatives do not provide.
 
 
  Market Outcomes
 
  Market Size Overall the total freight market size did not grow significantly until
1992 when an estimated 9.5% annual growth was recorded,
signalling the end of the recession that New Zealand had
experienced for 4 years.  Again market size has been estimated
using data on road user charges, and shows the following market
dimensions for the period to 1993.  Of importance here is the strong
growth in the overall market NTK’s late in the period against
declining or small growth in Rail NTK’s.
 
  While the NTK estimation technique is not accurate enough to be
totally confident of the absolute value of the growth rates, the trend
of overall flat rail growth against a positive market growth




1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Market Size (m NTK) 11,900 12,350 12,300 13,500 15,800
Growth % +1.7 +3.2 -0.1 +9.5 +17.1
Rail Share % 22.1 22.2 19.2 18.3 15.8
Rail Growth % -9.7 +3.9 -13.8 +4.7 +1.0
 
  Market Share Prior to 1990, two different estimation methods for  market share
had been used by Rail to assess their market position. As before
they had used Statistics New Zealand’s AES data, which indicates
that rail’s share had stabilised at a low of 15% by 1990 when that
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and was no longer used.  To improve their estimates Rail
implemented a new approach in 1990 that used a model of inter-
regional freight movements.  Estimates from this method show a
1990 market share of 19% compared to 15% from the AES data,
and only small declines through to 1992 when the last of these new
estimates was completed.  Neither of these methods are comparable
over a long enough period of time to be that informative, nor do
they show what is felt to be the real trend, an ongoing decline in
rail’s share.
 
  ISCR Method The ISCR method of estimating market share that is described on
page 30, uses data to estimate market share, i.e.; an analysis of road
user statistics and truck utilisation data from RTA surveys, it is
believed that rail’s share of the NTK’s of the freight market has
declined steadily since the late 1980’s and is in fact much lower
than was previously thought.  The decline is particularly apparent
when viewing the strong growth in road NTK’s, up an average
8.7% pa 1989 through to 1993, while rail freight NTK’s declined by
3% pa in the same period.  While this is valuable trend information
it should be used with caution  for an analysis of levels.
Unfortunately the lack of a common unit of output and data
availability makes more certain market share estimates quite
difficult.
 
  From this and other data it seems that the nature of truck
competition did not change. Truck industry surveys indicate that the
real revenue per unit of output was stable for much of the period but
as already noted, capacity grew very strongly towards the end of
this period, as did utilisation of the truck fleet.  It seems that road
could offer a more attractive service, based on a competitive price
and therefore the market growth simply went to road and, quite
simply, rail’s overall market share fell as a result.
 
  Freight Volumes Rail’s own rail freight volumes, both tonnages and NTK’s were flat,
but this disguises some interesting changes within the individual
market segments Analysis of rail’s NTK’s (these capture both
distance and load) show that the bulk goods commodities, coal for
instance, increased a little while volumes of export goods fell by a
small amount.  In contrast to these changes, the output of
distribution goods fell through to 1991 after which a strong growth
in NTK’s can be seen.    The economy was not strong for most of
the period, it was in recession until June 1992 but started on a
strong growth cycle from late in 1992.  While any direct link
between rail’s performance and the New Zealand domestic
economy would be weak in the bulk and export transport segments,
the movement of distribution goods could well be affected by the
macro economy and this would therefore flow on to Rail’s freight
business.  This latter point is reinforced by the fact that during this
period truck capacity, represented by road user charges, changed
little but, as mentioned above, it grew strongly from 1992.  The link
between rail’s performance and international business cycles may
not be weak in that certain bulk commodities are very susceptible to
the price and quantity change in international markets.
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  Unit revenue  Unit revenues (in cents per NTK) for each segment is a more
informative performance indicator than simple revenues.  Both the
bulk goods and export segments for instance had unchanging to
increasing volumes but declines in c/NTK which suggests that real
price reductions were necessary to maintain volume.  The only
segment to show growth in unit revenues of any magnitude was
distribution goods, which later became Tranz Rail’s Distribution
business.  Here rail managed to increase the real unit value of the
business with unchanging volumes.  Three factors contributed to
growth in this sector; firstly the service value to the customer
improved through rail including door-to-door capability, secondly
warehousing services were provided and thirdly a high value long
haul refrigeration capability was added during this period.  Also of
note within the distribution segment is the decline in output volume
and value of the freight forwarding business, remember that this is
the long haul component of the freight fowarding market that is
dominated by trucks.
 
  Passenger Market The involvement of New Zealand Rail in the business of moving
passengers in the period 1989 to 1993 changed dramatically.
Firstly, a substantial portion of Rail Corp’s Passenger Group
business was either left with Rail Corporation in 1990 as a result of
the NZ Rail Ltd. restructuring, or it was sold to private ownership
(e.g.: buses).  These decisions were implemented as a result of
various strategic reviews and of the deteriorating market position of
their rail passenger business.
 
  During the 1980’s the number of passengers that Rail Corp moved,
both long distance and short, had remained fairly stable.  Suburban
rail passengers peaked at nearly 16 million in 1986 while long
distance demand was stable between 800 and 900,000 pa.  By 1993
however, suburban passenger numbers had declined to just 10
million and long distance passenger numbers had more than halved
to less than 400,000.
 
  The increase in the number of second hand cars imported during
this period likely contributed to this decline, the following data on
used car imports shows a sharp increase that coincides with the
decline in rail passengers.



































































  source: Statistics NZ Yearbook 1987.
 
  InterIslander Despite these rail passenger numbers, numbers on the InterIslander
increased by nearly 40% throughout 1988-93, to more than 900,000
in 1993.  This result was particularly notable as it was achieved
during a period of recession in the economy and after a period of
low growth in InterIslander demand during the mid to late 80’s.  In
tandem with the growth in passengers, Rail’s InterIsland
commercial vehicle traffic grew more than 30% in this period
alongside a growth in their own freight tonnage of less than 10%.
The growth in commercial freight volumes coincides with the
strong growth in road transport capacity, totalling 40% over the 5
years that occurred towards the end of the period 1988-93.   In real
terms ‘external’ revenues on the InterIslander were unchanging,
however as a result of the 1990 structural change, a change was
made to InterIslander performance reporting and it has not been
possible to recreate a Rail Corp to NZ Rail Ltd. comparison of
commercial and freight business.
 
  Prices for all InterIslander services fell in real terms, suggesting that
there has been some pressure from alternative modes of transport.
 
 
  1994 to 1997 - Post Privatisation
 
  This period was notable for 2 events; market share stopped falling
for the first time in 10 years and in real terms revenue grew, again
for the first time in 10 years.
 
 
  Market Segmentation - Rail Freight
 
  Regulation ended The deregulation of the freight business was well concluded by the
time NZ Rail Ltd. was sold in 1994.  Road User charges that had
been implemented in 1984, and had remained unchanged, were
revised in 1996 into a 2-tier price structure that was targeted at
being revenue neutral.  There were no impediments to competition.
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  Tonnage Mix The tonnage mix in this period reflects Tranz Rail’s strategy
targeted at both yield management and operational efficiencies
through economies of scale.  The mix is now increasingly
dominated by larger tonnages of bulk goods driven by growth in
that segment.
 
  Average Haul Average haul is stable, with both bulk and export goods averaging
about 300km.  The average haul of goods in the distribution area
showed a decline, in contrast to the small rise seen prior to
privatisation.
 
  Train Size & Speed Train size and speed are also interesting to compare with the
previous period.  Whereas train speed increased significantly
(+20%) in the period to 1993, it has not gone up much since then. It
is probably not possible to improve speed further without
significant investment.  Train size has continued the 1989/93 trend
and increased a little following privatisation, as Tranz Rail fine
tunes yield management aimed at improving net revenues from
market segments.  However, net train size has been reasonably
stable for the last 3 years.
 
  Costs Costs for train running continue to fall with significant reductions
apparent in the bulk and export goods segments.  Terminal and
capital replacement costs for distribution goods have increased as
market needs dictate.  Terminal costs for bulk goods have been
reduced significantly.
 
  Service Quality In 1996 Tranz Rail implemented a programme of measuring and
managing a range of operational indicators that have been identified
as important to service quality.  Time series data are not available




·  Average time delay per train
·  InterIslander delays - arrival and departures
·  Wagon Utilisation
·  Claims against Rail
Time series data are available for a continuation of the indicators
previously identified;
target ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97
Passenger Service Performance - Timekeeping
TranzScenic
% on time 70 52 53 52 39 41 56
% within 10 mins 95 75 73 69 60 72 80
InterIslander
Arrivals within 5 mins 68 100 61 70
Freight Service Performance
M a i n l i n e  D e r a i l m e n t s 6 24 86 37 85 37 1
Speed delay-mins 13870 12246 46542 20347 10100The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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These data are variable and they are not informative of the
characteristics that matter directly to the customer.  For instance
they do not indicate the extent to which Tranz Rail’s specification
of being within +/- 15 minutes of the planned delivery time for
priority distribution freight is met.
Stability Overall it seems the period was one of stability compared to the
market upheaval of previous periods; with markets steadily getting
more competitive at the fringes.  It seems that Tranz Rail have
found their areas (market segments) of competitive advantage and
are managing them very efficiently.  The only issue is that of
longer-term sustainability as unit revenues decline and margins are
eroded as more of their costs become fixed.  Customers have
continued to place pressure on Rail for price/quality trade-offs and
the competition inside the distribution business and outside their
other nominated segments is quite intense.
Tranz Rail Strategic Approach
Focus
Overall the focus of the new owners has been on yield management;
that is, optimising the price/volume mix in the market place as well
as implementing refinements in the operations of the railway to
improve productivity and customer service.
Its 1995 prospectus states that its perception that it is moving from
being a key provider of low cost line haul to a provider of
integrated transport services.  Its well-defined marketing strategy
has been targeted at keeping the freight revenues growing by
managing the price element of the marketing mix and lifting the
level of service it offers to its customers.  It sees long term growth
in the freighting of bulk commodities such as coal and forestry and,
in the immediate future, in the distribution of goods that have
traditionally been handled by trucks.  It sees its competitive
advantages in this segment as its ability to move larger volumes
over longer distances in conjunction with efficient door-to-door
service that distribution customers require.  Tranz Rail has invested
in trucking capability to meet these requirements and since 1992
has (part and then fully) owned its own refrigerated truck business
for that specialised segment.  By the date of privatisation most of
the heavy investment restructuring had been completed, and Tranz
Rail has concentrated on fine tuning their service operations since
then.
Freight Customers The specialised marketing tactics that are needed to compete in
each segment have resulted in Tranz Rail preserving and tightening
its focus on the same market segmentation as existed before this
period.  It has further developed the business units especially for
this purpose.  Obviously, BulkFlow customers, for example: Coal
Corp, require a different approach than customers of the
Distribution business.  The marketing tactics employed so far
appear to have been very successful, especially in expanding
volumes of bulk commodities, but also in continuing the importantThe Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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revenue growth trend that developed from their Distribution
segment.
Passengers Passenger segments are a little different.  Commuter services in
Auckland and Wellington are undertaken with subsidy payments
from the local bodies in those areas, while marketing of long
distance services are route based and are targeted at tourists.   The
long distance business is not subsidised and is marketed on the
basis of the travel experience it provides.  Some passenger services
are still viewed by Tranz Rail as marginal business. To survive they
are required to contribute to the fixed costs of running the network.
Presumably, this applies to all market segments.
InterIslander The InterIsland ferries provide both an essential part of the rail
network connecting the North and South Island as well as separate
services to commercial freight customers and to passengers.  Tranz
Rail has faced various competitors to their InterIsland service,
however those that have managed to survive more than a short time
have proved to have an insignificant impact on market share.  It is
noteworthy that real prices of InterIsland services have continued to
decline.
Market Outcomes
Market Size The freight market grew significantly in the period following
privatisation. Much of the expansion was due to the increase in
aggregate real economic growth of 6.2%, 5.3% and 3.1% in 1994,
‘95 and ‘96 respectively.  As before, market size (road and rail
NTK’s only) has been estimated using data on road user charges,
and shows the following market dimensions for the period to 1997;
1994 1995 1996 1997
Market Size (m
NTK)
20,7000 22,200 23,500 24,500
Growth % +31.1 +7.3 +5.6 +4.5
Rail Share % 13.7 14.4 13.9 14.3
Rail Growth % +13.4 +12.9 +1.8 +7.5
Growth in overall market size has slowed from the high levels that
occurred just prior to privatisation, but importantly rail have
managed to maintain their share and in fact expanded their NTK’s
at a higher than market rate for 2 of the 4 years since privatisation.
Market Share Market share estimates, using the ISCR approach described earlier,
indicate a significant change in the trend of falling share that rail
had experienced for 9 years.  While the ISCR approach is clearly
not accurate enough for other uses, it is, as previously discussed, an
adequate indicator of broad trends.  Market share analysis shows
that the market share loss observed in other estimation approaches
for the period 1989 to 1993 is replicated using this method, and
that, from 1994 to 1997, the decline slowed considerably, despiteThe Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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the strong growth in trucking’s share of the NTK’s that started in
1992.  This indicates success in rail’s product marketing tactics as
well as for the growth in output volumes of commodities in rail’s
core market segments.
Output Volumes Tranz Rail continued to transform its Fowarding business (as in the
pre-privatisation period) to Distribution where it was of greater
value to its customers. This change was at some cost to rail, as
volumes went up, real unit revenues fell.  Their major lines of Bulk
Goods suffered the largest price declines, falling an average 7% pa
over the 1994 to 97 period but had volume growth of 5.5% pa as a
result.  Other than the price and small volume growth in the
Distribution segment, the most significant changes took place in the
Export goods segment where price fell by 4.4% but volume growth
was nearly 12% on average.  These results all indicate how price
sensitive Tranz Rail's market segments are.
Overall Overall, the long term decline that rail had experienced in both
freight volumes and market share ceased and from 1994 sustainable
growth was recorded.  By comparison, capacity in the road
transport business (data sourced from road user charges) grew
strongly to 1994 but growth has slowed from that time.  The
analysis also recorded a trend to smaller capacity trucks with road
user km’s purchased showing a decline in all weight categories
above 5 tonnes. This possibly resulted from Tranz Rail’s success in
the long haul of bulk goods.
Unit Revenues Until 1994 the long term trend in real output prices had been in
sympathy with the decline in output volumes, they both fell, but
unlike the growth in volume since then, unit revenues have
continued to fall albeit at a slower rate.
Within this overall downward trend in prices, output value in
cents/NTK fell significantly in both the Bulk and Export segments
over the post privatisation period and, as noted, increased in the
Distribution segment, continuing the trend of the pre-privatisation
period.  Clearly customers are placing an increasing value on rail’s
capability in this area.  The emphasis has continued to be on
enhancing the mix of factors that make up their distribution
offering, timeliness, storage and handling especially.
Passenger Market
Tranz Rail Strategic
View Some passenger services are marginal and if passengers cannot pay
their avoidable costs and make a contribution to common costs then
they will not continue with that particular passenger service.  The
same argument applies to other activities, including passengers on
the Cook Strait ferries.  In this case Tranz Rail maintain that freight
and commercial vehicles would still provide them with a viable
business to fund the ferries that did not carry passengers, although
there are some economies of scope.  Passenger services are allThe Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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viewed as standalone businesses and are managed and marketed as
such.
TranzScenic Marketing rails’ long distance passengers services was
implemented via the 1995 rebranding of long distance services
which created a number of individual “named” long distance
journeys targeted at tourists who seek a particular train trip
experience.   In the same fashion as freight the strategy here was to
maximise yield by getting the price/service mix right, adjusting
prices upwards whenever possible.  Price increases were
implemented in 1995 and twice in 1996. Passenger numbers
increased in both 1996 and 1997 after a small decline in 1994.
As a result of this strategy both revenues and passenger numbers
have grown strongly since privatisation.  This indicates that Tranz
Rail have targeted “experience” travel, because real airfares and
costs of car transport between main centres have declined over the
period.
TranzMetro In line with this strategy, from 1990 suburban passenger journeys,
branded as TranzMetro, are confined to Auckland and Wellington
and as long as contracts and financial support from the local
regional councils are available, rail will continue to provide the
service.  Passenger journeys are increasing again but are not
anywhere near the levels of the early 1980’s, with the market
growth limited by the strong competition from the transport of
people by road.
InterIslander Compared to rail passenger performance, InterIslander passenger
business is a real success story.  Passenger numbers increased from
966,000 in 1994 to 1,085,000 in 1997 while revenues show
particularly strong growth from 1995.  In the summer of 1994/95
Tranz Rail introduced a fast ferry service across Cook Strait to cater
for passengers that want a shorter travel time and who are prepared
to pay a price premium for it.  For part of that summer season and
the following summer two operators competed with Tranz Rail in
the fast ferry portion of the InterIsland business but both failed to
survive.  Competition for passenger non-vehicle transport exists
from Plimmerton.
The aging of the existing conventional ferries and the on-going
success of the InterIslander service has encouraged them to invest
in a new roll-on roll-off ferry and to seriously consider keeping the
fast ferry on for future summer seasons.  The fast ferry service
breaks even as a standalone business and is therefore of value to
Tranz Rail.  Analysis of the fast ferry financial performance has
revealed that Tranz Rail do not cross subsidise this service.
The price of standard commercial vehicle and passenger transport
on Cook Strait services declined in real terms over the period 1987 -
1997, some by as much as 3% per annum.  The introduction of a
new product - the fast ferry - resulted in measured non-quality-
adjusted increase.  However, this did not eliminate the decline in
real prices over all.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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Overall: the Market
In Summary Competition in the product markets was pivotal to the fortunes of
Rail Corp. through the 1980’s as they struggled to get to grips with
what competition meant to a railway.  Unfortunately it took too
long to work those issues out and when in 1990 rail did eventually
devise a marketing strategy to establish and maintain its market
position it was in a very weak structural and financial state.
This aspect of the analysis is picked up later where the financial
consequences of the market evolution are reviewed, and the
financial and organisational restructure is described.
From this analysis a number of issues emerge;
The market The market for long haul freight went through a long adjustment
stage that resulted in rail emphasising its competitive advantage in
the movement of bulk goods over long distances.  Structurally the
overall market seems to have changed little but its value increased
20% in real terms over the 1986 - 97 period.  While the market has
grown Tranz Rail’s share on the other hand has fallen by nearly
40%, with much of the loss occurring in the period prior to 1990.
Market volumes have more than doubled in the period 1986-97 as
prices fell.
Marketing Strategy Once rail had adjusted to the turmoil of the 1980’s it devised a
marketing strategy that, combined with good operational
management and targeted investments, has allowed them to stem
the market losses and actually grow the business.  This was
implemented not coincidentally, at the time that privatisation
decisions had been reached.  This will be discussed subsequently.
Service Quality It seems that more attention could be paid to the assessment of
service quality, particularly that which relates directly to customers.
The random results of the limited range of indicators are not sharply
focussed on customers.  It was not until 1996 that management
sought systematic evidence of both these and other indicators.
Passengers The rail passenger business shrank as a consequence of withdrawal
of central government subsidies, and lower car costs, partly
resulting from the importation of used cars.  Again it was not until a
strategic approach was taken to managing the business that it
showed any signs of being successful.  Contracts with local
councils in Auckland and Wellington, to support local passenger
services, have been key to successful provision of these services. A
particular marketing strategy was applied to long distance services
to make them successful.  Both services make a positive financial
contribution to Rail’s fixed costs.
InterIslander The movement of passengers and freight across Cook Strait has
been financially successful.  Innovations, such as the fast ferry have
survived entrants to the passenger business and despite small
competitors moving freight, Rail have been very successful inThe Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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expanding all aspects of that business.  Real prices for these
services have declined and hence potential and actual competition
seem to be constraining prices in this market segment
Market deregulation and the competitive evolution was a major
contribution to the changes observed.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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8 LABOUR AND TECHNOLOGY
Key Elements The importance of labour and technology to the success of the rail
business should not be underestimated. Labour productivity and
asset efficiency determine rail’s cost structure which is the basis of
success in a competitive market.  To be a successful carrier of long
haul - bulk commodities simply requires being the cheapest
because customers are primarily seeking low cost service.  As
observed in the review of rail’s marketing effort it is possible to
gain incremental value from doing something differently (their
distribution business brought together a mix of service features
that have led to expansion in the size and value of that segment),
but at this time rail do not have a core advantage in distribution
and logistics, it does in bulk haul commodities over longer
distances.
Redundancies After deregulation in 1983 and before March 1985 rail reduced
staff numbers only by voluntary means, in accordance with a
political directive.
The financial situation of the company in 1986 necessitated more
rapid productivity gains.  The recovery plan outlined in the
Strategic Plan of that year concentrated on reducing staff more
quickly by closing facilities such as workshops and warehouses as
well as introducing more effective work processes and methods.
Before 1986 Rail management and the owners had employed a
strategy of allowing staff to take voluntary severance but when
that did not provide a fast enough reduction in costs, a more
forceful approach was taken.  The introduction of new technology
was critical in allowing this to happen and a series of projects
were introduced to increase productivity.  The investment
initiatives are reviewed in the next section.
Seagoing Reducing the costs of seagoing personnel appears to have taken
longer than similar initiatives in other areas of the business.  In the
early stage of rail’s restructuring, the employment conditions for
its InterIsland operation’s (Searail) seagoing staff were complex:
they were contained in four service organisations and five
industrial documents.  Two other documents, to which Searail was
not a party, also had a bearing on these principal documents.  In
this environment, the industrial relations function of Searail was
seen as key.  In reviewing the functions, structure and numbers of
staff in 1987, Searail was keen to “adopt a pro-active positive,
modern and imaginative approach to industrial staff/relations to
create a solid, loyal, co-operative team …”
By 1989, however, it was noted that there was low morale among
large sectors of the staff as a result of restructuring, even though
the relationship with the Maritime Union was reported to be
“stable” and there were low levels of industrial dispute within all
parts of the Company.  Two years later, negotiations with the
Maritime Union to reduce crew numbers and eliminate restrictiveThe Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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practices and expensive conditions of employment (for example,
leave ratios, extra sailing payments, and shore-based
accommodation) were again reported.  While the process was
expected to be lengthy, the unions were “willing to concede on
costly and inequitable conditions of employment”.
But high personnel costs and rigid operating regimes contained in
the maritime collective agreement in 1994 were stated to be the
most important issue for interisland operations at this time.
Negotiations concluded in mid-1994 were expected to reduce
personnel expenditure by 28%.  This was on top of substantial cost
reductions which had been achieved through shore-based
restructuring in early 1993/94.
  Work practices and methods
Innovations A series of technological innovations, along with industrial
agreement to implement them, allowed the introduction of more
efficient work practices.  For example, radio technology has had a
significant impact on the company and the way in which it
operates its rail network in the following areas:
·  Alternative train crewing:  In 1988 an industrial agreement
had been reached to implement single person crewing on rail
and by 1991 it was substantially complete.  This was
achieved with the assistance of computer-aided radio
communication which allowed communications between
train control and the locomotive engineer.  It was then no
longer necessary to have a second crew member on board for
safety reasons.
 
·  Track Warrant Control: Track Warrant Control uses radio
technology to provide a simple method of track clearance for
trains.  Centralised traffic control had been used on heavily
used routes, but simpler forms of signalling and control had
been retained on less used provincial lines.  These latter
forms of signalling were labour intensive and expensive to
operate and maintain.  In some instances required staff based
at regular intervals along the route and around the clock.
 
·  Shunting:  Shunting had traditionally been controlled using
hand signals during the day and hand lamps at night.  In
addition to the restrictive visibility requirement, this system
was hampered by the numbers in the work teams involved.
Radio communications has allowed considerably fewer
people and lower costs. Recently the Corporation has been
investigating the use of remote controlled locomotives for
shunting.
 
  Fewer Staff Restructuring within the organisation and rationalising operations
also led to changes in work methods and a reduced need for staff.
For example, when the Corporation was restructured into three
business groups in 1987, they were to provide their own supportThe Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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services, reducing the Corporate group from 800 to 60.  There
were also staff reductions in workshops due to the lighter
maintenance workload as a result of a smaller wagon fleet (see the
section below); re-organisation and reduction in track and work-
gang strengths; the closure of District Offices and rationalisation
of Area Construction Managers’ offices; and freight terminal
consolidation. Multi-skilling has been a more recent introduction
under a company and trade union agreement to bring increasing
flexibility in work methods.  It was introduced into freight yards
by 1991 and has since been extended into workshops and depots
as well.
 
  Contracting Out The contracting-out of services has been another method the
corporation has used to reduce fixed costs and establish a greater
dependence of operating costs on volume.  It began early in the
restructuring process (before 1988 this was mainly in the area of
building and bridge construction), at which time there was some
resistance from unions.  In addition to increasing the volume
variability of costs, there were other benefits seen to be gained
from contracting out services:
 
·  quality assurance standards, including benchmarking
opportunities
·  penalty payments for non-performance
·  the creation of a competitive supply situation.
In 1991, the Boston Consulting Group estimated that the
Corporation could save approximately $20-30 million annually by
contracting out those services that were not strategically important
to control in-house, for example yard operations, freight services
and crewing.
Improving work practices by using technology has remained an
on-going focus for the company in seeking productivity gains.
Recently the company has invested in Ontrac for freight
management using barcode technology.  The system tracks freight
items themselves, rather than tracking associated documentation.
An extension of the system, Ontrac Direct allows customers to
track the process of their freight in close to real time using the
Internet.  The system produces electronic versions of waybills and
consignment notes.
  Rationalisation of wagon fleet
Objectives Changes in the wagon fleet and the basic hardware of the freight
business, have been substantial and on-going.  The key principles
have been to:
·  replace the traditional four wheel wagons with the faster,
more efficient eight-wheel bogie wagons,
·  improve the load-to-tare ratio,
·  allow more payload per tonne of wagon,
·  develop wagon types that are more suited to meeting the
needs of customers.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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The aim had been to enable the Corporation to compete more
effectively with road carriers in terms of both cost efficiency and
customer service.
In 1988 the Corporation began the introduction of new high
volume aluminium bulk wagons which were used principally for
coal haulage, but which also opened up market segments in other
bulk products where rail had been previously uncompetitive.  Only
42 of the new wagons were required to replace approximately 600
of the old ones, resulting in lower maintenance and operating
expenses. The following year the Corporation began plans to
introduce the Roadrailer, a wagon used for freight distribution
which can transfer from road to rail, eliminating double-handling.
SwapBodies The development of new wagon types continued, and by 1991, the
wagon fleet consisted of several types of wagons which could be
configured to meet the specific needs of individual customers.
These included the wagons mentioned above, Swap Bodies (where
a larger container-type unit can be placed on top of a flat-bed
wagon), canopy wagons designed for ease of loading and
unloading, car-carrying wagons, wagons with extended cradles for
carrying forest products, and a growing variety of containers such
as curtain sided containers and containers with extra height and
weather protection for coal.  These all added to the service
capability provided and represent an aspect of service quality that
customers were prepared to pay a premium for.
The dramatic change in the make-up of the wagon fleet has
improved asset utilisation as well as quality.  It has reduced costs
and placed the company in a better position to meet customer
needs.
  Investment in infrastructure
Some of the innovations in wagon development have allowed the
company to take advantage of track improvements which enable
heavier axle loads, improved clearances and the faster train speeds
noted earlier.  Investment in an on-going programme of welded
joint elimination that created continuous lines throughout the
network.  It enhanced the utility of the North Island Main Trunk
Line electrification that had been completed by 1989.
  Information technology
The Information Services division of Railfreight Systems detailed
an extensive review of the business systems requirements for the
organisation in its 1988-1990 Business Plan.  The emphasis was
on an integrated approach to planning and clarifying priorities for
the Group overall with the ultimate aim of enhancing the ability of
the company to work effectively as a single business entity.  A
range of requirements was identified for each group within
Railfreight, but a common focus was a perceived need for
improved decision support and productivity gains.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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The rationales for the introduction of systems in each area were as
follows.
0DQDJHPHQW ,PSURYHG PDQDJHULDO HIIHFWLYHQHVV ZLWK UHGXFHG FOHULFDO VXSSRUW￿
0DQDJHUV ZHUH SURYLGHG ZLWK FRPSXWHU WHUPLQDOV WR DOORZ DFFHVV WR
GDWD DQG GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ WRROV￿
&XVWRPHU
LQWHUIDFH
3URGXFWLYLW\ DQG VHUYLFH TXDOLW\￿ 7KH SODQ QRWHG WKDW §LQIRUPDWLRQ
WHFKQRORJ\ LV KDUGO\ XVHG LQ WKH FXVWRPHU LQWHUIDFH DFWLYLWLHV RI WKH
JURXS DW SUHVHQW >￿￿￿￿@￿ DQG \HW LW LV LQ WKLV DUHD RI WKH EXVLQHVV WKDW
WKH VWUDWHJLF XVH RI LQIRUPDWLRQ WHFKQRORJ\ KROGV RXW WKH JUHDWHVW
RSSRUWXQLW\ WR PDNH ELJ JDLQV LQ SURGXFWLYLW\￿ VHUYLFH TXDOLW\ DQG
FRPSHWLWLYH DGYDQWDJH￿¤
2SHUDWLRQV 2SWLPLVDWLRQ RI WKH SURFHVV XQGHU ZKLFK WUDLQ WLPHWDEOHV DQG FUHZ
DQG ORFRPRWLYH URVWHUV DUH GHYHORSHG IURP ZRUNORDG SURMHFWLRQV￿
7KLV FUXFLDO SURFHVV GHWHUPLQHV WKH IL[HG ODERXU DQG FDSLWDO UHVRXUFHV
RI WKH UDLO WUDQVSRUW RSHUDWLRQ DQG ODUJHO\ GHWHUPLQHV WKH FRVW OHYHOV
RI WKH *URXS“V UDLO RSHUDWLRQV￿
(QJLQHHULQJ ,QFUHDVHG GHFLVLRQ VXSSRUW WKURXJK DFFXUDWH GDWDEDVHV ZLWK VLPSOH
GDWD UHWULHYDO￿
6HDUDLO ,QFUHDVHG SURGXFWLYLW\ DQG FXVWRPHU VDWLVIDFWLRQ YLD SDVVHQJHU DQG
PRWRU YHKLFOH UHVHUYDWLRQ V\VWHP￿
$FFRXQWLQJ (QVXULQJ WKDW WKH FRVWV FRQVHTXHQFHV RI PDQDJHUV“ GHFLVLRQV ZHUH
FOHDU WR WKHP￿ 5HGXFWLRQ RI WKH FOHULFDO FRVW RI WKH DFFRXQWLQJ V\VWHP￿
+XPDQ
UHVRXUFHV
,PSURYHG SURGXFWLYLW\ LQ FOHULFDO DQG DGPLQLVWUDWLYH SURFHGXUHV IRU
WKH SD\UROO V\VWHP￿ $OVR￿ FRPSXWHULVHG WUDLQLQJ IRU ODUJH VFDOH
UHWUDLQLQJ LQ QHZ VNLOOV ￿HVSHFLDOO\ EXVLQHVV VNLOOV DQG QHZ EXVLQHVV
A series of projects was implemented in a sequence which allowed
the benefits from less complex projects to be gained quickly.  The
first was the Marketing Information System (accounting,
marketing and asset database) and systems for transit control and
yard and train operations followed.
AMICUS In 1990 a computerised ticket system was introduced and the first
stage of a major project AMICUS was completed.  This project,
implemented in two parts, has provided an integrated marketing
and operations system.  AMICUS 1 is a computerised record,
pricing and invoicing system for freight.  It is designed to reduce
costs and increase customer service.  It provides sales planning,
equipment ordering, automated waybilling and a variety of
market-related activities.
The following year saw the beginning of development work for
AMICUS 2 which was operational by December 1992.  It
automated recording of train and wagon movements, assisted with
planning for train and ferry services, and permitted immediate
wagon location, ordering and distribution.  As a part of the system,
automatic vehicle identification was introduced which identifies
locomotives, wagons and containers as they pass checkpoints by
reading identification tags.  Wheel sensors provide information on
train direction, speed and the specific wagons being carried and
some also record the weight of each wagon.
The corporation sees its ability to quickly unite information
technology and the physical elements of the business as the means
to gaining a competitive advantage.  A recent example is the 24-
hour customer service centre which is being integrated with a new
equipment management centre and the network control centre.
The aim is to ensure that equipment availability and systems
management are integrated with customer needs.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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  Results of these Initiatives
Staff numbers  The staff reduction programmes resulted in a dramatic decrease in
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As discussed in the previous section, the company hoped to reduce
staff by means of attrition after corporatisation in 1983, but its
severe financial position by 1986 forced it to do this by means of
involuntary redundancies.  In the longer term this saved a
substantial level of cost, but one-off redundancy payments were a
major cost to the organisation.  In 1997-dollar terms, the company
made a total of $438million in staff severance payments between
1987 and 1993.  It announced a further redundancy plan in the
1997 Annual Report with a provision of $12 million over the next
three years.
Redundancy Expenses
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
$m
Spent
40.8 56.8 90.4 47.9 48.4 39.3 13.9
Along with a reduction in overall staff numbers there has been
more subtle changes in the composition of the workforce in rail.
In 1983 46% of the workforce was employed in engineering and
track operations and 38% in freight handling.  Only a very small
number of the freight staff were customer interfacing in marketing
or sales roles.  By 1990 organisational changes resulting from
market conditions and internal performance requirements saw
changes.  Only 32% of the staff were in either engineering or
operations while these in freight totalled 36% of the total.  In 1990
7% of total staff were involved in freight marketing.   At the time
of privatisation that number had risen to 9% and in 1997 it was
13%.  Since 1991 the number of staff involved in engineering or
operational work has remained at about 40%.
Cost Structure As well as reducing the absolute level of personnel costs, a
principal goal of the reduction of staff numbers has been to
increase the volume sensitivity of operating costs.  A discussed
earlier this was a critical element in increasing competitiveness
relative to road carriers.  As a result of the lower staff levels, staff
costs (excluding severance costs) as a ratio of total operating costs















      Capital expenditure
Capex The reduction in staff levels and improved work processes were
possible only with the increased use of new technology and
information systems.  Investment over the period 1983 to 1997 is
shown below.  The graph shows that capital expenditure over the
last 10 years was heaviest prior to, and during, the period of staff
layoffs.  It should be noted, however, that changes in accounting
treatment of investment relating to capitalised expenses mean that
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9 FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
Approach The analysis of financial performance follows the steps of the
market approach, it has 3 distinct phases, the market outcomes
directly affected the financial performance, and formal performance
reviews led to strategic decisions to improve performance.  In each
period (83 to 88, 89 to 93 and 94 to 97) the financial analysis review
considers;
·  the financial consequences of market outcomes
·  objectives from performance reviews
·  actual operating performance that resulted
 
 
  1983 to 1988 - Deregulation
 
  Performance Reviews  In the 10 years prior to privatisation the performance of railways in
all its structural forms was the subject of constant performance
review, especially by US consultants Booz Allen & Hamilton.  In
the face of deregulation of the trucking industry in 1983, Rail
Corporation Directors brought Booz Allen in to undertake a review
of operations and strategic options for the future of rail in NZ.
Their concern was whether rail had a sustainable business with a
deregulated road transport sector.  The 1983 review was very
significant because it identified the key factors that rail needed to
deal with if it was to be competitive over the longer run and set the
organisation down a commercial path that became more tightly
focused as time went by.
 
  Rail needed to:
·  lower its freight cost structure to match that of road transport
·  accept that it could lose up to 25% market share
·  generate productivity improvements
·  close some of the workshops
·  review ferry operations
·  organise on a more commercial basis
Rail’s continued participation in the market place was the subject of
a series of strategic options, with both passenger and freight
reviewed in some detail.  BAH recommendations were implemented
almost to the letter and over the 5 year period to 1988 much of what
BAH had forecast did indeed come to pass for that period. Rail’s
costs, especially for freight, were restructured with a very heavy
emphasis on investing to upgrade assets and productivity
improvements from process upgrades and limited staff reductions.
Freight was defined as the core business, with passenger services
viewed as incremental to the core.
Market Share losses The financial consequences of the market share losses and the price
reductions that rail experiences were severe with freight revenues
dropping 37% in the period, substantially resulting from the real
price reductions discussed in section 4.2.2.  Special note should beThe Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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made of the influence of property revenues and the level of the
subsidies received from government (see the following table).  Two
other important points to make relate to the sale of the road bus
business leading to the discontinuation of that revenue. The constant
restructuring makes the comparison of different revenue
classifications hazardous over this period.  The road service
business had been part of rail operations for a number of years.  But
because this review is of the core rail business that was privatised,
the bus business is not analysed in detail in this report.
OPERATING PERFORMANCE – CONSTANT  $000
31-Mar
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
OPERATING REVENUES
NZ Rail Freight 640,654 556,328 516,162 475,912 445,515 422,607
Rail Passengers 116,457 113,615 68,678 82,420 71,531
Passenger Group 139,033
Road 67,721 70,215 68,584 74,718 81,762
Sea 95,914 87,331 87,097
SeaRail 85,334 98,169 63,659
Other 16,293 23,450 13,683 18,108 15,110 4,093
Property 6,560 16,994 22,490 64,216
Subsidy (inc in rail/passengers) 134,907 116,172 89,907 99,634 92,081 52,973
TOTAL OPERATING REVENUES  937,038  850,940  760,764  753,488  734,576 693,608
OPERATING COSTS
Personnel Costs 709,413 604,229 570,075 605,273 599,317 584,065
Depreciation 48,931 63,299 63,602 65,662 67,150 69,620
Materials Services etc 282,426 197,168 197,057 198,988 152,198 260,079
Other Costs 110,886 99,493 89,074 107,868 124,378
TOTAL OPERATING COSTS 1,151,656 964,188 919,809 977,790 943,043 913,764
EARNINGS FROM OPERATIONS (214,619) (113,248) (159,045) (224,303) (208,466) (220,156)
Costs In absolute terms rail’s cost levels did decline with the most
significant drop taking place in 1984.  For the remainder of the
period costs were unchanging in real terms. During 1983-1988 it
appears that rail did not make adequate headway in gaining real cost
reductions and, by using basic cost estimations in the absence of
economic cost models, their freight business is estimated to have
been at a cost disadvantage relative to trucks.  BAH estimated that
long haul trucks costs were about the same level as rail in 1986.
Balance Sheet In addition to their deteriorating operating performance, by 1988
rail was also facing a crisis on its balance sheet brought about by the
big investment projects that were described in section 4.2.3.  As one
element of the essential productivity improvements BAH, in 1983,
recommended an investment programme to update rail’s older
rolling stock and infrastructure assets.  These programmes were in
addition to the major main trunk electrification project that the
government imposed.  In the ‘83 to ‘88 period rail spent $914m
(constant 1997$) on capital projects.  The difficulty with their
investment programme was that rail simply had an inadequate cash
flow to fund the investment and, in addition to the capital plan, they
needed to borrow to fund their operating losses.  This need was not
unexpected, BAH had predicted the requirement to borrow to fund
the capital programme, however extremely high local interest rates
helped to expand the costs of rail’s debt.  By 1988 rail had $1billionThe Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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of debt compared with $200m in 1983. Shareholder's funds were
nearly halved in the period.  As will be seen the financial crisis
came to a head in 1989 when $1billion of debt had to be written off
rail’s books.  It was taken over by the government.
1986 Optimism BAH were brought back in 1986 to review progress on
implementation of their 1983 report.  Rail Corp management was
deeply concerned about the rate of market share loss and the
collapse in financial performance.   Advisors to rail management
were optimistic that the measures that were being taken would
reverse the trend of steeply declining revenues and poor labour
productivity especially given the decision to restructure to achieve a
tighter focus on markets.  This restructuring involved adjusting the
freight business to bring the major commodity groups (paper, logs,
coal etc) into management focus and allow both market and cost
issues to be managed together. Financial performance through to
1988 did not show any improvement beyond a small reduction in
costs.
It is not possible to review incremental costs and the activities
where Rail generated contributions to fixed cost over this period.
Rail did not have cost models to assess the avoidable costs of each
business area.
1989 to 1993 - Financial Restructuring
Overall This period was of major importance when looking at the financial
performance of Rail in this period as well as post privatisation.
Significant organisational, financial and resource restructuring took
place as a result of the poor financial performance in the 1983 to
1988 period.  Looking at overall organisational performance during
this period, 4 particular aspects stand out.
1. The steep revenue decline that had existed from 1983 to 1988
persisted,
2. In 1989 approx $1.0 billion of debt was written off the balance
sheet of NZ Rail Corporation.
3. NZ Rail Ltd, a “Rail” only business was established in 1990.
4. NZ Rail Ltd was sold to private interests in September 1993.
More Optimism In the continued absence of suitable internal resources, BAH were
still used as rail’s performance advisors and in July 1989 they
reported on the long term viability of a stand alone rail business.
Management were advised that rail’s poor financial performance in
the period to 1988 would become stable by 1991, based on the
belief that the major changes in the road transport market place
were complete and that freight rates for road transport would not
drop further.  As noted earlier, long distance road fees had been
removed in 1988 and the restructuring of truck, tyre and diesel
tariffs had resulted in a lower cost of ownership and therefore lower
rates for freighting goods by road.  As discussed in section 4.2.2 rail
increased price in both the freight and passenger rail markets in
1989.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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Actual results On a normalised basis (1989 results were for 15 months.  1991 was
for 4 months as the old Rail Corp. and 8 months as new NZ Rail
Ltd.) revenue continued the trend of the 1980’s and in real terms it
fell right through to 1993.  The severity of the decline in both
freight and passenger revenue was masked somewhat by the growth
in property related revenue - they reached $100m in the 15 month
reporting period in 1989 as well as the sale of the bus passenger
business.  With the market share losses, revenue for the core freight
business fell an average 3.9% pa through this period demonstrating
just how sensitive the market was to price.
The classification of revenues from Rail Corp to NZ Rail was not
transparent and direct comparison over time is just not possible.  At
the same time Rail made changes to their financial systems that
changed the definition of the revenue that was reported.  Part period
reporting adds another layer of complexity to the results.
OPERATING PERFORMANCE - CONSTANT $000
15 months to  8 months to
30-Jun 30-Jun 30-Jun 30-Jun 30-Jun
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
OPERATING REVENUES (000's)
NZ Rail Freight 366,977 354,976  237,101  333,167 321,433
Passenger Group 169,618 120,549 27,218 54,177 50,450
SeaRail 90,365 93,409
InterIslander 38,342 59,042 64,182
Other 2,971 6,893 31,829 27,718 29,497
Property 102,499 2,888
TOTAL OPERATING REVENUES  732,431  578,715  334,489 474,104  465,561
OPERATING COSTS
Personnel Costs 594,807 384,421 204,654 271,968 245,365
Depreciation 93,735 41,562 11,399 23,577 26,646
Materials Services etc 380,969 239,649 161,425 211,221 193,430
Other Costs
TOTAL OPERATING COSTS 1,069,511 665,632 377,478 506,766 465,441
EARNINGS FROM OPERATIONS (337,079) (86,917) (42,989) (32,662) 121
Cost Reductions The real improvements in operating earnings were sourced from
real reductions in the costs, mainly reductions in personnel numbers
which fell from 10,000 to 5,000 at the end of 1993.  On a
normalised basis people costs halved from 1989 to 1993, though it
should be remembered that this reduction was a mix of both fewer
people in NZ Rail Ltd. and the fact that the people not needed in the
core NZ Rail were retained in the old Rail Corp structure and as
such do not appear in this analysis after 1989.  The 1989 debt
reduction on the balance sheet was accompanied by a corresponding
reduction in asset values that manifested itself in a lower
depreciation charge to the operating statement.  The purchase value
of other materials and services also fell through the period as
operating processes, maintenance levels and the like were reviewed
and costs reduced.  Again a portion of these costs were left in the
old Rail Corp. in 1989.  It should also be noted that by 1989 rail no
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central government though regional local body support was
maintained in Auckland and Wellington and is reported as
passenger revenues.
Revenue Growth It was clear that in 1989 rail management understood that, to
survive, they had to tackle the market share and revenue losses as
well as improve their earnings position with at least cost reductions
that matched the revenue losses.  With privatisation as an objective
they needed a core rail business that would be attractive to potential
buyers however, in its first year to June 1991, NZRL experienced a
financial operating loss that persisted until 1993.
Restructuring Costs The period of financial restructuring to 1993 also included
significant redundancy costs.  These costs were either actual cash
costs paid to staff who left NZ Rail or were accounting provisions
taken into the balance sheet to cover future staff reductions.  At the
time NZ Rail was sold the redundancy provision in the balance
sheet was $69m and a total of $438 million (constant 1997$) had
been paid to reduce staff levels.
Cost Models One of the direct consequences of management seeking a strong
market segment focus was the development of detailed economic
cost models to better understand their cost structures in the
competitive environment.   Those models made management aware
of their cost disadvantages.  The price levels that result from these
basic cost differences seem to be the fundamental reason why rail
continued to lose market share and had declining revenues through
this period. It was not until the privatisation period that the cost
structure of the core freight business was reduced to a level that
allowed rail to successfully compete across a number of market
segments.
Contribution With rail starting to focus on yield management of the freight
business previous management change is reflected in the form of
improved contribution to fixed and common costs.  By 1993 it
seems that the contribution per NTK from Bulk Goods had
improved from a small negative to a small positive sum, and Export
Goods also improved.
In this analysis, incremental costs are those costs that are avoidable
if the particular activity is discontinued.  In that regard they are
most useful for performance analysis.  They are not strictly
marginal, in a network business the marginal cost of 1 more output
unit is extremely small and an increase of 1 unit is not generally
applied, rather an increment of capacity is added.  Rail update their
incremental cost models annually based on a thorough review of
their current cost structures.
Passengers Passenger contributions are not as readily available for this period,
financial models of direct costs had not been developed for the
individual rail passenger.
1990 Restructure In 1989 Rail Corp had liabilities exceeding $1.4 billion and virtually
no shareholders funds.  This represented the culmination of their
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programme.  Rail Corp management sought Government assistance
with restructuring the Corporation to allow the core freight business
to perform as they felt it could and to facilitate its sale if that was
desirable.  The 1989/90 financial and organisational restructure was
implemented in two stages, the first was a $360m equity injection
by the Government in 1989 that was accompanied by a guarantee of
the debt and the second saw the creation of NZ Rail Ltd. in October
1990 and the retention of the $1.1 billion of debt as well as land and
non core businesses in the balance sheet of the old NZ Rail
Corporation.  NZ Rail Limited’s balance sheet was simple, made up
of core rail assets at $102m in value and shareholders equity to fund
them plus the current portion of both assets and liabilities.
The assets themselves were written down by approximately $1.0b,
with the values of permanent ways, bridges, electrification and land
and buildings making up most of the write down.
1994 to 1997 - Post Privatisation
Success The financial performance of NZ Rail/Tranz Rail since privatisation
is represented as a success story.  It has had a lot of exposure both in
NZ and overseas (interest in Tranz Rail performance has come from
UK, Australia, USA as well as less developed countries).  The
performance in this period follows from the stability that is now
evident in their market share and revenues.  While their share of
market volumes has stopped falling, prices have continued to fall in
most of the freight segments but in real terms both freight and
passenger segment revenues have reversed the long term trend.
Overall real revenue growth has averaged 6% pa over the period,
resulting from strong growth in freight volumes that were supported
by small improvements from rail passengers and a healthy 8.5% pa
increase in InterIslander revenues.
OPERATING PERFORMANCE - CONSTANT $ 000
1994 1995 1996 1997
OPERATING REVENUES (000's)
TranzRail - Freight 349,085 386,703 402,942 404,900
Passenger Group 53,798 60,266 63,453 66,700
InterIslander 67,803 75,544 82,258 85,100
Other 20,445 40,851 26,210 22,688
TOTAL OPERATING
REVENUES
491,130 563,364 574,862 579,388
OPERATING COSTS
Personnel Costs 225,962 208,303 213,783 214,539
Depreciation 24,555 26,633 27,343 28,994
Materials Services etc 193,246 224,770 226,587 236,591
Other Costs 2,226 3,043 6,447 15,682
TOTAL OPERATING COSTS 445,989 462,750 474,161 495,806
EARNINGS FROM OPERATIONS 45,141 100,614 100,701 83,582
Cost Management As a consequence of decisions to further improve operating
performance, personnel costs were reduced in real terms but there
was a small increase in total costs.  The productivity analysis inThe Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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Stage 2 of this review would look at the consequences of this in
more detail.  Also in keeping with the increasing level of capital
investment, depreciation grew over the period.
Cost Models In parallel with their operational cost reductions, Tranz Rail has
further improved their understanding of the cost structure of the
freight business through continual development of their incremental
cost models.  This capability is particularly targeted at supporting
pricing decisions in their market segment business units.  Their
efforts at understanding and reducing costs and therefore their direct
competitiveness has also improved significantly.
Passengers Passenger contributions show that the performance of these services
has quite obviously improved.  Although the approach to identifying
shared passenger costs (as opposed to directly avoidable
incremental costs) has an element of arbitrariness in the allocation
of costs, there is a significant and consistent positive trend in the
financial performance of passenger services.
InterIslander The revenue and expenses for InterIslander services include both
passengers and commercial vehicles because, from 1994 expenses
were combined and are not available for these services individually.
Note also that these contributions are at the level of individual
services and do not include the overhead costs associated with
managing the passenger business unit.
Turnaround The financial turnaround of the rail business has been achieved
because of a marketing strategy that was born from a strong
management desire to see the core freight business as successful,
and a financial restructuring to remove a legacy of debt from the
balance sheet.  Success in the market came from a better
understanding of the customer strategies necessary to succeed, and
the selection of the people and tools to make it happen. An essential
element in the process has been an understanding of the cost levels
that were required to compete in each segment and the tactics of
getting costs to those levels.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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10 RAILWAY EFFICIENCY
Although efficiency and productivity will be reviewed in depth in Stage 2 it is useful to
consider some basic productivity indicators.
Asset Utilisation
Wagons The core hardware of the freight business is wagons.  The
programme to rationalise and modernise the wagon fleet has
dramatically reduced the number of wagons from 25,750 in 1983 to
7,280 in 1997 (a reduction of 75%).  The intention has been not
only to bring the size of the wagon fleet more in line with the
amount of freight being carried by the business, but to be more
responsive to the market and the needs of the customers by
constructing wagons suited to carrying their products as efficiently
as possible. While the number of wagons decreased significantly
between 1983 and 1997, the net tonnes carried in 1996 was similar
to that in 1983.  The total number of wagons and thousands of net
tonnes carried are shown in the graph below.
Net tonnes carried (000s)
and
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Net tonnes carried (000s) Total number of wagons
Utilisation One measure of utilisation of the wagon fleet is the ratio of net
tonne kilometres to wagon capacity.  An index of this ratio shows
that the utilisation of the wagon fleet increased significantly over
the period 1983-1997, as illustrated in the graph below.
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Train Size & Speed At the same time as the size of the wagon fleet was declining, train
sizes were increasing.  Between 1983 and 1995, the average net
train size increased nearly 30% from 263 tonnes to 339 tonnes.  The
number of mainline locomotives decreased from 324 to 193 over the
same period. As noted previously, the amount of freight being
carried has not changed significantly over this period; however,
these figures indicate it is being carried with less labour, and lower
operating and maintenance costs.
Productivity
NTK/Employee The principal measure of productivity used by Rail themselves is
NTK per employee which has improved dramatically since 1983.
The improvement was gradual between 1983 and 1987, but was
subsequently more rapid as the impact of the staff redundancies and
capital investment took effect.  Revenue earned per employee has
also improved, doubling from $50,000 in 1983 to $100,000 in 1996
(in 1997 dollars).
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11 PRIVATISATION OF NZ RAIL AND THE IPO
The Basis for Privatisation
SOE’s New Zealand state owned limited liability companies are now
generally identified with the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) that
were created during the reform period of the mid-late 1980s under
the SOE Act of 1986 (see Robert Cameron and Stephen Jennings
(1987, pp.124-127) for a detailed chronology).  The principles for
trading operations are encapsulated in the SOE Act of 1986.  Each
SOE is to function as a limited liability company. Management is to
have standard commercial objectives, subject to the caveat of the
contents of a Statement of Corporate Intent that has to be approved
by the government each year.  It sets corporate policy for the ensuing
two years and other matters to do with facilitating monitoring. The
Act provides for a Board of Directors accountable to the minister of
finance and another minister, who hold the shares.
SOE Limitations Because SOEs are subject to the same competition laws facing
private enterprises and have no contracts giving preferential access
to government procurement or finance, an SOE is on a similar
footing to privately-owned firms. They differ in a number of
respects. These include the fact that their limited liability status is
not entirely credible: it is unlikely that the Government will let a
major SOE fail. This both reduces incentives for prudent
management and the cost of capital to these firms. SOEs do not have
traded shares and thus are not monitored by the range of equity
holders and analysts that scrutinise private sector company
performance.  Also, non-tradability of SOE shares limits the range of
incentive contracts that are available to reward managers: these
cannot include equity options, for example.
The SOEs’ ongoing relationship to government, albeit much weaker
than that of a government department, affects their focus on business
performance. First, the possibility of the introduction of non-
business objectives is ever present and this reduces concentration on
business by SOEs: in the jargon of economics, it is simply very hard
to make the business objective function of SOEs time consistent.
Secondly, the government can, and does in fact, influence
investment and other decisions through the statement of corporate
intent and its ownership. This influence detracts from the pursuit of
business objectives subject to the provisions of competition statutes.
Thirdly, the appointments process for board members of SOEs can
result in directors that may take more cognisance of political issues
than would those appointed in the private sector (although the SOE
Act is specific about the qualities of directors). These are all
impediments to company efficiency for which there are preferable
ways of handling in the private sector: they thus provide arguments
for privatising SOEs.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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Rail Ownership New Zealand Railways Corporation was incorporated as a limited
liability company in 1983. Despite the arrival of the SOE Act in
1987, it was never converted to SOE status under this Act but was
monitored as per the State owned Enterprises Act.  NZ Rail Corp
had the efficiency impediments of SOEs under the 1986 Act, plus
other difficulties.  Its governance structure included the Board being
appointed directly by the government of the day, and the
“controlling” minister and the minister to whom the board was
accountable was one and the same.  This intimate link between the
company and the politicians affected the appointment of directors
exacerbated the time consistency problem and affected the
investment decisions that were taken.  This was heightened by the
fact that railways had been used for all sorts of educational and
social programmes in the past. In short, we would expect railways
efficiency levels to improve at least as much from privatisation as
would standard SOEs under the 1986 Act.
So what of the process
1988 – The Start Early evidence of the desire for sale of Railways Corporation of NZ
is available from mid 1988 and is public information from 1989, by
which time the company were openly planning for a sale, possibly in
late 1992.  Management designed privatisation business plans exist
from 1989 and at that time external advice had been sought on
getting Rail Corp ready for sale.  It appears from the research that
privatisation was the real reason behind the creation of NZ Rail Ltd.,
planned in 1989 and implemented in 1990.  The Board and
management wanted to shed government ownership and run a
genuinely commercial railway.  Their frustrations with state
ownership are evident in both their business plans and other
documentation.
Strategy Although rail did not make a financial surplus (in real terms) from its
operations until 1993, it had the potential to do so.  A minimum of
both capital and labour resources had been included in the new
structure, so costs were low, operations had the mandate to make
them lower.  Meanwhile the marketing units had the strategy to
secure volume growth in all markets but more especially in bulk
commodities where cost efficiencies would improve financial
contributions.  Management had also identified several value-added
strategies in freight handling, especially door to door and
refrigerated road transport, where it is anticipated that revenues
would be higher despite higher costs of handling.
Value added was also designed to flow from developments in the
area of customer service (info on freight and billing) and electronic
data handling.
Privatisation Process
By the time NZ Rail Ltd. was formally put up for sale the NZ
Government had developed a well established sale process, as
followsThe Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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Sale Process
decide to consider selling asset





The sale transaction itself was by a two-stage process open tender
that sought to maximise sale price.
Scoping Studies The first government scoping study was commissioned in 1990
(A.T. Kearney, CS First Boston, 31.7.92) and followed close on the
heels of two BAH 1989 studies that had carefully considered the
long term viability of NZ Rail core business on a stand-alone basis.
Their first report defined what resources would be needed in the
stand-alone core business after making two assumptions about when
some form of competitive equilibrium was reached in the market and
that rails cost structure was efficient.  BAH envisaged a core
business of about 5000 employees that needed about $100m pa of
capital expenditure to support its operations.  They also identified
that $300m in cash would need for redundancies and to upgrade
some assets over the following 2 years.  On the basis that NZ Rail
Ltd. was more or less set up this way, it seems that BAH’s advice
was acted on by NZ Rail Corp. and the government.
The second report was a detailed analysis of the competitive status
of the core business and the steps/strategy needed to make it viable.
BAH projected a positive operating cash flow from 1992 and
recommended tactics to meet the financial objectives.
The scoping study recommended that government sell immediately
but noted that the price may be less than it otherwise would be
because of various cash flow risks. The scoping study highlighted
that the core rail business had positive economic value but in the
short term there was doubt about how competitive conditions would
evolve, and therefore cash flows were regarded as risky.  BAH’s
prediction that $300m was needed for extraordinary costs was
assigned as devaluing the business for potential purchasers.   The
government chose to restructure Rail Corp, defer privatisation and,
between 1990 and 1992, two further scoping studies were
undertaken to determine the return maximising time to sell.   In late
1992 the decision to proceed was taken and Bankers’ Trust were
selected as government advisors for the sale.  They proceeded to
short list potential bidders.  These are thought to have included:
·  Wisconsin Central/Berkshire Partners consortium (Tranz
Rail)
·  Sea Containers
·  Ports of Wellington/Sofrana consortium
·  Ports of Tauranga/Lyttleton Pacifica consortium
·  Freightways/Noel group
·  MainfreightThe Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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Wisconsin Bid It appears that three serious bids were received by the government,
Wisconsin, a combined ports consortium and Freightways.  The
$400m successfully bid by the Wisconsin consortium in September
1993 was the only “clean” unconditional offer and $328.3m of the
cash went to the government for all the shares in NZ Rail Limited
and $71.7m to retire debt.
Shareholding following Privatisation
The share ownership of Tranz Rail Holdings remained in private
hands through to June 1996, although there were some changes to
the number of shares on issue and to the proportion owned by the
original consortium members.   The following table describes the
ownership structure.
Shareholding Structure % of total
Sept 93 June 94 June 95 June 96 June 97
Wisconsin Central 27.3 26.7 31.3 22.7 22.5
Fay Richwhite 31.8 31.1 28.2 20.4 19.2
Berkshire Assoc 27.3 26.7 25.2 18.3 5.4
Public/Other 9.1 8.9 8.0 30.4 43.8
David Lloyd 4.6 4.4 4.0 2.9 2.9
Management 0 2.2 3.2 5.2 5.5
S t a f f / D i r e c t o r s 000 00 . 6
Total Share on Issue – m 114.7 121.8 95.1 126.8 127.6
Share Price $6.88 $8.5
IPO
Public Offer On 22 May 1996 Tranz Rail Holdings issued a prospectus offering
27 million ordinary shares for sale to the public at a price of $6.19.
The offer was oversubscribed and a greater proportion of the
companies shares went into public ownership.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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12 COUNTERFACTUAL: IN GENERAL
Overview In the case of Tranz Rail the counterfactual can be  defined as the
most likely scenario that would have occurred if privatisation had
not taken place. A counterfactual experience is required in order to
assess the economic efficiency of the privatisation process. It is
used for comparison with measured actual performance in order to
assess the welfare change that are attributable to the change from
government ownership to private ownership.  There are various
generic sources of uncertainty that can affect the outcome in any
study of privatisation.
Firstly, the counterfactual is necessarily an estimate based on
judgement and therefore there is uncertainty about its specification
and company performance under it.
Secondly, there is uncertainty about the performance of the
privatised company due to its management: the fact that point
estimates are used to calculate actual performance means that it may
suffer/benefit from random outcomes. Examples include data
measurement errors and performance-affecting factors such as the
state of the economy at the time of privatisation. Because any
individual study will be affected by these random inputs, it is only
over a number of studies that a complete empirical picture of the
welfare effects of privatisation will emerge.
Two comparisons There are two sorts of counterfactual. The first entails comparison
with other railway companies or entities. In common with the case
of most privatised industries in New Zealand, there are no New
Zealand railways that can serve as benchmarks. The are data on the
performance of railways in other countries that would provide some
comparative information. Such analysis would contribute to our
understanding of the performance of New Zealand rail, but the
absence of a common economic environment would limit
conclusions that could be drawn.
New Zealand railways is different from most other railways.  It is
smaller, reflecting market size.  It has a narrow gauge with low
capacity wagons and short trains.  These characteristics render
benchmark comparisons with best-practice railways – such as
certain of those in North America – limited for the purpose of
comparisons.
The second approach is to construct a New Zealand counterfactual
with which the actual performance of New Zealand rail can be
compared. It is this latter approach that we are evaluating for the NZ
Railway’s privatisation, although we would seek to use cross-
country comparisons where the relevant data are readily obtained
and germane to the comparison. Initial investigation has revealed
data that will be of limited use for this purpose.
Rail Privatisation Consider the privatisation timeline set out in the next figure. For
illustrative purposes only, the figure incorporates a slow rate ofThe Privatisation of New Zealand Rail –Part 1 – Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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improvement in the entity as a government department that is
represented by the bottom, solid line, improvements in performance
with each organisational change, starting with corporatisation.  At
the time of evaluation we see from the figure that performance gains
at the date of evaluation, Te, will be due to performance growth
that:
·  Would have occurred anyway,
·  Was due to corporatisation,
·  Was due to commitment to
privatisation, and
·  Was due to implementation of
privatisation.
Welfare The diagram indicates the importance of establishing the
counterfactual (e.g. government department, or SOE) and the
performance of the counterfactual entity; but it is a significant
abstraction from what is really required. What is not apparent from
the diagram is that the comparison should be based on welfare
enhancement, not simply on productive efficiency, or x-efficiency,
that is a component of welfare. Welfare enhancement will require
incorporating output market welfare changes, and this will entail
catering for market changes over time. For an extreme example,
suppose that the privatised firm was more productive (in terms of x-
efficiency) than its counterfactual (an SOE say), but that because of
market changes it was not viable. In this case, despite the
productivity improvement, it would not be in society’s interest –
absent external effects – for the company to remain in operation:
there would be no welfare gain to its continued existence.  Thus,
application to New Zealand Rail must embody in the counterfactual
the market changes that have taken place. The specific


















The Timing of Privatisation and Construction of the Counter Factual
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12.1 Measurement of Welfare
Approach The approach for the measurement of welfare is, in general terms,
that of the ex-post “cost-benefit analysis” methodology that is more
or less that which is described in the Review of Methodologies for
Estimating the Welfare Impacts of Corporatisation and
Privatisation (the Review) that was prepared for the New Zealand
Treasury in 1997. There are New Zealand Rail specific
characteristics that are not addressed by The Review, but which are
critically important to an evaluation of the privatisation of New
Zealand Rail. In particular, these include multiple outputs, matters
of output market structure and dynamic change in these markets.
Output Markets The previous analysis has defined 7 classes of outputs (see the
product-flow diagram of section 7).  They differ in that each has it
own characteristics (passenger, handling requirement,
distance/volume requirement) that mean that they are not close
substitutes. The key characteristics of these outputs are that each
falls into one of two market structures. These are now described.
Evidence presented in previous sections is that other modes of
transport are vigorously contestable markets in their own right and
that they provide the benchmark competition for much of rail’s
product. In this discussion, road transport is used as an example of
constant average and marginal cost industrial competition that
would be expected of an almost competitive market.
The two proposed markets are illustrated by the following simple
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In the market structure diagram the cost curve for other modes of
transport – road is the example - is flat and therefore represents a
constant cost industry. This is reasonable since there are arguably
no congestion costs over this period in the modes of transport. The
demand curve facing rail has a kink because of the competitive
fringe that is provided by road transport. As it is depicted in the
diagram, there is a little market power for rail.  It depends upon the
elasticity of demand beyond the kink.
There is a welfare gain to the existence of rail over road transport
because of the assumed lower marginal cost of rail in this market. It
consists of the lower resource use that is characteristic of rail in this
diagram and the willingness to pay (less the cost) for the extra
output generated by the lower cost of rail transport. If it is assumed
that the output is quite inelastic1, as seems reasonable for
intermediate products, then the extra output will be very small and
the price set by rail will be negligibly below that of road transport.
In this case, welfare resulting from the presence of rail in this
market will simply be the economic profit of rail.
Now, for a market segment for which rail has no cost advantage,
then mcrail=mcroad=acroad and there will be no economic profit for
rail in that segment. Furthermore, there will be no welfare gain
from rail’s participation in that market. The model of a perfectly
competitive market has to be viewed as a very crude approximation:
if it was exactly correct then either rail would not compete in that
market or rail would have all of the market.
In reality, there will be some product variation on diminishing
returns that enable rail to exist in part of the market. In product
variety models welfare can be estimated from hedonic price indices
that express price as a function of product characteristics. However,
for rail competing with other modes of transport the estimation of
such indices will not be possible. Firstly, the indices would have to
be estimated from all participants on an individual operator basis, in
the market and these data are not available. Secondly, even if they
were available many of them – such as timeliness - are not
quantitatively measurable. Hedonic indices therefore, are not
estimable. Product variety will be indicated by various measures,
and qualitative conclusions drawn about it. Nevertheless, to the
extent that improvements in product quality provide welfare in
excess of that provided by their competitors in the markets taken to
be almost perfectly competitive, welfare changes will be
quantitatively under estimated.
In sum, the 7 markets will be placed in two categories:
·  one that is taken to be (almost) perfectly competitive, and
·  the second wherein a competitive fringe is assumed.
                                           
1 Note that this inelasticity should not be construed as inelasticity to rail per se: because of the fringe
competition, rail faces a very elastic demand for its output.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 1 - Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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In both cases welfare will be indicated by profit buttressed
qualitatively by indicators of product variety.
The welfare assessment of privatisation will, of course, be affected
by the counterfactual.
Calculation The productivity study would subtract the rate-of-growth in
aggregate output from the rate-of-growth of input use [see Boles de
Boer and Evans (1996)]. It would seek to estimate the marginal
costs of the outputs (though these would not be reported) to
construct an output aggregate (Fuss 1994) and it would aggregate
inputs using the standard index (dual) methodology.
There will be issues to solve in constructing the capital stock series,
especially given that the core rail business was in the 1980s
combined with other activities. Nevertheless, it is considered that
reasonable capital stock figures may be constructed. There will be
the issue of the embodiment of technological change: while it will
not be as acute as for telecommunications, it will mean that the
productivity change measure will reflect new technology as well as
organisational change.  It is difficult to separate these two.  In the
case of Tranz Rail, new technology  was adopted before and after
privatisation.
Following the previous justification, the welfare change over time
will be measured by the real economic surplus over time, calculated
using the estimated capital stock. It will be adjusted by the (either
annualised or valued at the date Te) of redundancy and investment
payments. The redundancy payments will be included as a cost to
represent some compensation for employees earnings in the
company.  This approach is justified on the assumption that these
payments induced employees to leave the company.
Cost-benefit analysis is essentially a comparative-static
methodology.  This will be manifest in the static snapshots that will
be compared.  The investment data will help determine a measure
of the capital stock at points of comparison, but to include it as a
cost as well, would be to double count.  It will be interesting and
useful however to evaluate the development of the company for sale
(1989-1993) in which case the sum invested will be of direct
relevance.
The final welfare measure will be assessed against counterfactual
scenarios that are proposed in the final section of this report.
Other Issues In addition to the welfare calculations, there needs to be considered
whether subsets of economic agents benefitted or lost differentially
from the privatisation of New Zealand rail and the impact on the
government.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 1 - Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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Differential Effects Differential effects are only of direct relevance to consumers of
final goods.  They can arise from income effects, or consumption
decisions.
New Zealand rail provides freight and passenger transport. Freight
is an intermediate good the cost of which is distributed through to
final prices in myriad ways. The implications of changing transport
prices for final goods prices would be a major research exercise in
itself, and yet it is only the effect of final consumption or
investment goods prices that is of interest for questions of
incidence. Also, it is noteworthy that the market for rail freight is,
following the earlier assessment, competitive in many markets. The
existence of close substitutes means that the performance of
railways has negligible implications for incidence.
For passenger transport there are also very close substitute modes of
travel and thus, while passenger transport is often a final
consumption good, the performance of rail will not materially affect
the welfare of rail passengers. Certainly, the long distance and
urban passenger travel has close substitutes. In fact, even the inter-
island passenger traffic also has existing and potential close
substitutes that appear to constrain pricing. It also makes up a very
small proportion of rail business.
A proportion of the shares are held by foreign owners and they are
traded on a US stock exchange. While, this entails remittance of
profits overseas, there need not be any implications for New
Zealand’s foreign exchange position given that the company was
sold in a competitive tender.   More on this in stage 2.
Gov’t Cash The final study will report on the implications of the privatisation
for the government’s fiscal position    More on this in stage 2.Conclusions and RecommendationsThe Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 1 - Assessment of History, Markets and Data
13 STAGE 1 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The stage 1 analysis in this report reveals a story that can be simply captured in a chain of
events, as follows;
·  deregulation led to:
®market share collapse 1983 to 1993, led to;
®financial crisis in 1988, led to;
®decision in 1988/89 to privatise; and
®financial & organisational restructuring in 1989/90, led to;
®privatisation in 1993, concurrent with;
®improved qualitative and financial
 performance
The market, financial and productivity indicators tell part of the story.  By themselves
however they do not capture the true the state of Rail in 1988, nor do they adequately relate
how the decision to privatise was made or the real forces that were behind the sale.  For these
we draw on assessments in 1988/89 and a range of events of the 1988-1993 period.
The History of the Privatisation of NZ Rail Ltd
This history is substantially based on material from interviews with
people who were central to the sales process.
The Start The first privatisation discussions emerged from NZ Rail’s Board
in 1988 when two members of the Board and advisors started work
on whether it was possible to privatise Rail and how to do it.  One
director, in particular was very keen on the sale option and while the
Board’s focus was on the commercialisation of rail they worked as
if privatisation, was to take place. A private Board committee was
formed to further the idea.  At this time a presentation to the Board
emphasised the design of incentives for senior managers that would
focus them on preparation for privatisation.  There is no evidence of
such contracts: although senior managers’ contracts over the 1990-
1993 period did include bonuses that increased with profit levels
that exceeded forecast profits.  Of course, the prospect of
privatisation did provide senior managers with a probability of very
rewarding contracts upon privatisation if their services were
retained.
Key senior management was not galvanised at this stage and they
continued to assess the privatisation benefits over a period of time.
A person was employed to advise on the communications andThe Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 1 - Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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political strategies to do with privatisation.   The period between
1988 and 1992 was devoted to preparing for the sale, in particular a
lot of time was spent on property rights (land access and rights of
way) as well as selling the non core businesses, for example, buses.
An initial valuation was completed in 1989. It set a sale value of
$250m but advisors reckoned that it would be improved if further
restructuring was done.
Two additional Board members became the key implementers of the
sale. They were to lead the process of explaining the options to
politicians, evaluating the risks and convincing the Minister that the
business case for sale was viable.
Political Change The change of government in the 1990 election was material.  In
1991 CEOs of SOEs were informed that the impetus for
privatisation was reduced.  Treasury, who had taken a lot of
convincing that a sale was viable, had a change in personnel and it
was more difficult to get the new government to accept
privatisation.  The government was very concerned that rail was not
viable and that therefore it would end up underwriting problems
when they occurred.  Indeed this point of view was present just
before the sale.  The CS First Boston and AT Kearny report (1992)
spent a lot of space evaluating the (potential) rundown of railways,
and indicating that anticipated cash flows were very sensitive
indeed to prospects.
CEO & Strategy It was about this time (1990) that NZ Rail developed their
customer/market focus approach.  Some of the negative views of
privatisation may have been a significant in the further development
of the market strategy and tipping senior executives over to
commitment to privatisation..  One visited USA railroads that had
successfully implemented similar marketing strategies and returned
to convince management and the owners, that these strategies would
produce a financially viable outcome.
Management It was also at this time (1990) that senior executives became
“engaged” in the privatisation idea, they had gone along with it to
that point but were more committed when they saw a way of
reducing government control and the concomitant frustrations. A
Rail manager was pivotal to the success of the sale.  He was very
heavily involved in resolving the critical property rights issues.
Various of the people interviewed consider that there were two key
factors in the success of the sale; convincing the politicians that the
risk was with the buyers and management, and getting management
engaged and committed to its success.  A large amount of work was
done on the optimum structure of management incentives and a
detailed package was put to the Board in early 1993.  It is clear fromThe Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 1 - Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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the evidence of the interviewees that without the incentive of private
ownership and the financial incentives to senior management, the
performance changes witnessed from the early 1990’s would not
have occurred, there were simply weaker incentives to make them
happen under public ownership.
Skill Levels Throughout the 1989-1993 period rail continued to have skill
problems with the assembly and analysis of strategy and tactical
options.  A lot of skilled outside help was used in the 1990/93
period to evaluate strategy – much of it came from Fay Richwhite.
BAH were out of it by this stage because their role as operating
consultants was over.
Strategy Again A strong debate emerged during the 1990/93 period as to which
business model Rail should adopt to be successful after the sale.
One view was that Rail should fill the line haul portion of the
freight moving transaction and the depot to door portion should be
carried out by the freight forwarders.  This model would cement the
position of the freight forwarder as the owner of the customer
interface.  Alan Gibbs put a bid together on this basis but under
open bidding it was valued lower than the alternative.  The other
view was advocated by Fay Richwhite.  It was that rail could just as
well provide the customer with an end to end integrated service and
own the customer interface in their own right.
In this alternative, Fay Richwhite argued that the freight forwarding
industry is an arbitrage operation and will only exist as long as the
end to end freight movers (rail and road) allow them to be there.
Recent history has established this point, Tranz Rail appear to be
successful in freight movements via their distribution unit that was
part of the forwarding industry. Tranz Rail’s internal business unit,
termed the “kombi” unit, is a term used for the group who transport
freight over long distances, for the freight forwarding industry.
Tranz Rail’s kombi unit interfaced with the freight forwarding
industry and volumes there are now declining significantly.
Decision The decision to privatise was simple in the end, management were
convinced late in 1988-89 and the government had two
preconditions to be covered: political risk and potential financial
problems in the future. In late 1992 they were convinced that there
were strategies to minimise these risks, and the decision to actually
privatise was taken.
This history is important for documenting the origins of incentives
for senior managers, and risks for government that attended the full
privatisation process.  These affect the counterfactual.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 1 - Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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13.1 The Counterfactual
Summary The situation for New Zealand rail is summarised in the following
table of key characteristics.
The State of Rail
Characteristic 1983 1989 1992 1993-
Operating Surplus (accounting) $(214m) $(42) $(32) $0-100m
Market Strategy No No Yes Yes
Stable Market Share No No No Yes
Cost/efficient rail & rolling stock No Yes Yes Yes
Labour input (number employed) 20,000 8,000 4,800 4,800
Customer information systerms No No Yes Yes
Separate Core Business No No Yes Yes
Management Incentives Weak Weak Strong Very Strong









·  Competition in 1983 was met by massive investment in rolling
stock, the rail network and by labour force downsizing.
·  By 1989 there was an efficient network but weakness in
managerial personnel, no market orientated strategic plan,
overstaffing and no stable position in the market.
·  The (privatisation) programme embarked on in 1989 resulted in
a customer orientated strategic plan that included investment in
customer systems and yield management of market segments. It
entailed additional staff reductions.
·  In 1992 the market share and operating surplus had not
stabilised, and yield management was still not well developed.
There were signs that the market share and operating surplus
would stabilise. Personnel costs were down. The down side risk,
entailing the run-down of rail, remained as a real concern (it was
regarded as such a possibility that analysis of a run-down was a
central part of CS First Boston, &A. T. Kearney 1992. This
report also assessed the prospective cash flow as risky and rail
management’s forecasts as optimistic ).
·  Throughout its history New Zealand railways has had corporate
and board structures introduced at times of poor commercial
performance. Typically these have led to improved management.
Always – excepting the 1983-1993 period – reversion to
departmental control has taken place with an accompanying
deteriorating commercial performance.
There is clear evidence that the decision to prepare New
Zealand Rail for privatisation was taken in 1988/89: in 1988
there was a Board presentation that focussed on a perceived
need for privatisation and that raised the need for appropriateThe Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 1 - Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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incentives for senior managers. Viable privatisation was the
basis for the capital injections over the 1989-93 period and the
form adopted for the company structure of 1990. Prospective
privatisation of the core rail business led to the customer focus
of 1989-1993, and sharpened (prospective) incentives for
management. Throughout this period there was a struggle to get
rail to the status of a viable business, and there were alternative
views of its prospects.
The choice of counterfactual must be influenced by these factors
as well as the performance of companies owned by government.
In reaching the choice of counterfactual, the following points
were most influential.
1. Although cost reductions and a degree of modernisation had
been achieved, the status quo from 1989 would not have been a
viable business. Fixing the status quo as of this date would mean
comparing the path that took place with a counterfactual of no
railway.
2. The investment in electronic customer systems and the
development of yield management (which had not reached
maturity by 1992) over the period 1989-93 would have been
necessary for rail survival.
3. The prospect of privatisation provided a (potentially rewarding)
goal for management and probably brought necessary
developments forward in time.
4. Given its markets, there is no reason why rail would have
performed better under public ownership.
5. The decision to privatise together with the accompanying
(potential) incentives would stimulate performance changes of
themselves (Beesley and Littlechild, 1992:38).
6. The data of Orr (1981, 25) suggest that the business
performance (working expenses/gross earnings) of rail
improved under corporate and board structures, but that the
longest period that it maintained the more efficient performance
was 6 years, and more often it was two years before
performance began to deteriorate.
7. While private ownership (with the incentives of share-
ownership) is the best way to lock in gains made, when the
decision to implement privatisation was finally taken in late
1992 the distinct possibility of private sector run-down of the
railways was considered.
Counterfactual There is no basis to pinpoint the extent to which NZ Rail,
without the incentive of privatisation, would have attained the
performance level of 1993 and beyond. However, even if it
attained the 1993 level of performance, there is plenty ofThe Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 1 - Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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evidence that it would not maintain this level. These arguments
suggest that two counterfactuals may be proposed:
·  Break even from 1993, and
·  Deterioration to break even point from the 1993 position after,
say, 4 years.
In addition, the economic efficiency of the decision in 1988 to
embark on the privatisation course of action, as opposed to
shutting down rail, should be evaluated. This would entail
incorporation of any externalities from the shutdown of
railways.
13.2 Recommendations
The issues in defining a counterfactual are the same as in any study of this sort.  The data for
the completion of Stage 2 are assessed to be available, although work is required to assemble
them and cast them in a useable form.  The availability of data and relevant information is as
comprehensive and detailed as could be anticipated.  Confidentiality will be able to be
preserved while presenting the results in an informative, but aggregative, manner.
It is recommended that stage 2 be conducted.  The framework for stage 2 is indicated in the
section (4.3.1) that sets out the approach to welfare analysis.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 1 - Assessment of History, Markets and Data
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1  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In this study we estimate the social impact of privatisation by means of cost-benefit
analysis. It includes assessing the performance of the privatised firm against
counterfactual situations and examining economic efficiency at points in time as well
as assessing the dynamic efficiency of investment.
The broad financial trends of the New Zealand rail business have evidenced
increasing difficulty of competition with other modes of transport since the 1920s.
From the early 1930s all sorts of mechanisms have been used to shore up the viability
of New Zealand rail in the face of emerging competition. The de-regulation of all
modes of transport in New Zealand in the early to mid 1980s forced rail to confront
its situation. Historically, it was in its best position to perform well as a public
enterprise business; for although it was not an SOE, the 1980s was a period when
there was a sustained attempt to separate out political requirements and improve the
commercial performance of public enterprise businesses.
Starting in the 1880s New Zealand rail has had five episodes of re-organisation to
corporate-type forms under state ownership. In each case the rail business seems to
have improved commercially but the improvement was not sustained. The data
suggest that this was true as recently as the corporatisation of 1983.  In 1988 the
Board of the Railways Corporation committed to the preparation of rail for
privatisation. From 1989 the focus was on the core rail business only. In 1993 the
government sold rail. The economic empirical and theoretical literature on
privatisation suggests that productivity will change from the time of managerial
commitment to privatisation.  The three counterfactuals used and the estimated
welfare gain, as at 1997 under each are:
·  The situation at the time the decision to privatise was made - $9.8b.,
·  The situation at the date of privatisation - $0.9b., and
·  The situation at the time of privatisation deteriorating to the state of the
company when management committed to privatisation - $5.4b.
These indicate that welfare increased from the privatisation of rail. They reflect the
remarkable improvement in productivity that took place from 1989. Between 1989
and 1995 the productivity from all inputs grew by 65%.  It has grown at a slower rate
since then.
Dynamic efficiency is a critical element of the performance of an economy.  The dynamic
economic efficiency of ownership forms is of particular interest.  It is determined by
appropriate investment decisions. Tranz Rail’s investment has maintained its core-business
capital assets and modernised them to reduce costs and to meet customer requirements. It has
done this while rail’s economic surplus has continued to be negative. The economic surplus
generated by rail has improved dramatically since 1989, but we estimate that it has not turned
positive in the period of our analysis.  If competitive modes of transport are paying their full
social costs, a negative economic surplus indicates that the outputs produced are valued by
society less than the value society places on the inputs in other uses.
Throughout the 1980s New Zealand rail struggled to come to terms with its increasingly
competitive environment.  In this context, and given uncertainty about productivity of rail in
private ownership, an entirely reasonable strategy for the owners of rail would have been toThe Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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take time to improve productivity in order that a better assessment of the economic position
of rail could be made.  Taking stock at this point in time, it would seem that significant
further productive gains, relative to other modes of transport, are required if all traditional rail
services are to be economically sustainable into the future.
Taxpayers have been the major gainers from privatisation. They have not had to shore up
rail’s financial position since 1993 and have received some tax revenue. In 1997 prices the
government made net-injections of approximately $1.1b between 1983 and 1993.  Reflecting
the economic surplus of rail, the private owners have not achieved returns in excess of a
broad portfolio of other investments.
If relative prices of competing modes of transport do reflect social costs then economic
surplus indicates welfare and public and private interests will coincide.  It also means that the
history of rail in New Zealand has been one of enormous taxpayer and social cost entailed in
retaining rail as a state-owned enterprise. The record suggests that appropriate investment and
dis-investment decisions are more likely now that rail is in private ownership.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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2  INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW
The Treasury called for tenders for an empirical evaluation of the impact on the New Zealand
economy of the privatisation of NZ Rail Limited, now Tranz Rail Ltd.  The terms of reference
were to:
·  determine the nature and extent of the economic welfare gains and losses
resulting from the privatisation
·  identify which groups have gained or lost
·  estimate the quantum of the gains or losses, and
·  analyse in depth the decision and consequences of the privatisation
The aim of the review is to determine whether the privatisation of rail was in the public
interest and to provide input to examinations of welfare changes associated with privatisation
more broadly.
In conducting its evaluation, ISCR adopts the ex post cost benefit approach to appraisals
while noting that standard cost-benefit analysis is conducted on an ex ante basis. The ISCR
evaluation follows the broad guiding principles of the Review of Methodologies for
Estimating the Welfare Impacts of Corporatisation and Privatisation, but not slavishly. In
addition, the nature of the market (the extent of competition, for example) identified in part 1
of this study will be carefully taken into account in the design of the specific measures and
techniques used in the cost-benefit calculations.  Productivity is an important input to the
explanation of cost-benefit findings.
The term “privatisation” has general use in a variety of contexts.  For example, contracting
out is at times referred to as privatisation.  In this study privatisation is the act of transferring
ownership of a company from the government to private individuals.  For rail the act of
privatisation was implemented some 5 years after the Board decided to prepare the company
for privatisation.
2.1  Stage 1 Conclusions - Precis
Markets As a result of deregulation overall freight and passenger market
share steadily declined until 1993 when NZ Rail Ltd was sold to
Tranz Rail Holdings.  For a variety of reasons it is difficult to assess
market share, however we estimate that between 1983 and 1993
about one half of Rail’s long haul market share went to its
competitors. The markets that rail operates in are directly
competitive or have a vigorous competitive fringe.
Financial Partly because of the market consequences but also due to very
heavy investments in a number of projects, rail’s financial
performance was very poor.  Revenues were halved and by 1989
large operating losses and accruing interest generated a debt of $1.2
billion that could not be sustained.
Restructuring Restructuring during 1983 - 1989 entailed significant investment in
both rolling stock and the rail network, and layoffs of rail staff.  The
restructuring continued after 1989, when it also included a
dedicated focus on the core business of rail that required high
quality management and sharp managerial incentives.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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1989 Position The position had reached a crisis point by 1989,
·  rail's market position had been drastically reduced by
competition
·  rail had an uncompetitive cost structure and continued to make
financial losses
·  rail seemed to not have in place a strategy and capability to
succeed
Ownership The Board of The Railways Corporation decided in 1988 that if
New Zealand was to have a viable rail system the core rail business
needed to be in private hands.  In 1989 a plan to make this happen
was put into place.  From this time privatisation was the dominant
motivating element for management.
Core Rail Business Organisational, financial and cost restructuring in 1990 led to the
creation of a core rail business, non-core activities were assigned to
NZ Railways Corporation.  However, rail’s deteriorating
performance in their product markets did not stabilise until 1993.
Privatisation The sale of NZ Rail Limited to Tranz Rail for $400m in 1993
coincided with an improvement in both market share and financial
performance.  These improvements came from a successful
marketing and performance enhancement strategy targeted at the
long haul of bulk commodities and in the distribution of door-to-
door goods.
Performance Passenger services have shown a turnaround in demand volumes
and financial performance, while operational efficiency has been
improved significantly.  This has been achieved through reducing
costs, implementing service enhancing customer and operational
systems as well as targeting technology investments.
Counterfactual In the 110-year period prior to 1993, railways performance under
five attempts at establishing corporate sorts of organisational forms
did not succeed.  In each case business performance improved but
then deteriorated when it was re-departmentalised.    If public
ownership had continued past 1993, then, given management of rail
since 1880 and the deregulation of all modes of transport since
1984, the counterfactual would be at best captured for the long term
by rail’s economic surplus in 1989/90 or in 1993 accompanied by
deterioration over time.
Stage 1 Recommendations: It was recommended that the data and information available were
of a very satisfactory quality for studies of this sort and that the Treasury should proceed with
stage 2.  It was further recommended that a segmented multiple output market approach for
outputs be adopted to compliment the market analysis in stage 1.  We note that no capital,
productivity or economic surplus data had been evaluated prior to the commencement of
Stage 2.
2.2  Counterfactual - As proposed
A counterfactual experience is required to assess the economic efficiency of the privatisation
process. It is used for comparison with measured actual performance in order to assess the
welfare change that is attributable to the change of ownership.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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There are three broad sorts of counterfactual. The first entails comparison with other railway
companies or entities.  New Zealand railways is different from most other railways.  It is
smaller, reflecting market size. It has a narrow gauge with low capacity wagons and short trains.
These characteristics render benchmark comparisons with best-practice railways in other
countries, such as certain of those in North America, uninformative.
The second approach is to construct a New Zealand counterfactual with which the actual
performance of New Zealand rail can be compared.  The choice of a New Zealand
counterfactual must be influenced by the factors peculiar to rail during the late 1980’s, as well as
the performance of companies owned by government. In reaching the counterfactual
recommendation in stage 1, the following points were most influential:
·  Although cost reductions and a degree of modernisation had been achieved, the
status quo from 1989 would not have been a viable business.
·  The investment in electronic customer systems and the development of yield
management (focus on customer segments, and deliberately linking these segments’
contributions to profit to efforts in the segments) had not reached maturity by 1992.
It was almost certainly necessary for rail survival.
·  The prospect of privatisation provided a (potentially rewarding) goal for
management and brought a sharper focus on business and necessary developments
forward in time.
·  Given its markets, there is no reason at all why rail would have performed better
under public ownership (Shleifer (1998)).
·  The decision to privatise together with the accompanying (potential) incentives
would of themselves stimulate performance changes (Beesley and Littlechild,
1992:38).
·  The data of Orr (1981:25) suggest that the business performance (working
expenses/gross earnings) of rail improved under corporate and board structures over
other departmental organisations, but that the longest period that it maintained the
more efficient performance was 6 years, and more often it was two years before
performance began to deteriorate.
·  When the decision to implement privatisation was finally taken by the government
in late 1992 the distinct possibility of private sector run-down of the railways was
of paramount concern.
There is no basis to establish the extent to which rail, without the incentive of privatisation,
would have attained the performance level of 1993 and beyond, although the literature suggests
that the ethos and performance of the companies changes significantly at the time management
is committed to privatisation (Beesley and Littlechild (1992)). However, even if it attained the
1993 level of performance, the history of rail is that it would not maintain this level. These
arguments were adduced in the Stage 1 report to suggest that two counterfactuals may be
reasonable:
·  Break even from 1993, or
·  Deterioration to break even point from the 1993 position after, say, 4 years.
In addition, the economic efficiency of the decision in 1988 to embark on the privatisation
course of action, as opposed to shutting down rail, should be evaluated. This would entail
incorporation of any externalities from the shutdown of railways. Running down rail from
1988/89 is not used as a counterfactual, although it was a possibility of concern in 1988 and
1992.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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In light of further work conducted in Stage 2, and for reasons that will become apparent, we
propose now the counterfactuals for this study.
·  The 1988/89 economic surplus, and
·  The 1992/93 economic surplus
·  The 1992/93 economic surplus deteriorating to that of 1988/89 in 1997.
The third category of counterfactual is to use the performance of New Zealand State Owned
Enterprises (SOEs).  The SOE model represents New Zealand's strongest attempt to set up and
manage state-owned businesses as business enterprises.  It is recognised that comparison of
rail’s privatised performance with those of existing SOEs has the major problem that certain of
the SOEs do not operate in contestable markets; and thus economic surplus comparisons will be
confounded by a mixture of market power and organisational performance.  Also, technological
change varies enormously across SOEs, posing further difficulties of assessment.  Nevertheless
a study of SOEs provides an opportunity to get some information as to whether performance is
maintained under the SOE structure.
An SOE study is underway and it may provide useful benchmarks for the performance of rail.
The diversity of SOE's and the fact that the SOE study will not be of the depth of the rail
investigation means that the study is of an experimental nature. It may be buttressed by
benchmarking studies of the Australian Productivity Commission of Australian public
enterprises.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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3  APPROACH TO STAGE 2
The methodology of “cost benefit analysis” is more or less that which is described in the Review
of Methodologies for Estimating the Welfare Impacts of Corporatisation and Privatisation (the
Review).  This analysis does however differ from the Review because of factors that are specific
to rail, in particular the structure of the output markets.  The Stage 1 analysis defined 7 “classes”
of output (see section 4.2.2), none of which is a close substitute for the others.   The 7 market
segments fall into one of two market structures; either they are taken to be competitive or there
exists a competitive fringe, as explained in the stage 1 report.  In both these cases welfare will be
indicated by the level of real economic profit, buttressed qualitatively by indicators of product
variety where these are available.
A study of productivity will be conducted to gain a better appreciation of the sources of changes
in welfare over time.  Productivity gains directly effect cost reductions and these enter the
welfare calculation. These will be estimated by subtracting the rate of growth in aggregate input
from the rate of growth of output.  The outputs will be aggregated using estimates of marginal
costs and input aggregation will be by way of standard index methodology (see Diewert and
Lawrence (1999)).
3.1 Approach to Welfare Calculation
The change in aggregate welfare due to privatisation will be estimated using the equation:
            DW =ldsDSd +lfsDSf +lgDGR+ ldpDp d +lfpDp f +ldxDXd
where  D is change due toprivatisation,
           S is consumers' surplus
           GR  is government net revenue
            p  is  profits, generally taken to be the  profits going to owners.
X is welfare associated with  inputs
             d  is domestic ownership,
            f  is  foreign ownership,and
            l  denotes weights.
In practice, the value of welfare change will be calculated at a particular date. It should be
noted that there are some-what different formulae in the literature. This equation is broadly
that of Galal et. al. (ch.2).  We now consider the components in turn.
Consumer surplus: Our argument has been that because rail supplies largely intermediate goods,
and goods for which there are close substitutes from other transport modes (even for passenger
transport), any direct consumer benefits will be diffuse and virtually impossible to estimate (note
that this applies to aggregate consumer benefits as well as to benefits as between consumer
groups). Thus, we take rail markets to be competitive1.  This implies that in measured terms
DSf =D Sd = 0  in the equation.
                                           
1 Note that an explanation for rail holding a share of a competitive market can be explained by
increasing rail marginal cost, without resort to product variety.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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Nevertheless we expect that there are in fact some benefits to domestic consumers. The
following illustrates potential, but unmeasurable, sources of consumer benefit.
·  Product variety/quality: as intermediate goods arising from better (but unmeasurable)
characteristics. In the only tangentially relevant theory reference we have uncovered,
Anderson et. al. (1997) argue that if a government-owned firm maximises social welfare
and product differentiation is valued by consumers, privatisation is efficient, and that this
outcome is signalled by the price of the government firm’s output being less than that of
its competitors.  Empirical assessment of differences in price between rail and other
transport modes that reflected product quality would require the estimation of hedonic
price indexes.  This requires quantitative measures of service quality in these modes, but
the data are not available.2
For the welfare effects of product variety, the classic trade-off is between the (aggregate)
fixed costs of the firms providing different (but related) products and the consumers’
enjoyment of variety: less variety implies lower prices because of fewer firms and
consequent lower fixed costs. In many models there is too much variety (i.e. fixed costs)
because entering firms do not take account of other firms’ profits (Carleton and Perloff
(1994, 299)). Now suppose that Tranz Rail improved its product variety without much
changing its fixed costs, then there would be an increase in welfare. This is obvious if the
products are new to the market, and may also be true if rail displaced trucking firms that
had the same marginal cost of delivery and (small) fixed costs. This argument is
introduced, rather than advocated.  It would be mitigated if the fixed costs in trucking
were small and perhaps related to warehousing rather than transport per se and if rail's
services were not that different from the services of its competitors.
·  Rail provides final goods in some areas of passenger transport, but we still assume no
increase in consumer surplus here (eg: we assume that the fast ferry just breaks even, in
competition with its opposition. To the extent that rail’s competitors have higher costs,
there will be a benefit to consumers of the presence of rail. This raises the question of
whether the higher cost entrants have higher network access costs because of rail’s
ownership of the network.  Any economies of scope may favour rail, but be an efficient
comparative advantage.) We can rely upon the small share of passenger transport in
Rail’s revenue to neglect this aspect, and we note that existence of some alternative
suppliers and the decline in the real price of ferry transport services is indicative of
some competitive pressure.
·  There may be externalities associated with rail as opposed to road transport. If these can
be quantified these would contribute to DSd . This is a difficult area where there is little
hard information: but we explore this very briefly and approximately in Appendix 5.
Where safety and environmental externalities are discussed the externalities of a “with
and without rail” comparison will be quantitatively more important than a comparison
where rail continues to exist and the volume of traffic is redistributed between rail and its
competitors.  We shall assume that subsidies for commuter services cover congestion
externalities.
                                           
2 In Part 1 we noted that rail quality improved through faster trains (aided by welded tracks and more
passing bays) much improved timeliness and loading and unloading times.  These, and other changes,
improved quality but there has been no measurement of service characteristics that, with data from
other modes, would enable the product variety impact to be assessed.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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If there were measurable benefits to consumers we would suggest setting l fs = 0 and lds = 1 .
Excluding consumer benefits enjoyed by foreign consumers is standard practice.
Producer surplus: Changes in producer’s surplus broadly defined are:
DPS =D GR+Dpd +Dp f
where
DGR=DT -DD
where T denotes tax revenue and D dividends3. Here we take government expenditure plans as
given independently of privatisation.  Asset sales will thus affect government’s dividend income
and taxes at the time of sales and in the future.  If the firm’s efficiency improves on privatisation
or the price reflects more generous company tax in some other jurisdiction, the government’s
financial position will improve with the sale (Harrison and Grimes (1989) and Hogan (1990)).
The taxation use of any improved financial position represents a useful benchmark of the
opportunity cost of funds to the government.  If (successful) privatisation were to stimulate an
expenditure increase by government, then, on cost-benefit grounds, there must have existed an
unrealised opportunity for government expenditure that had a social return exceeding this cost.
Because the opportunity cost is not affected by a privatisation of the magnitude of NZ Rail
Limited, it is difficult to see why there should be such an unrealised opportunity.  If there was
one, then, given the government’s power to tax, it could be implemented in dependently of
privatisation.
We do not include producers’ surplus changes from firms other than rail: we consider that this is
reasonable, given our assessment of market structure that concludes that close substitute modes
of transport are very competitive. Nevertheless if, in any market where rail has some market
power and cost reductions are shared with the customer then our procedure will under estimate
welfare gains.
The role of the different weights is to differentiate between elements of producer’s surplus. The
magnitude of these weights cannot sensibly be addressed independently of the sale process. Our
working hypothesis is that at the time of the sale there was considerable competition among a
significant number of bidders. Supposing that the outcome was the maximum price that could be
solicited for the company, it represents that ex ante valuation of the company by the bidder that
values it the most [if the purchaser did not offer the highest bid, we presume that the other bids
had contingent liabilities that reduced their bid below that of the purchaser]. In this competitive
situation, the payment for the company will include:
1. efficiency improvements that are expected to be realised, and
2. net revenue generating aspects that are peculiar to the purchaser, in particular it will
include tax advantages that the purchaser possesses by virtue of its location (tax
jurisdiction).
In consequence, the government will have received a lump sum payment that incorporates
elements of these two items, and the flow of dividends to the owners wherever they are
domiciled will simply be recompense for the payment made.  In short, the changed profits, no
matter where the owners are domiciled, should be included as welfare gains. In this
circumstance the weights on the elements of PS should all equal 1, in particular, ldp = lgp = 1.
We will impose these equalities, and describe the shareholding and flows of funds in a
                                           
3 We shall treat subsidies as a negative dividend.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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foreign/domestic classification (see 'Shareholding Structure % of Total' chart on page 68 of
Part 1).4
The argument for a weight on GR that is greater than 1 (of the order of 1.2-1.3) is that it should
reflect the marginal dead weight loss of taxation in New Zealand (see Diewert and Lawrence
(1992)).  Taking expenditure plans as given, the argument is that, no matter to what uses the
extra revenue is applied (repayment of debt, or reducing an amount of increased tax required for
increased expenditure), the extra revenue will reduce efficiency losses of taxation.
Note that because the purchase price may reflect a difference in purchaser-specific tax factors
DGR may be more or less than that which is simply calculable under New Zealand tax law.  In
this event, the annualised   DGR, Dpf  and Dpd need not add up to the total pre-tax change in
economic surplus generated by the privatisation of the firm.
Finally, the approach advocated here is based on ex ante speculation that is measured by the
purchase price. The study of welfare change is ex post, however. The outcome may exceed or
fall below expectations, and there are various problems with estimating the expected profits that
formed the basis of the successful bid. The extent to which the actual profits are above or below
expectations will depend on uncertain factors, for example, company performance, the business
cycle, and various relative price changes. It could be argued that profits diverging from
expectations should be assessed somehow, and if they do exist they should be included if owned
domestically, and excluded if owned by foreigners.  The difficulty of assessing expected profits
renders this approach completely impractical. The idiosyncratic factors that make a reasonable
assessment impossible are one reason why a number of studies of privatisation are required to
yield robust conclusions about the efficiency of the privatisation process..5
The final component of our welfare equation is DX .  It will largely consist of changes in labour.
Three issues are:
1. Reduced workforce: where voluntary redundancies have occurred, the redundancy payment
is a lower bound on the amount of compensation that induces the employees to move to
their next best occupation. The payment will include rent that employees earn in rail. The
voluntary severance payment is at least the welfare reduction of employees. But where
forced separation occurs the accompanying payment under-estimates the welfare loss.
There is no way we know of to get a justifiable adjustment factor, particularly given that the
voluntary redundancies largely took place prior to 1988, when privatisation became the
motivating force. There are no records of the subsequent experience of staff who left  rail,
although we shall explore the extent to which they have been involved in contracting out.
We can also look at the redundancy payments per-head over time, but the sorts of staff that
left rail will also have changed over time. It might be noted that to the extent that some of
these became unemployed the welfare efficiency loss of the concomitant taxation is likely
to be very small (see Boles de Boer and Evans (1996) for the case of Telecom).  We
propose redundancy expenditures as indicators of lost welfare to redundant workers.
2. Staff may have gained or lost from privatisation.
                                           
4 As at June 1997 22.5% was held by Wisconsin Central Railroad, 19.2% by Fay Richwhite and nearly
50% by public in NZ and overseas.  The balance was held by management and 2 private owners in NZ
and US.
5 While there have been many studies of privatisation (see Evans (1998) and McFetridge (1995)) there
are no such studies in New Zealand.  The study of Boles de Boer and Evans (1996) for NZ
Telecommunications was concerned more with de-regulation than privatisation.  However, reference to
elements of this work will be made.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
100
Some staff who gained may have left the organisation and these will be treated as described
above. Others will remain in the organisation. The staff records do not allow us to study the
changed salary structure of staff over time [they can be studied by company functional unit
but not by task/personnel classification]. To the extent that staff are receiving rent, profits
will be lower and thus these rents will be reflected in our evaluation: all labour expenses
will be included as a cost.  Differentiating between rent and an employee’s opportunity cost
is very difficult.  For example, as a practical matter employment contracts of senior staff are
confidential to us. Employees’ opportunity cost would have to include realisation of
incentives for their management of the privatisation process. There is recent indicative
information (Wolfram (1998)) provided by the growth in salaries of the 12 UK electricity
supply authorities that were privatised in 1990.6  It shows that CEO salaries grew rapidly
towards CEO salaries of other comparable private sector companies and that there was
minimal staff turnover. Because these were the CEOs of the government-owned companies
for some years prior to privatisation, the study concludes that these persons did extract rent
from privatisation.  A key question remaining in the study, is why were the CEOs in the
public sector prior to privatisation if they could obtain much higher private sector salaries?
One explanation for the growth of CEO salaries for the same CEOs, is suggested by the
result of Wolfram that the growth in salary was higher for those CEOs whose companies
had a higher price cap: various explanations of which include that of regulatory capture. A
second potential explanation is that because private (as opposed to public) sector companies
have a more credible objective of profit maximisation they rely more on incentives than
monitoring in their governance structures. Incentives typically entail payment schemes that
mimic to some degree the prizes of tournaments (Lazear and Rosen (1981)).  Under
tournament theory one would expect private sector CEOs to be paid a lot more than their
counterparts to provide strong incentives for those on the rungs below. Under this scenario,
CEOs that manage the move from public to private would gain rents. However, these rents
are in lieu of monitoring costs. All of the reduced monitoring costs may or may not show
up in the profits of the firm, since under public ownership these costs may been met by the
firm and the taxpayer by (via expenditures on government departments etc. that are
involved in monitoring). Nevertheless, under this story the higher salaries of CEOs are
legitimate resource costs and there is not a rationale for special treatment with respect to
DX .  The salary growth that is concomitant with the transition to private company provides
very strong incentives for SOE service managers to develop their businesses, if
privatisation is in prospect.  The salary structure of employees is a matter of public and
economic interest about which we will present what evidence we can.
There is an argument that an increase (decrease) in wages for the same work should be
included as a benefit (cost) of privatisation because these represent rent transfers between
the owners of the firm and employees and not real resource costs.7  Because it would be
impossible to assess jobs in this detail, and, typically, changed wages entail more than
transfers, and data are limited, we have not sought to explore this argument.
3. Further components of X will include any activities of the railways that were shed as a
result of the privatisation process.  Most of these were quantitatively very small and had
been shed by 1988.  The training of apprentices that railways once carried out, and now
does not, may have been an example while another example would include politically
inspired idiosyncratic requests.8 On the resource cost side, reduced cost because the
apprentice activity (say) was shed, is a loss of welfare to the extent that the value of this
activity exceeded its cost.  If the (identical) activity was taken up by polytechnic training
                                           
6 Evidence from other industries is discussed by Haskel and Szymanski (1994, ch.17).
7 For example, if increased wages are simply a transfer there is no net cost/benefit and the cost has
already appeared as an increased cost of production.
8 The apprentice training programme ceased by 1988The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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then there will be a welfare loss only to the extent that rail provided the service more
efficiently. There may be a welfare loss (from taxation) and the redistribution of income if
the polytechnic approach required individuals (or the state) to pay for their own tuition and
living expenses, when the railway had done so. These sorts of activities make a negligible
quantitative contribution to the cost-benefit analysis.  The fact that they had been virtually
eliminated by 1988 means that they have no role in the quantitative analysis.
Setting lx =1 implies that we do not distinguish the welfare of economic agents as between their
actions as consumers or providers of labour (DX  will largely be determined by the changes to
labour).  This would be justified, for any individual, by the standard labour/leisure choice that
results in the marginal rate of substitution being equal to the real wage, and across individuals,
by arguing that, under current policy settings, the tax, social welfare, health and education
systems are the mechanisms by which the appropriate trade-off between efficiency and equity is
set.
3.2 Output Markets - Segmentation
During the 1980’s competitive pressure that differed by market segments – broadly freight and
passenger - forced rail to focus on each of its output markets, with the aim of identifying what its
advantages were by sub-segment and thereby how to maintain market share and develop
profitability in each.  This approach quickly revealed three freight and four passenger sub-
segments.  The freight segments were all long haul, as rail could not compete on short haul
routes, while passenger markets covered long distance, suburban and InterIsland travel.  The
market segments are identified in Figure 1.
While each sub-segment is described by its own characteristics (handling requirements,
distance/volume factors, length of haul etc.) the cost characteristics and financial performance of
each segment also differs significantly.  Tranz Rail has quite deliberately targeted specific
segments for either growth in size and/or market share or profitability.  For example the bulk
goods segments are especially vulnerable to demand cycles for commodities and it has been
diversified to some degree by Tranz Rail's more recent efforts to expand the size of their
domestic door-to-door business which is less volatile but more competitive with trucks.
Because rail managed targeted specific market segments from the mid 1980’s, data in one form
or another are available to support the analysis.  While various organisational restructurings
resulted in changed managerial charts the core data that recorded inputs and outputs was
(generally) collected independently of the organisation chart and assembled to meet the
management structure of the day.  This consistency over time enables the welfare calculations to
be completed with confidence.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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Figure 1.
Flow of Goods and Segmentation Structure
TranzRail Flow of Goods
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4 DATA
The data used in the welfare calculations are from the same sources as the data that NZ Rail
Corporation, NZ Rail Limited and then Tranz Rail used for official reporting to shareowners and
for internal management reporting.  Further, the economic performance data used in the
productivity and economic profit calculations is from the same data-bases and is easily
aggregated to provide data by market segments freight and passengers.
There are two types of data used in the welfare analysis: measured performance data and
estimates of economic costs from a model calibrated for internal use by Tranz Rail.
1. Empirical performance data; revenues, costs, output volumes and input volumes all come
from rail data bases, especially financial (General Ledger) and operational (AMICUS)
statistics.  These data are [mostly] consistent over time at the freight/passenger segment level
and are supplied to ISCR by Tranz Rail in that form.  Data on sub-segments are not available
prior to 1988 (for freight sub-segments) and 1994 (passenger sub-segments) as a series of
internal business changes made consistent comparisons difficult before these times and
aggregate data are used instead.
Financial data are converted to constant 1997 dollars using Statistics New Zealand’s output
PPI index for each, except, labour costs for which Statistics New Zealand’s wage-rate index
is used, and InterIsland passengers where the CPI is used to convert revenues and prices.
Overall, these data are considered to be of very good quality and, except for the sub-segments
noted above, they are time consistent.
2. Estimates of economic cost, especially incremental costs by freight sub-segment and
replacement capital costs, come from rail’s economic cost models.  These data are however
derived from measured performance data as in 1. above, but are manipulated to yield
economic cost estimates for freight using the cost models.  The models are proprietary to
Tranz Rail but they employ industry standard engineering/operational rules for charging
freight capacity on the rail network and are founded on sound economic principles for
assessing average incremental costs (AICs).  The models were introduced by NZ Rail in 1989
and have been updated each year using costs of that year.  For the period prior to 1989,
incremental costs are estimated retrospectively by rolling the 1989 AIC’s backwards by the
actual cost changes experienced in the 1983-1988 period (more about this process is
described in Appendix 2).
In the absence of specific passenger-service cost models, economic cost estimates for
passenger sub-segments are derived from the detailed contribution analysis Tranz Rail
routinely undertake for each of its business segments.  This analysis captures the current
costs of labour, materials and passenger specific capital assets in a way that allows them to be
converted to estimates of average incremental costs.  The potential for error in the cost
estimates is largely confined to the area of assets and is thought to be small, in part, due to
the low weighting of passenger outputs in aggregate output.  Freight segments dominate the
variable costs; accounting for 72% to 78% of the total variable costs for the period 1983 to
1997 with the balance made up of passenger and Cook Strait ferry costs.
After detailed review of the models and the data that they produce, we are satisfied that the
estimates of economic costs are most adequate for this analysis.  As a point of quality control the
freight estimates were cross-checked against the detailed contribution analysis by segment that
Tranz Rail introduced in 1994.  While the results are not directly comparable, the two sets of
data are in broad agreement.   The main difference is evident in the capital costs where the
contribution analysis uses accounting depreciation on the historical cost of assets and interest
costs from the General Ledger of the accounts, while the cost models estimate capital employedThe Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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at current replacement cost and calculate capital costs using the real weighted average cost of
capital (WACC).
The following table lists our estimates of the economic costs expressed in constant 1997 dollars.
Readers are referred to Appendices 1 and 2 for a detailed explanation of how costs are
estimated, but briefly labour costs are the direct costs associated with the generation of outputs
and specifically exclude labour used to build or put in place capital assets.  Material costs are for
those items that are purchased outside the firm for use in the productive process.  They include
materials, fuel and electricity, operating leases as well as ordinary overheads.  Capital costs are
the gross value of the replacement cost of capital stock annualised at the weighted average cost
of capital.9
Rail is increasingly sourcing assets by way of finance and operating leases, examples of which
include computers, some vehicles and rail berthing facilities.  The lease costs are in effect the
current cost of the capital items that would otherwise be purchased outright.  Operating leases
include both asset and operating costs (eg: people such as drivers) and are counted as material
costs incurred in each year.  Finance leases are applied to locomotives and wagons and the
annual cost of the lease is recorded as material costs in rail’s accounts. Because these assets
appear in the replacement capital costs in this analysis and are charged each year at their
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) value they are separated out of the cost of material
inputs and included in capital.  A summary of costs in constant 1997 prices is provided in
Table 1.
Table 1 : NZ Rail Economic Costs - $m
Labour Materials Capital Total Cost
Mar-83 562.1 427.4 295.9 1285.4
1984 514.1 336.5 267.3 1117.9
1985 490.3 286.1 257.2 1033.6
1986 526.8 306.9 258.2 1092.0
1987 541.6 276.6 249.2 1067.4
1988 503.2 260.1 253.2 1016.4
June-89 429.7 304.8 232.1 966.6
1990 361.7 239.7 221.7 823.1
1991 280.1 242.1 204.7 726.9
1992 253.2 211.2 206.2 670.6
1993 238.3 193.2 164.5 596.0
1994 225.6 193.3 160.1 579.0
1995 215.3 216.8 160.7 592.9
1996 212.0 226.6 176.2 614.8
1997 202.4 233.1 185.0 620.6
                                           
9 The capital cost series is described in Appendix 2.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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5 PRODUCTIVITY
In this section we measure the total factor productivity – sometimes termed x-efficiency - of the
core business of New Zealand railways between 1983 and 1997.  An increase in total factor
productivity indicates the increase in output that can be achieved from the same level of inputs.
For any level of output, it reduces costs. The increased output from the same quantity of inputs
can arise from improved organisational efficiency or technical progress of various sorts.  It is an
important determining factor of social welfare in any market.
We adopt the standard approach of estimating total factor productivity growth in year t as
g[t] = g[q]- rsg[i]  where g[.] denotes rate of growth, q is output, rs is returns to scale and
g[i]= a1g[m]+ a2g[l]+ a3g[k]  is aggregate input growth constructed using the ai , measured
by cost shares;10 and m , l, and k , respectively, are material input, labour and capital indices.11
The growth in total factor productivity is measured as the difference between the growth in the
indices of outputs and inputs adjusted for returns to scale. If scale economies exist rs will exceed
one.  We assume that that there are no scale economies, and thus that rs=1. Although Rail’s
economic model does have a separation of incremental and fixed cost that might suggest
economies of scale, it is likely that this applies to the very short run decision making where
capacity may be bid for by the different sections. The fact that in any of the market segments,
rail has not obtained nearly 100% market share suggests that rail activities are subject to
decreasing returns at some point over their operational range, particularly in the relatively large
freight market. We report the productivity results as cumulative productivity indices.
It is likely that g[t] will reflect more than simply organisational gains in x-efficiency. Inputs
may embody technological advance. If this occurs but technological advance of the inputs is not
measured then our index of productivity growth will reflect technological advance as well as
organisational efficiencies.12  Relatedly, to attribute productivity growth to organisational
change requires that the output and input indices accurately represent output and input growth.
For example, if the labour index that we calculate under measures (e.g. by mis-estimation of the
growth in real wages) the labour input, it will positively influence measured total factor
productivity growth. Finally, we recognise that g[t] is a static concept in that it does not
measure dynamic efficiency - which entails choosing the timing and amount of investment in the
presence of adjustment costs, technological change and intertemporal market and organisational
issues. However, the growth of output, inputs and g[t] over time, together with information
about investment will enable an assessment of dynamic efficiency.
The productivity calculations should use the prices producers face (Diewert and Lawrence
(1999)) even if this requires adjustments to data to account for tax wedges.  Our firm-level data
essentially values inputs at the prices paid and output at prices received.  In terms of rail's profit,
subsidies provided explicitly for passengers are more difficult.  Until 1988 these were paid on a
per-unit-of-output basis, but after this time as a negotiated lump sum.  This complicates the
creation of a price index for these outputs.  Ideally output prices used in this analysis should
include output-specific subsidies as prices, but negotiated lump-sum subsidies, even if averaged
over passenger number and added to the passenger fare, very imperfectly represent the firm’s
marginal revenue from passengers.  We return to this issue in the welfare calculations.  For the
productivity study it is appropriately handled because output is indicated by passenger numbers
and total output includes them aggregated at their average incremental costs.
                                           
10 Aggregate input growth is calculated by means of a Divisia index.
11
 For a review and application of this approach see Kendrick (1973), and for an application to utilities
see Denny, Fuss and Waverman (1979).
12 See Norsworthy and Jang (1992) for discussion of the implication of quality changes for the
measurement of productivity and for the estimation of quality adjusted indices.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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5.1 Productivity Changes
Total factor productivity is described in Figure 2 in cumulative form. In aggregate, the total
factor productivity of the core railway business improved 79% in the period 1983 to 1997, at an
average of nearly 6% per year.  The majority of the improvement was to a considerable extent
the result of a 61% reduction in input growth, which was shared between significant reductions
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What is clear from these data is that there are two stages of change to rail productivity, the
period to 1989 saw only a small improvement (aggregate of +10%) with declines in 1986, 1987
and 1989; while for the period 1989 to 1997 growth averaged over 7% per year and +68% in
aggregate.
The productivity improvements that were gained following the establishment of the NZ Rail
Corporation in 1983 were not sustained and performance deteriorated until privatisation was set
as the goal in 1989.  This is entirely in accord with Orr's (1981) conclusion that productivity will
not be sustained under government ownership, even under corporation forms of governance.  It
is remarkable that productivity did not improve significantly between 1983 and 1989, given
rail's genuine attempts to meet increasing competition by restructuring.  One contributing factor
to this was the decline in output over the period that more than offset improvements in
productivity that appeared as cost reductions.  As discussed, it coincided with a period of
adjustment in all modes of transport under New Zealand’s economy-wide de-regulation (Evans,
Grimes, Wilkinson and Teece (1996)) and particularly road transport where distance limitations
were lifted in 1983.  However, it must be recognised that competition has been at least as
vigorous in the period since 1989 as before, particularly with the expansion of the importation of
used-vehicles, in both road and rail.
The turnaround in productivity of 1990 will reflect the fact that during the 1980s Rail
Corporation entered property development as a partial response to the declining demand for the
freight services. We estimate that the level of investment involved in this activity was not nearly
sufficient to explain the poor productivity of the period. But this diversification activity will
have diverted management’s attention from commitment to the core business of rail.
Furthermore, the investment in electrification during the period 1985-1989 – and in other core
rail assets for that matter - may also have absorbed management time and thereby created
investment adjustment costs that appeared as poor productivity. The commitment to
privatisation embodied management commitment to the core business of rail that is likely to
have contributed to improved productivity.13
                                           
13 Green and Vogelsang (1994, Ch4) suggest that commitment to privatisation is also likely to have
contributed to the productivity improvement of British Airways before its sale.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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The higher productivity growth rate since 1989 has recently slowed considerably due to
increasing levels of inputs (capital and materials) as opposed to the net input reductions of the
early to mid 90’s.  Aggregate output declined on average, in the period to 1989 but has grown by
nearly 4% per year since then.
While overall this 7% post-1989 growth of productivity is significant and compares to an
average 9% improvement in the total factor productivity of Telecom NZ Ltd. in the period 1987
to 1993 (Boles de Boer and Evans (1996)), it should not be a surprising result given that, to
arrest the market share losses to trucking and thereby simply survive, rail has had to increase its
productivity and thereby reduce costs substantially.14
New Zealand rail was placed in a de-regulated environment well before it was privatised or the
management planned privatisation.  The disjuncture between privatisation and de-regulation is
unusual (see McFetridge (1997)), but very useful in that it allow for separate conclusions about
the effect of these two events to be proposed.  We have pointed out that productivity of rail has
grown at the rapid clip of 7% since 1989 when management firmly adopted the goal of
privatisation.  The effect of de-regulation on privately-held railroads is indicated by
Friedlaender, Berndtard McCullough (1992) who report that total factor productivity in a wide
cross section of US railroads grew at an annual rate of 3.5% during the 10 years following the
railroad de-regulation of the Staggers Act of 1980.15  If this in indicative of what is achievable
by de-regulation in railways, the faster growth of New Zealand rail total factor productivity
since 1989 is suggestive of the influence of privatisation.  This performance may result from an
element of catch-up since 1989.  If so, it may be difficult to maintain this rate of productivity
growth.
5.2 Output Growth
The index of output volumes is constructed from the growth rates of the sub-segments of freight
and passenger markets, as described in Table 2.
                                           
14 Guria (1988) reports that the real price of transport fell significantly when limitations on road transport
were lifted in 1985.  The Telecom result is likely to have benefited more from technological change than
has that of rail.
15 The regulation of the rail industry in the US will have emphasised different factors differently from the
New Zealand situation, but regulation was of a common set of factors – tariff setting , entry restrictions
and financial structure (for the USA see Freidlaender, Berndt and McCullough (1991, 98-99)).The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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Table 2.











1984 0.0 6.2 6.8 0.0 -5.6 0.7
1985 -1.4 12.5 -11.2 0.0 33.6 -0.1
1986 -2.2 2.6 0.3 0.5 15.4 -1.2
1987 -4.6 -5.7 1.0 -4.9 29.0 -3.7
1988 0.4 -6.8 -40.8 0.5 6.8 -2.0
1989 -9.7 -7.2 0.0 -5.3 -2.2 -8.6
1990 3.9 -4.7 -39.6 12.2 18.5 2.1
1991 -12.5 -4.1 3.9 2.8 11.2 -9.5
1992 3.0 -6.0 16.9 6.3 2.5 3.3
1993 1.0 -6.0 6.5 12.1 -0.2 1.5
1994 13.4 -2.3 15.1 4.7 7.2 11.6
1995 12.9 1.0 -1.6 10.2 11.1 11.2
1996 1.8 3.9 2.3 -1.8 0.7 1.6
1997 7.5 4.7 4.2 3.8 6.4 6.8
Aggregate = +13.8%
Note:
·  Standard unit of freight volume is the NTK and is uniform across all freight sub-segments.
·  Actual observations of long distance passenger numbers for 1988 and 1989 are not available and estimates have
been used.
·  Units for measuring InterIsland truck volumes changed in 1991 but data overlaps allow time consistent
measurement.
·  Growth rates of total output are calculated by weighting each segment volume by its marginal cost estimate.  (see
Denny, Fuss and Waverman (1979)).  Because estimates of marginal costs for all segments are only available for
1995 to 1997, the marginal cost weighting by segment for this period are averaged and used in the previous
periods.
Aggregate output growth in the 14 years to 1997 was only +14% but, as with total factor
productivity, there were two very specific trends (see Figure 3). As a result of the decline in
freight market share and passenger numbers, in the period 1983 - 1991, cumulative output
growth fell until 1991/92. Since then, output has grown.  Unlike freight which contributed most
to the overall trend, individual passenger sub-segments have experienced varied output growth
with aggregate suburban passenger growth declining 12% over the period and long-distance
falling 36%; largely as a result of the halving of passenger numbers in the 1987-1990 period.
On the other hand the InterIslander service has shown positive output growth in both passengers
and trucks with the latter in particular experiencing very strong growth.  The changes in
passenger numbers reflect competition in that sector as well.  The importation of used Japanese
vehicles starting in the late 1980s lowered car transportation costs and affected public transport
ridership.
                                           
16 At the time these data were assembled no motor vehicle data were continuously available.  We have
learned that this dataset has recently been constructed.  The output index is not sensitive to the
inclusion of this series.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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Figure 3.
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5.3 Business Cycle
It could be anticipated that because rail outputs consist of substantial proportions of
commodities its output performance (and hence productivity and economic profit) will be
subject to business cycle influence.  One way of testing this proposition is to examine rail-
freight market performance during the early 1990’s when the economy was in recession (1991
and 1992) and growing (1994 and 1995).   In fact, rail’s market share was independent of both
market growth and GDP.  Rail continued the trend of the 1980’s and lost market share through
to 1996 during which period the market overall was going through periods of high and low
growth.  Data from stage 1 of this project show that while Rail’s share stabilised at about 14% as
measured in NTK’s in 1996, economic growth seemingly had little impact on its performance,
as can be seen in Figure 4.  This shows that road freight NTK’s grew throughout the period,
rail’s shrank initially then grew while GDP grew throughout.  Certain of rail's large volume
outputs (eg. coal) are largely for export.  Exports fluctuate according to foreign market
conditions that do not necessarily mimic New Zealand business cycles and this imparts some
independence between rail output and fluctuations in New Zealand economic activity.
As a result of this analysis we do not make any business-cycle specific adjustments to our
analysis.
5.4 Input Growth
Inputs are split into the three categories; labour, capital and materials.
Labour, formerly the biggest category of input by cost (40% in 1983, now 30% of total costs)
has shown major changes.  The basic measure of staff numbers has fallen from nearly 21,000 in
1983 to 4600 in 199717.  Aggregate growth of numbers employed has been  -136% since 1983.
                                           
17 Staff numbers represent full-time equivalent employed staff.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
112
Figure 4.
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Contracting out of various tasks and activities has occurred especially in the 1990’s.  Anecdotal
evidence suggests that a number of ex-rail employees are now providers of services to Tranz
Rail, in the same way that former Telecom Corporation staff became service providers to that
firm.  From a total factor productivity point of view, contracting out to ex-staff will appear as
declines in this category of input but will be counterbalanced by increases in aggregate material
inputs.
Though the fall in labour costs began in 1988, the big changes to the rate of growth of labour
inputs did not occur until 1989 when a 15% reduction was recorded and large (10% or more)
reductions continued through to 1992 (see Figure 5).  Although smaller in magnitude, the rate of
growth has consistently been negative since then18 .
Figure 5.
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By way of comparison average employment in US railroads changed relatively little between the
1980-85 period where the average was 33,284 and 1986-90 when it changed to 26,574.19
Closer to home, the Productivity Commission (1998) reports that the number of full-time
equivalents employed by rail in Australia fell by 38% between 1991 and 1997.
                                           
18 Labour expenses result from labour employed directly in the productive process and therefore do not
include labour that is used to build capital assets.  They do not include redundancy payments.  Detailed
data by type of labour (engineers, drivers etc) is not available and this analysis therefore cannot
estimate dis-aggregate changes to workforce “quality”.
19 Although US and Australian railroads differ to the extent that benchmark comparisons with NZ rail
are not definitive, changes over time do provide some useful information.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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For the subsequent welfare analysis we note the redundancy payments reported in Figure 6
relative to total labour cost.  Prior to 1989 redundancies were voluntary, but from this time
onwards they have been largely forced.
Figure 6.
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The rate of growth of labour expenses, placed in 1997$ by way of Statistics New Zealand’s
Wage Rate Index, has also fallen though not by the same amount as staff numbers.  The 94.5%
fall in aggregate growth of expenditure has resulted in the average real cost per staff member
rising from $27,000 in 1983 to over $48,000 in 1994 but falling since then (see Figure 7). The
bulk of the rise was completed by 1989 and there has been little change since then.  The increase
between 1987 and 1989 will reflect the lower wage rates of persons made redundant as
compared to the average wage.  For example, guards were made redundant in this period and
they did not draw high wages. Special-purpose public sector conditions of employment were
eliminated by the end of 1988 for much of the company. It took longer to restructure the
employment conditions of the Inter-Island ferries.
Figure 7.
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Executives of Tranz Rail have indicated that there were no special managerial incentive
contracts put in place in 1989, though there was Board discussion of these. However, the record
of privatisation world-wide is that public sector managerial salaries approach those of the private
sector upon privatisation (Wolfram (1998)), and this may have, for individual managers,
provided the anticipation of personal pay-off from privatisation. In fact the situation did change
in 1993: the new owners provided senior managers with private-sector employment packages
with performance incentives that included performance bonuses and for a small number of
managers, allocations of shares.  In May 1996, the IPO prospectus reports that 4.71millionThe Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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shares were held by executive officers. This holding would have provided very strong incentives
for the executives to improve the productivity of the company. Since the listing of the shares,
senior managers have held contracts that incorporate options and potential bonuses.  The higher
executive packages at privatisation have not applied sufficiently widely to employees of the
company to raise the real average wage since 1989.20
We conclude this review of labour by comparing the average labour productivity of New
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These data reveal a substantial increase in labour productivity over that of US railways the
average for which shifted from the 1981-85 average of 2,488 to that of 4,019 in 1985-90.21  This
confirms the relative total factor productivity comparison.  For Australia the Productivity
Commission reports that NTKS increased by 26%.  When combined with the decline in labour
the average labour productivity increased by 64% between 1991 and 1997, about half the
increase of New Zealand rail over the same period.
Materials, the next largest category of input is made up of a number of different sub-categories
(see Figure 9).  Among these are basic materials: these include items that rail purchase to run the
railway, in particular fuel and electricity, external contractors’ services, lease and rental
expenses and general (overhead) costs.  While detailed data by these sub-categories are available
from 1992, they are not available before then and it is not judged as consistent enough to allow
analysis at that the sub-category level.  Input growth rates are therefore analysed at the level of
“total materials”.
                                           
20 The average wage does not include the value of stock and options.
21 These are in revenue-ton-miles per employee.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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Figure 9.















What is evident from the trend in these sub-category growth rates is that overheads (which make
up nearly 40% of this category of input) have been stable in real terms, materials and fuel (23%
of total) have declined since 1992, while the growth of both contractors (25% of total) and
leasing (16% of total) has risen strongly since the early 1990’s. While contracting out work has
expanded since 1992, a major component of the growth of contracting will represent the
expansion in trucking services that Tranz Rail has implemented since the mid-1990s.  Since
1993, Tranz Rail have entered into a number of lease arrangements for various assets, especially
locomotives and wagons (in 1997) and (in 1999) the new Cook Strait ferry. Lease expenses
increased in 1996/7 because of the inclusion of the leases of locomotives and wagons.  To avoid
double counting with capital inputs the annualised amount of this lease has been excluded from
materials inputs in that year.22
As illustrated by Figure 10 overall aggregate material inputs have declined by more than 49%
with two trends visible, a significant and steady decline in growth through to 1994 and an
increase in growth in the 3 years since then.
Figure 10.
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Capital inputs are made up of those capital assets that are required to be in place and allow Rail
to operate its business of providing freight and passenger services to its customers.  These assets
have been allocated into 6 categories as follows.
                                           
22 For our purposes the lease annual cost is capitalised, excluded from materials and included in
capital.  Rail use other assets under operating leases that are rightly material inputs but are not included
in their fixed assets.  This latter category includes the ferry berthing facilities in Wellington, various
trucks and motor vehicles as well as computers and information technology assets.  They appear in the
materials category.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
116
Table 3 : Classification of Assets
   Asset Category Definition/Includes
   Right of Way Access to the land that the rail tracks are laid on. (did not exist pre 1993)
   Land Freehold land owned by NZ Rail Ltd for yards, offices etc.
   Buildings All buildings, offices, workshops, stores etc.
   Infrastructure etc All  track,  permanent  ways,  roads,  bridges,  signals,  electrification,
communications etc.
      Plant  Equipment  etc Rolling stock, locos, motor vehicles, other plant, computes and office
equipment, InterIsland facilities (excluding Wgton) and ferries.
   Work in Progress Assets in the process of being built.
Note that the assets do not include the land that the rail bed sits on.  Because this land was
retained in the previous NZ Rail Corp structure from 1990 onwards it is excluded from the core
business capital throughout the analysis.
Measurement of the economic value of these capital assets has been confounded by two events.
The first was the company restructuring and the consequent debt write off/capital restructuring
that took place in 1990 and the second was the value attributed to the assets by the private
owners in September 1993 and that is now entrenched in Tranz Rail’s balance sheet.
Table 4 : 1989-90 Asset Split
Fixed Asset Split - NZ Rail Corporation to NZ Rail Ltd, 1989 - 1990.
NZRC 1989 NZRL 1990 NZRC 1990
All fixed assets rail freight, rail bed land,
for rail-freight, rail passenger, some IT, houses
passenger, ferry, some IT, ferry, property,





There was a write-down of valuation as well as the re-allocation that took place in 1990.   Prior
to these events, NZ Rail Corporation had valued its assets using historical cost and depreciated
them in a straight-line fashion using conservative asset lives. The capital restructuring that took
place in 1990 was aimed at relieving rail of a large amount of debt that had been incurred
through interest costs, operating losses in the 1980’s and capital (mainly electrification) projects.
As was noted in the stage 1 report the debt “write-off” was implemented in June 1990 by
holding the debt in the old NZ Rail Corporation entity and creating NZ Rail Limited that held
only those core freight and passenger assets needed for it to operate the core rail business.  Of
the $1.1b of fixed assets that existed on NZ Rail Corp books at June 1989 only $159m of fixed
asset value was transferred to NZ Rail Ltd.  The value of the fixed assets was written down with
the bulk of the write down in rolling stock, electrification and permanent way formations while
land, non-core assets and investment property were retained in NZ Rail Corp.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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In 1993 the new owners allocated the total purchase price of NZ Rail Ltd23 to the net assets,
based upon an appraisal of the asset values.  This process resulted in the creation of an asset
called “Right of Way” which recognised the company’s right to use the Crown owned land that
the track was laid on and, in addition, the fixed assets were re-valued to $405.9m compared to
the June 1993 value of $290m in NZ Rail's accounts.  As a result of these events and actions the
book values do not adequately represent estimates of the economic value of rail capital stock for
any analysis of productivity or welfare.
The capital stock estimate used in the productivity analysis is the replacement value in constant
dollars.  It is the cost in $1997 to reproduce the rail freight and passenger network to meet the
capacity requirements in each year of the analysis.  This approach is preferred because it
represents the current maximum value of the inputs used.  If the replacement valuation is correct
it will capture the impact on capital of the capacity changes necessary to meet market conditions
as well as reflect the technology changes that are implemented for performance related reasons
such as cost reduction or quality improvements.  Appendix 2 describes in detail how the capital
stock was estimated for this analysis.
Figure 11.
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Figure 11 is the chart of cumulative growth of replacement capital for the core business only.
The method of estimating capital pre 1989 inevitably includes investment that was in non-core
assets but that spending is thought to have been small compared to investment in the core
business and will therefore not feature in the capital growth reported here.24
While the book value of Rail assets climbed dramatically between 1983 and 1989, estimates of
the replacement value declined in real terms through to 1991 as the network was refined to meet
smaller volumes of freight and fewer passengers, and combined with better asset utilisation.
Also, prices of elements of capital fell.  The investments made in improving network
performance, such as larger, faster trains made up of wider bodied wagons, appeared as reduced
capital input particularly in the period 1988 to 1992.25  The turn-around to a small growth in
capital from 1992 and sustained growth from 1994 is noticeable.  It consists of substantial
investment in standard rail assets such as, locomotives and rolling stock.
                                           
23 While the full purchase price was $400m, $77.1m was applied to pay off bank debt and $332.9m was
paid to the government for the shares.
24 Capital expenditure in 1985 – 1989 included investment in electrification.
25 In 1983 Rail had more than 26,000 wagons in service and over 500 shunting and mainline
locomotives.  Lower volumes of freight, faster trains and technology developments reduced these to
10,000 wagons and 280 locomotives in 1992.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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5.5 Productivity growth contribution to welfare analysis
Total factor productivity growth of the core business of New Zealand railways indicates the
increased output from the same quantity of inputs that has arisen from improved organisational
efficiency and technical progress of various sorts. Productivity indicates changes over time in
the output attainable from a given set of employed inputs. It is an input to the welfare analysis of
privatisation in that it is one explanation for welfare effects. It should be noted that no account
has been taken in the measurement of productivity of factors such as subsidies, or employee
severance costs. This reflects the fact that productivity analysis simply seeks to measure the
change in (aggregate) inputs and outputs. The measurement of welfare requires taking account
of the broader set of factors that enter cost benefit analysis.
The productivity advancement of rail will result in a lowering of the cost of operation of rail,
and this is direct input to the welfare calculation. Under constant returns to scale the
approximately 2% (7%) per annum productivity growth between 1983 and 1989 (1990 and
1997) would reduce costs at the rate of 2% (7%) per annum.26  Thus, the considerable
productivity growth that we have estimated will directly lead to cost reduction and hence
welfare gains.
                                           
26 See the appendix of Boles de Boer and Evans (1996).The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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6 ECONOMIC PROFIT BY SEGMENT
As previously discussed (section 4.3.1 of stage 1 report) in a competitive market for
intermediate goods, producers’ surplus in the rail market is simply represented by the economic
profit or surplus that is generated by rail.  This is a key input to the welfare analysis.  We
describe the producer’s economic surplus before proceeding to the complete analysis.
Here we seek to quantify the “economic profit” or surplus that rail was able to generate from
each of its market segments over the period 1983 to 1997.  By economic profit we mean the real
economic surplus that remains after all costs are deducted from the real revenue stream.  The
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Figure 12 illustrates the feasible disaggregation of cost that is possible.  Within each sub-
segment box, contribution (revenue less variable cost) of each sector can be calculated.
However, there are some costs that are attributable to Total Freight and Total Passengers but
which cannot be assigned to individual elements of these categories.  Those are termed
‘Segment Shared’ costs27.
The category of other-revenues includes the revenue from items that are not central to the core
business of rail.  These include telecommunications and property interests, for example.  While
other revenues only reached 10% of total revenue in any year, they have to be included because
they utilise shared and corporate overhead costs.
Data sources for this analysis have been described earlier.  They combine the performance data
from financial and operational databases with the economic cost models of the freight and
passenger networks.  A number of minor issues were encountered and dealt with as follows.
1. Cost data for the period prior to 1990 includes those costs incurred by both the property and
bus passenger businesses and in generating various minor “other” revenues (joint ventures,
catering and the like).  Because these costs cannot be simply eliminated from total
shared/common costs the corresponding revenues are also included.   It is recognised that the
resulting economic profit (or loss) from these business areas will mean departures from core
                                           
27 A substantial portion of the individual segment shared costs are reported in the segment contribution
analysis that TranzRail conducts internally however a number of asset types (IT for instance) are shared
across both freight and passenger segments and cannot be attributed to a particular segment and
thereby allow a true segment profit to be calculated.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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business results prior to 1990 compared to after that year (remember that the business was
core rail only after 1990), however the small magnitude of these “other” revenues do not
seriously influence the overall results of the analysis, as already mentioned.28
2. To recapitulate, total costs are not accounting costs from rail’s accounts but are economic
costs that are derived from the financial data as follows.  Both labour and material cash costs
are per the annual accounts but are net of capital works and are converted to constant 1997$.
Leasing costs are not included in materials but the concomitant capital is included in the
capital stock (as for the productivity analysis).  Annualised capital costs are derived from
estimates of capital employed in each year and an estimate of rail's cost of capital that is the
WACC as described in Appendix 2.  Accounting depreciation is included as a proxy for
economic depreciation at the “corporate shared costs” level because it cannot be attributed to
particular activities, but interest charges are removed from the sum of total rail costs.
3. The model's estimates of incremental costs are used in this analysis.  Deviations in actual
from our estimates of variable costs (AIC’s) are more likely in the 1980’s when Rail did not
have detailed economic models.  The large economic losses that were incurred during this
period are less sensitive to incremental cost estimates (which are simply used to determine
contribution to profit by segment and sub-segment) than to the magnitude of the
shared/common costs which had a larger impact on the big losses experienced in the 1980’s
(see Appendix 1 for a discussion of the calculation of shared costs).
We depict an economic surplus that includes passenger subsidies.  While these subsidies are
over and above market revenues they must be treated as revenue in the computation of
producer’s surplus.  The presence of the subsidies led rail to make particular decisions and to
incur costs that it would not have incurred without them.  It is recognised that the welfare cost of
the economic surplus should be adjusted for the fact that these originate from taxes, but this can
be done in the GR term of the welfare calculation.  To pressage this calculation, we note that if
the subsidy covers an un-priced externality e.g. congestion – the subsidy-inclusive producer's
surplus may reasonably accurately represent welfare without any tax adjustments.  If there is no
externality then it should appear in the net government revenue (GR) welfare term as well as
economic profits and be adjusted for taxation and be subject to the cost-of-taxation multiplier.
Our subsequent discussion refers to the subsidy-inclusive producer’s surplus unless otherwise
indicated, and we shall not adjust by the tax multiplier or include the subsidy in GR.29
The freight segment contribution changed from positive to negative in the mid 1980’s simply
because real unit freight revenue was falling at a faster rate than variable costs.  As previously
identified, rail did not really get to grips with its (largely fixed) cost structure until 1989 and
1991.   In particular, this occurred when it had shed staff and concomitantly moved as much cost
as possible to be variable to volume.30  These staff reductions are reflected in the trend of the
economic profit from the freight business.
                                           
  28 Their aggregate varies in size up to 10% of total revenue.
29 Note that if the passenger subsidies are unaffected by privatisation they will net out of the welfare
calculation in any event.
30 In part, the switch to volume related expense was implemented by contracting  out.  In effect, this
replaced long-term contracts with piece-rate contracts.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis 122
Table 5: Rail Producer’s Surplus
(in 1997 $)
1983198419851986198719881989199019911992199319941995199619
Freight Segment Contribution ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ---
Passenger Segment Contribution ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ---
Total Contribution 45.3 67.4 19.4 (39.7) (24.3) (64.3) (57.3) (10.7) 15.5 35.9 49.6 72.3 125.3  127.4  12
Segment Shared Costs* Because this category of cost can only be partially id
Other Revenues 83.96 93.59 88.94 109.78 119.34 136.69 123.19 130.19 69.17 68.96 22.16 15.75 68.52 58.19 55
Corporate Shared Costs 639.9 541.6 524.6 552.6 552.8 545.8 567.6 428.1 353.8 343.9 236.1 203.0 254.0 263.5 26
Economic Profit = (510.6) (380.6) (416.3) (482.6) (457.8) (473.4) (501.7) (308.6) (269.2) (239.0) (164.3) (115.0) (60.2) (78.0) (84
Excluding Subsidies = (597.9) (452.6) (474.5) (540.5) (516.6) (526.3) (521.7) (328.6) (289.2) (259.4) (185.4) (133.5) (82.1) (99.8) (10
* See footnote 14 for an explanation of these costs and why they cannot be separated from corporate shared costs.  Readers should also note that the annual capital cost (replacement value
times WACC) is included in this calculation in two places.  The portion of the capital that is peculiar to freight (locomotives, wagons etc) is counted in the
freight segment contribution via the cost models. The same is true of passenger-activity capital.  Those portions of the capital that cannot be counted in the
segment analysis (less than 20% of the total capital) are included in corporate shared costs.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
123
Two events led to improvement in contributions from both freight and passengers during 1991 –
1997.  Firstly rail’s costs were reduced by productivity growth.  Secondly the declines in
passenger volumes slowed (some segments even grew in volume
As noted Rail did not manage to make any serious reduction in the overall level of real costs
until 1990 when they reduced staff numbers, cut materials costs and when the balance of “non-
core” costs, such as property, were retained in the NZ Rail Corporation.  This trend shows up in
the level of shared costs in this analysis which remained between $500m and $600m in real
terms until 1990 when they start to fall and dropped to a low of $203m in 1994.  The slow
decline of shared costs from 1990 suggests that the property cost component was small. The
inclusion of other revenues 31completes the picture and reveals the following trend in
cumulative economic profit of rail.
Figure 13 reveals that the producer’s surplus was negative at the start of the period and it has
remained negative, with losses of more than $4.5b having accumulated over the full period.32  It
is noteworthy that the trend changed noticeably (ie: the losses became smaller) from 1988/89
when privatisation of the core business was planned.  It is also noticeable that this pattern agrees
closely with the time path of productivity improvement.
Figure 13.
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Figure 14 shows that the operating surplus of rail has been positive in recent years.  However,
this surplus does not take account of capital costs: these need to be included to evaluate rail’s
success in covering all the resource costs it incurs.  Figure 13 shows that the inclusion of capital
costs, at replacement value, results in a negative economic surplus.
                                           
31 Other revenues are made up of revenues identified in Rail accounts as “other” or property, as well as
revenue from joint ventures, asset sales and investment income that is not generated from the market
segments described here.  Property income was the largest of the other revenue, growing to be $82m
(constant 1997$) by 1989, after which it was retained in NZ Rail Corp.  These various revenues have to
be included in the analysis because the costs associated with them for the 1983 to 1989 period are
included in shared costs and simply cannot be identified for exclusion.
32 For a description of the economic surplus at a WACC of 8% see Appendix 4.  It has the same broad
features as Figure 13.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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Figure 14














Rail's economic performance will be studied more deeply in Section 8.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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7. OWNER NET REVENUE - GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE
In this section we describe the financial effect of rail on its government and private owners.
7.1 Government
The government as owner could put cash into rail in ways that include direct cash subsidies for
market services, equity inputs of various sorts, cash injections for special purposes (say a
restructuring or to meet general losses).  Equally it could remove cash from rail by way of
company taxation, regular or special dividends, share repurchases or other one-off transactions
(such as a sale).
The government had traditionally subsidised passenger services and this continued through to
1988.  From this date passenger-service subsidies have been provided by local government.  The
position is described in Figure 15.  For the purpose of the welfare analysis we will treat these
subsidies as the purchase of passenger services by central government and then local
government.  This treatment does not differ between pre and post privatisation.  To the extent
that the subsidy is an efficient response to an externality problem it would not enter the welfare
calculation of privatisation.  It would, however, be an important component of any analysis of
the public interest in closing down rail commuter passenger services.
Figure 15 provides a break down of the cash injections by government in rail.  Direct cash inputs
to rail were by way of passenger subsidies for both long distance and suburban rail services, take
over of the 1990 debt plus injection of new equity and the ongoing subsidies from (local)
government of suburban passenger services33.  The totals are expressed in 1997$. It should be
noted that the 1990 debt and equity input is net of the debt that existed in 1983 and therefore
represents the net debt accumulated in the 1983 to 1990 period.
Figure 15.
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The cumulative Government cash position in constant $ described in Figure 16 falls into three
definite stages, the period to 1989 which was pre-privatisation, the period 1990-1993 when the
sale occurred, and the period of private ownership to 1997.
In the period to 1989, $1480m in constant 1997$ was provided to Rail, $450m was cash for
passenger subsidies (which are counted as revenues in the analysis of economic profit and are
therefore excluded from this review of cash injections) and the remainder was debt write off to
                                           
33 Prior to 1989 passenger subsidies were calculated on a per head basis.  Since that time they have
been a negotiated block grant.  They are reported in 1997 prices in Figure 15.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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that time, represented here by the losses on operations including investments on various projects
plus interest on the accumulated debt.  This cumulative representation of government investment
in rail is an informative way of accounting for the total $1.2b of debt that the Government took
over in 1990 and paid off, simply because the capital projects were funded by debt accumulated
during the 1980’s. Of this $1.2b, approximately $1.05b was a direct transfer from government.
34 It should also be noted that during this period the Government received no cash by way of
tax, dividends or other special payments (see Figure 16). The government injections as they
occurred are represented in Figure 15.
The period from 1990 to the sale transaction in 1993 saw a further $494m in 1997$ provided to
rail.  The net amount was made up of a $406m equity injection to cover other debts including
capitalised interest, plus $160m of capital investment to account for the balance of the debt write
off, as before.  The Government, for the first time the period of our analysis, received dividend
payments in 1992 and 93 as well as $60m nominal for redeemable preference shares that Rail
issued.
Figure 16.
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From the Government cash point of view a major turnaround occurred in 1990, after the
commitment to privatisation and  restructuring, and then again after 1993 when Rail was sold.
Since 1990 there have been no cash injections.  In 1993 (fiscal 1994) it received the proceeds of
the sale and since then it has also received tax income (see Figure 17).
Figure 17.










                                           
34 The records of NZ Rail Corporation since the restructuring of 1990 indicate that in 1996 the
Corporation held $397m. in debt that fell  due after 1999, and that the sales of property, buses etc had
yielded approximately $140m.  This to be balanced against the $1.2b debt.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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Nevertheless, for the full 1984-1997 period the government invested $1120m in 1997$ more in
rail than it received.  As owners, the Government did not receive any cash from Rail until 1990
when it paid a small dividend on the redeemable preference shares, with the shares paid back in
1992 and 1993 prior to the privatisation.  The Government received the proceeds ($400m) from
the sale in the 1993/94 year along with the usual tax stream.
7.2 Private Owners
To 1997 the private owners' cash position fared little better than the Government, having spent
$400m of nominal 1993$ to purchase the company, plus $342m of investment capital to 1997
while receiving only $23.2m in cash dividends.
Share ownership in private hands has changed since privatisation in 1993 as follows:
Year ending June 1994 1997
USA major owners 54% 28%
NZ major owners 37% 28%
Other   9% ---
Public owners   0% 44%
Dividends paid by Rail to its private owners has been limited to the following:
1993 to 1996 Nil
1997 $23.2m
1998 $10.7m (year not included in analysis)
The capital invested in rail by private owners is described in the following diagram.
Figure 18
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Much of the aggregate capital investment of $343.5 over the period has been financed from
retained earnings. Debt has not increased commensurately with the level of investment (see
Figure 19b).
Debt and equity levels in Tranz Rail are described in Figure 19a.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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Figure 19a.












The following figure provides more detail about the company's valuation over time.
Figure 19b.
Shares Value $m Debt Total
Share Price IPO 6/1996 = $6.88 126m $957m $162.3 $1119m
Share Price 6/1997 = $8.50 126.7m $1041m $65.2 $1106m
Share Price 6/1998 = $5.20 121m $629m $270 $899m
Share Price 6/1999 = $3.20 121m $387m $278 $665
The change in the mix of debt and equity from 1995 to 1996 resulted from the sale of 27 million
shares in Tranz Rail to public investors by way of a public offering.  The IPO was over
subscribed and by 1997, 44% of the company was owned by public investors around the world.
The cash raised was used to pay off debt.  The shareholding structure over time is shown in
Figure 19c.
An indication of the return to private owners is provided by their ex post returns. The ex post,
nominal, compound annual return on the investment of $400m provided by dividends plus the
increment in market value is approximately 28% to 1997 and 11% to 1998. These are ex post
returns and they will be subject to all the factors that enter the share market’s performance as a
whole, as well as those of the company.  Depending upon when shares have been realised,
investors will have had an experience of varying profitability.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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Figure 19c.
Shareholding Structure (% of total)
Sept 93 June 94 June 95 June 96 June 97
Wisconsin Central 27.3 26.7 31.3 22.7 22.5
Fay Richwhite 31.8 31.1 28.2 20.4 19.2
Berkshire Assoc 27.3 26.7 25.2 18.3 5.4
Public/Other Co's 9.1 8.9 8.0 30.4 43.8
David Lloyd 4.6 4.4 4.0 2.9 2.9
Management 0 2.2 3.2 5.2 5.5
S t a f f / D i r e c t o r s 0 0000 . 6
Total Share on Issue – m 114.7 121.8 95.1 126.8 127.6
Share Price $6.88 $8.5The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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8 THE ECONOMIC POSITION OF RAIL
It is important to establish the position of rail as it has been in the past and as it is now.  It is
generally argued (see McFetridge (1997) and Schleifer (1998)), that privatisation strengthens
incentives for dynamic efficiency as well as for productivity improvement. Dynamic efficiency
is economic efficiency, or welfare, over time, that emanates from investment decisions and the
adoption and adaptation of technological change. Evaluation of it must be carried out conjointly
with estimates of the welfare consequences for a complete appraisal of privatisation.  Changed
welfare and dynamic efficiency taken together indicate the public interest in privatisation. In this
section we provide the basis for this total evaluation.
We can summarise the key features of NZ Rail’s performance as follows:
·  There has been significant productivity growth especially since 1989.  It dropped slightly
in 1996.
·  With capital valued at its replacement cost, rail has produced a negative economic surplus
for each year since 1983.  The productivity spurt of the 1990’s has meant that this
economic loss has been at its lowest in the mid – late 1990’s.  Following the path of
productivity, economic surplus has grown, but waned in the last year or so, and has never
been positive in our data.
·  At the segment contribution level, revenue less directly avoidable capital and operating
costs shows a surplus
A key conclusion is that rail’s economic surplus has been negative throughout the period of our
data. The fact that it is negative in 1997 means that our latest estimate of this surplus is negative.
Whether or not 1997 is a good prediction of the future is a matter that would require knowledge
of further internal productivity gains that are possible for rail.  For the future economic surplus
to become positive would require productivity gains relative to other modes of transport, not
simply gains in the absolute level of productivity.35
                                           
35 Because of New Zealand’s unique characteristics, comparison with rail in other countries is fraught
with difficulty.  Nevertheless, we report that information on the Association of American Railroads
suggests a picture of mixed performance since deregulation of 1980.  Following a long period of
restructuring, including disinvestment, since 1996 there has been an upturn in volumes and in 1997 a
small upturn in employment.  But there seems to be no evidence that the railroads are generally
meeting their cost of capital.  The position is mixed because of factors such as major long distance
haulage contracts that have resulted from environmental regulation changes that specify the use of low
sulphur coal.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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The negative economic surplus throughout the period of our data, including 1997, should be
viewed in the context of Figure 20. This figure depicts (approximately) rail’s financial
performance since its inception in New Zealand.  Apart from the pattern of revisions to its
financial performance under episodes of corporatisation mentioned in Stage 1 of the report, the
figure shows the deteriorating financial viability of rail since 1920.36  Productivity has improved
hugely since 1989, but it has not yet yielded a non-negative economic surplus on the
replacement cost of its assets. Before examining the implications of this negativity we
cursarially evaluate the robustness of this conclusion for 1997.37
                                           
36 For much of its existence Rail’s financial viability has been propped up by restriction on competition
from road (1934 – 1985), by forcing other trading enterprises to use rail (for the case of Postal Services
see Smith (1997, Ch.1) and by subsidising their use of rail (eg. coal, Statistics New Zealand Yearbook
(1981)).
37 Figure A4.1 of Appendix 4 shows that if the cost of capital is left out, the operations surplus was
negative until 1993.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis 134
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The following is the 1997 economic surplus of rail calculated under different scenarios.  Each
presume that outputs, inputs and, unless otherwise specified, relative prices are maintained at
their 1997 levels.  Each therefore incorporate first round effects only in that output and input
levels have not adjusted to changed relative prices.  This is expected to only materially affect
Cases 3 and 4 below where rail’s share would be expected to expand: hence the economic
surplus is understated in these cases.  In all cases passenger subsidies are included and land on
which the long-distance rail bed sits is excluded from capital.
1. Economic surplus in 1997 -$85m (12% WACC)
2. Economic surplus in 1997 -$54m (10% WACC)
3. Economic surplus in 1997 -$77m (fuel cost doubles, 12% WACC)38
4. Economic surplus in 1997 -$41.5m (road user charges double, 12% WACC39
Case 1 is repeated from our previous economic surplus calculation. In Case 2 we lower the
WACC to the discount rate proposed by Treasury at the beginning of the 1980s for the
evaluation of public sector projects.  Case 3 is an estimate of Tranz Rail’s surplus when the price
of fuel is doubled, thereby increasing the cost of road transport relative to rail, and consequently
allowing rail to raise its freight output prices and remain in the same competitive position with
road freight transport. In Case 4 the effect of a doubling of road-user changes is reported.
Finally, we note that, from the analysis of Appendix 4, including externalities other than
congestion would not materially affect the key conclusion that the economic surplus is negative:
congestion, we assume, is covered by the local passenger subsidies. Most of the welfare cost of
externalities that rail ameliorates is incurred in urban areas, and hence it would only have
implications for welfare if these rail services ceased.
The negative economic surplus persists under these various alternatives. We conclude this brief
review of the negative economic surplus by noting that the costs of rail versus that of other
modes of transport are critical for the level of rail’s economic surplus. Because rail operates in
competitive markets the prices it can charge for its services are set by the costs of alternative
modes of transport (see Part 1). For the economic surplus to be a measure of rail’s contribution
to welfare, it is essential that other modes are paying their full social costs. We have not
investigated this issue except to explore the order of magnitude effect of changes in road user
charges on rail's economic surplus.
Our calculation of rail producer surplus has used the replacement cost of assets and annualised
them at the full opportunity cost of capital.  The negative economic surplus suggests that the
enterprise is not covering the maintenance and updating of its existing assets.  If other transport
modes are paying their social costs,, from an economic welfare perspective the negative
economic surplus means that the value society places on rail’s outputs has been for the last 14
years, less than society’s valuation of its inputs.  Taken at face value the cumulative loss in
economic welfare is estimated to be $4.5b over the past 14 years.
If there is no prospect of a non-negative producer surplus for rail then, although productivity has
improved hugely, there is no rationale for continuing to maintain and replace its assets.  The
options in this circumstance include selling up the business immediately and recovering the
salvage value; or switching away from, perhaps traditional, rail activities that are not making a
contribution, to those activities that are doing so.  We do expect that the qualitative conclusions
that rail has had difficulty meeting its replacement cost and therefore the present value of its
                                           
38 This scenario is included as an illustration of the impact of an external shock to the relativity of road
and rail (the doubling of fuel costs say) on the competitive and economic position of Rail.
39The rail-price effect of doubling road user charges is based on Road Transport Association truck
survey data.  These data imply long distance truck road user charges of 12.3% of total costs.  For NTK
this is 1.24c.  Thus based on rail's 1997 NTKs rail's economic surplus should improve by $43.5m
because the increase is assumed to be reflected fully in transport prices.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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economic surplus may be higher under restructured activities is reasonable. This conclusion can
be checked by the market valuation of the company.
The present value of the company was;
$1.5b - replacement cost (Appendix 2: $1997)
$1.1b  1997 debt and equity (Figure 19b)
$0.9b - 1998 debt and equity (Figure 19b)
$0.66b  1999 debt and equity (Figure 19b)
$0.4b   - salvage value (Appendix 3: $1997)
Figure 19a shows that in 1997 the total of debt and equity was approximately $1.1b which is
close to our estimate of the replacement value of the company ($1.5b). In 1998 debt plus equity
fell to $0.9b.  Despite considerable investment – a total of $231m in 1996 and 1997, the market
value of the equity nearly halved in 1996-7.  While the analysis would benefit from controlling
for changes in the level of the sharemarket between years and for any IPO effects, both these
valuations suggest that the market is assessing rail as in prospect of not maintaining and growing
the traditional core rail business, but restructuring aspects of this business.
Friedlaender, Berndt and McCullough (1992) report a very similar position for U.S. railroads for
the decade following de-regulation in 1980. By 1990 the number of Class 1 railroads and
railroad labour had been halved: route mileage had been reduced by almost a third. The
companies’ rates of return had increased dramatically, but not one railroad was consistently
earning its cost of capital. The study suggests that activity divestment that had taken place in
railroads to 1990, had a considerable distance to go before rail companies regularly earned a
competitive return.
In 1988 and again in 1992 Government policy advisers were concerned about the possibility that
rail would not be maintained.  Our analysis indicates that, despite a huge increase in
productivity, restructuring some traditional rail activities is a possibility.  If current and past
relative prices and passenger subsidies capture social costs even approximately, it will be
dynamically efficient and enhance welfare if this takes place. We acknowledge that this assumes
that other modes of transport are paying their full social costs and that there may be internal
efficiencies to be gained from the rail business that may change this conclusion.  Such efficiency
gains must improve productivity relative to that of other modes of transport.  For social costs of
competing modes of transport to be properly accounted for requires that the infrastructure and
other input of shipping and road transport, particularly, are priced at a level that covers their
social costs.
Investment and disinvestment decisions under private ownership will be taken by management
in concert with strategies approved by the board.  In contrast to public ownership, it will be
subject to the constraint of viability, monitoring and acceptance by the debt and equity
markets.40  Providing other modes of transport are meeting their social costs, private and social
investment criteria will coincide.
                                           
40 Although there is some monitoring under public ownership it is much less intense and the monitors
cannot instantaneously express their assessments in a way that quantitatively reveals them: eg. By
selling shares or denying debt.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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9 THE WELFARE OUTCOME OF PRIVATISATION
The method of welfare calculation has been set out in Section 3.  In subsequent sections we have
canvassed all inputs that are relevant to the calculation.  In this section we impose the
counterfactuals and assess privatisation.
In Section 3 we mentioned that what the government receives from privatisation may differ from
the elements of the company’s cash flow that goes to government because of various factors,
including those related to different tax rules in different tax jurisdictions.
There is a second reason why this difference may occur.  It is that the elements of welfare we
want to use should of themselves be our best estimate of welfare components.  In particular, we
use our calculation of producer’s surplus instead of accounting profit.  Producer’s surplus is an
estimate of society’s willingness to pay for rail output less society’s valuation of resources used
in producing this output.  Accounting profits materially deviate from this by accounting
conventions, including the treatment of capital. Our use of producer’s surplus values all inputs at
their opportunity cost and the method of valuing capital and including costs means that
producer’s surplus in each year is an estimate of the surplus that would continue over time if
investment strategies, productivity and prices did not change over time: in this sense it is a static
concept. The valuation of capital at its opportunity cost means that producer’s surplus will not
represent actual cash flows.41 For this reason the actual cash flows to Government will not be
represented by producer’s surplus even when rail was owned by government.
It is not actual cash received or disbursed by government, adjusted for the cost of taxation, that
indicates welfare changes emanating through the government from privatisation: rather, the
governments financial position should be on an accrual basis.  Because of government guarantee
of NZ Rail Corporation debt until privatisation, the government could and did accumulate
liability through the Corporation’s accumulation of debt.  In addition, given that some debt was
supportable by the company, the extent of this liability is a matter of judgment.  In fact, the 1990
cash injection (see Figure 14) is the government’s action as shareholder, declaring in one lump
sum an amount representing the accumulated deficits of rail.  We take the view that it is the
government’s accruing net position with respect to any SOE that is the appropriate entry to the
welfare calculation.
For the counterfactual that is the situation of 1989, the government budget impact will be
calculated for each year as (see GR1 of Table 6)
GR=R-C
Where R consists of; dividend payments (to 1993), share repayments (to 1993), tax payments
and the sale price: and C to 1993 consists of increments in rail debt each year and direct
investments in rail by the government as owner (eg share purchase). This process presumes that
the government equity in rail is zero in 1989 when the debt restructuring was implemented:
government investment from 1989 and the performance of the company are presumed to create
the equity realised in the sale price.  It treats the period before 1989 as sunk and not relevant to
the quantitative comparison.
In the counterfactual relating to 1993, history as represented by the government’s equity interest
in the firm must be taken account of in order to properly capture the accrual of equity that is
represented by the sale proceeds. We do this by presuming that the company entered 1993 with
                                           
41 This annualised cost is constructed on an ex ante basis and therefore producer’s surplus is not that
which is actually realised.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
139
equity valued at the share repayment of 1993 plus the equity component of the sale price.42 This
means that there was no accrual of equity for this counterfactual: the government simply
received tax revenue after the sale (see GR2 of Table 6).
We multiply the change in the government’s position attributed to privatisation by 1.2 to account
for the welfare cost of taxation, but we also report the welfare assessment without this cost-of-
tax adjustment.
Because producer’s surplus represents the sum available to service debt and equity we subtract
from the producers surplus that is used in the welfare analysis any withdrawal by government as
owner (see • 1 and • 2 of Table 6).   The fact that we are not distinguishing between domestic and
foreign owners means that we need not do this for the privatised company.
                                           
42 On an accrual basis the government entered 1993 with an asset that was equity in New Zealand
Rail.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis 140
Table 6
Welfare $1997m
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Government
Pte. Owner GR1 ($163.10) ($564.80) $1.95 $26.19 $43.01 $341.30 $24.64 $23.95 $12.57
Pte. Owner GR2 $1.01 $13.00 $24.64 $23.95 $12.57
G. Owner GRcf1 ($163.10) ($163.10) ($163.10) ($163.10) ($163.10) ($163.10) ($163.10) ($163.10) ($163.10)
G. Owner GRcf2 $1.01 $1.01 $1.01 $1.01 $1.01
?GRcf1 $0.00 ($401.70) $165.05 $189.29 $206.11 $504.40 $187.74 $187.05 $175.67
?GRcf2 $0.00 $11.98 $23.62 $22.93 $11.56
Economic Surplus s ($501.72) ($308.57) ($269.20) ($239.00) ($164.34) ($114.97) ($60.15) ($77.97) ($84.79)
Pte. Owner s1 ($501.72) ($308.57) ($271.15) ($265.19) ($207.35) ($127.96) ($84.79) ($101.92) ($97.36)
Pte. Owner s2 ($165.35) ($127.96) ($84.79) ($101.92) ($97.36)
G. Owner scf1 ($501.72) ($501.72) ($501.72) ($501.72) ($501.72) ($501.72) ($501.72) ($501.72) ($501.72)
G. Owner scf2 ($164.34) ($164.34) ($164.34) ($164.34) ($164.34)
?scf1 $0.00 $193.15 $230.57 $236.54 $294.37 $373.76 $416.94 $399.80 $404.36
?scf2 ($1.01) $36.38 $79.55 $62.42 $66.98
Labour ?X ($89.00) ($54.00) ($83.00) ($44.00) ($15.00) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 ($12.00)
Welfare ?Wcf1 ($89.00) ($342.89) $345.64 $419.69 $526.70 $979.04 $642.22 $624.26 $603.17
?Wcf2 ($16.01) $50.76 $107.90 $89.94 $68.85
Welfare in 1997 ?Wcf1 ($220.36) ($758.02) $682.23 $739.63 $828.78 $1,375.47 $805.60 $699.17 $603.17




1.  Includes payment of equity ($47m and $328.30m) to the government.
2.  1.2DGRcf1 +   Dpcf 1 -   DX
3.  Compounded at 12%The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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Congestion externalities are accounted for with the inclusion of urban passenger subsidies as
revenue to rail.  Redundancy payments make up X.
The counterfactuals that we use as base cases are the situations in 1989, 1993 and 1993
deteriorating to the 1989 position after 1997.  For each of these, the last year, 1997, will be
treated as though the position is an equilibrium state that will persist to the forseeable future.
Although trends could be forecast into the future, we have not done so.  Such trends are a matter
of conjecture and it is unlikely that the most recent economic-surplus trend of 1996-97 will
persist.
To summarise the welfare analysis we present the calculated welfare values in 1997 of the
privatisation act, assessed against the three counterfactuals.43 These are:
1. privatisation from 1989: $9.8b. ($9.2b44., $10.6b.45)
2. privatisation from 1993: $0.9b. ($0.9b., $1.0b.)
3. privatisation from 1993
returning to 1989 performance from 1997: $5.4b. ($5.1b., $6.4b)
They give the increment in welfare evaluated at the one point in time, 1997.
They each indicate that welfare is higher because of privatisation. The gains reported under
counterfactual 1 are substantial, but they are not out of line with the aggregate value of the
producer’s-surplus losses since 1983, since these are not compounded to 1997 and do not
include a calculation as to future losses.  It is the order of magnitude that would result from
eliminating these losses: but the welfare calculation is affected by other factors.
From Figure 20, it is clear that the decision to privatise coincided with one of the worst
measured financial performances in the history of rail.  In contrast to the very poor performances
of rail in the 1970s, however, the fact that rail in 1989 was in a de-regulated market meant that,
unless transport was to be re-regulated, rail could not respond to its plight simply by raising
prices or having market restrictions imposed.  The large welfare gain resulting from
Counterfactual 1 reflects the very significant recovery that rail has made from its position in
1989.
The economic argument that welfare change from the date of commitment to privatisation will
precede the privatisation act (Beesley and Littlechild (1992)), and the empirical findings of
Weyman-Jones (1994) that productivity increased in the UK electricity distribution sector
between the announcement and act of privatisation are in accord with our finding for
Counterfactual 1.  This counterfactual incorporates the “commitment to privatisation” effect and
quantitatively it is most significant.
Counterfactual 2 may well describe the best possible scenario for government ownership, in that
the counterfactual incorporates all the productivity gains to 1993 from vigorous restructuring
and increased customer focus, and maintains that position. If this occurred, it would be the first
time in the history of New Zealand rail that such gains were locked in. Counterfactual 3
represents the hypothesis of a cycle of productivity of corporatisations under government
ownership and quantitatively a compromise between the other two.
                                           
43 For counterfactual 1 (2) these are calculated as the sum of the second-to-last (last) row of Table 6
plus the present value of the 1997 figure in the second-to last (last) row at a 12% discount rate.  For
counterfactual 3, the sum of the last row and the present value of the 1997 value in the second-to-last
row is used.
44 The first figure in brackets places no shadow price on taxation.
45 The second figure in brackets uses a WACC of 10%, and discounts and compounds at this rate.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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The incidence of the benefits and costs of privatisation are also of interest.  Because rail
produces largely intermediate services, is in largely competitive markets and has maintained all
its services, the main incidence effects lie with taxpayers and the firm owners. Taxpayers are the
big direct gainers from this privatisation.  Not since privatisation have taxpayers had to
contribute to rail. In the past, transfers to rail from taxpayers have been very substantial.
Between 1983 and 1993 the government actually invested approximately $1.8b (in $1997) for
the return of the sale price and dividends and tax that reduced the net injection to $1.12b.  Under
the counterfactuals, injection of government funds would have been much higher. The actual
incidence of this gain across the population will follow that of taxation under either existing
rates if no change is made or under any new rates. The benefits to taxpayers of productivity
gains induced by privatisation were presaged by Harrison and Grimes (1989) and Hogan (1990)
who showed that providing firms were more productive in private hands the government’s net
income position would be improved by privatisation.
Employees of rail who have involuntarily retired from rail and have subsequently not found
equivalently satisfying work have lost from the activity.  A measure of their welfare loss is
included in the welfare calculation, but the incidence of it has fallen on certain former
employees.  Those executives who were allocated shares at privatisation and who sold them
before, or at the IPO are likely to have done well out of privatisation.
Finally, the return to private owners has been volatile and significantly different between 1994-
97 and 1994–98.  The nominal ex post return of the latter period is 11%.  It means that the
private owners have not earned the firm’s cost of capital and hence have not gained from rail
over ownership of investments in the market more generally.  Although, ex post returns are very
volatile and will differ, perhaps markedly, from year to year, this conclusion is in accord with
the estimate of economic surpluses.  The equity market seems to recognise the economic and
financial position of rail.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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10. CONCLUSIONS
Starting in the 1880s New Zealand rail has had five episodes of corporatisation under state
ownership. Under these episodes the rail business seems to have improved commercially but the
improvement was not sustained. The data suggest that this was true as recently as the
corporatisation of 1983.  New Zealand commentators have identified the inability of the
business to be run independently of actual and potential political influence as a key feature of
unsustained performance, and this is what the governance literature of modern economics would
suggest.
Excepting the corporatisation episodes, the broad financial trends of the New Zealand rail
business have evidenced increasing difficulty with competing with other modes of transport
since the 1920s. From the early 1930s all sorts of mechanisms have been used to shore up the
viability of New Zealand rail in the face of emerging competition. The de-regulation of all
modes of transport in New Zealand in the early to mid 1980s forced rail to confront its situation.
Historically, it was in its best position to perform well as a public enterprise business; for
although it was not an SOE, the 1980s was a period when there was a sustained attempt to
separate out political requirements and improve the commercial performance of public
enterprise businesses.
Throughout the 1980s New Zealand rail struggled to come to terms with the increasingly
competitive environment. Our productivity analysis suggests that total factor productivity
growth was slow during this period, not least because of rail’s falling share of its traditional
outputs. The enormous societal cost of having shorn up New Zealand rail since the 1930s might
be indicated by the accumulated producer’s (surplus) loss of $4.10b in 1997$s over the 1983-93
period alone. This does not include the costs of indirect forms of assistance to New Zealand rail,
including carriage restrictions applied to other public enterprises during the period.
The purpose of this study was to examine the effect on welfare of the privatisation of New
Zealand rail.  Because of the unique features of rail in New Zealand an appropriate
counterfactual would seem most likely to be drawn from New Zealand experience, although
buttressed with observation of performance from other countries.46   In 1988 a commitment to
the privatisation of New Zealand rail was made by the Board of Directors and later the
management of the company.  Plans and actions from this date were designed to this end. They
entailed focussing on the core rail business. The actual timing of the sale of the company was
determined by the evolving commercial state of the company as well as political exigencies.
Just prior to sale, the viability of rail was of real concern to government and its advisers, to the
extent that the possible run-down of rail in private hands was a major element of a report
commissioned by Treasury.
Non-viability had two implications.  The first is that the highest bid for rail in the sales process
may well have been above the salvage value but entail winding down key parts of rail.
Secondly, providing the revenues and costs of rail reflected the full social benefits and costs of
rail, winding down these parts would be economically efficient.
In 1989 the decision to commit to behaving as if rail was to be privatised had been taken, rail
was performing poorly despite substantial investment since 1983.47  W e  t a k e  a s  o u r
counterfactuals to privatisation the state of rail in 1989, the state of rail in 1993 and the state of
rail in 1993 declining, after 1997, to the situation of 1989.  In Stage 1 of this study we proposed
                                           
46 The counterfactuals for the privatisation of rail will include relevant information from a study of New
Zealand SOE’s that is currently under way; when data are available.
47 Some elements of this investment was not in rail’s core business.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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returning to zero profit from 1993, but, as we have shown, the economic surplus did not reach
breakeven point in our data.
In many previous studies privatisation has been implemented at the same time as de-regulation.
In the case of rail the major transport de-regulatory steps took place in the early-mid 1980s.
Although adjustment to the more competitive environment may still be going on, the fact that
privatisation is dated from 1989 at the earliest offers the opportunity to distinguish the effect of
privatisation more sharply than if de-regulation and privatisation occurred simultaneously.
10.1 Counterfactual : 1989
The change in welfare resulting from the privatisation decision in 1993 we estimate to be $9.8b
as of 1997.  This result reflects a very significant recovery from the very poor performance of
1989.  It is an outcome of productivity growth that we estimate reduced ongoing costs by the
order of 68% over the 1989-1997 period.  This growth has outstripped productivity growth in
other public (Australia) and private (U.S.A.) railroads that we are aware of.  It is significantly in
advance of the productivity growth achieved in the 1983–88 period in New Zealand rail.
There was significant investment and restructuring during 1983-88 that included the
development of certain non-core business activities.  This is likely to have diluted management’s
focus on the core business, affected productivity adversely and the economic surplus of the 1989
counterfactual. The commitment to plan for privatisation in 1988 coincided with a decision to
strip away all but the core rail business.48
10.2 Counterfactuals : 1993 and 1993 with deterioration
The position in 1993 was reached with rail as a public enterprise but with the commitment (by
the Board and management) to privatisation in place.  It most likely represents the position of
best commercial performance attainable as a public enterprise.  Without the privatisation
incentives for managers that attend privatisation it is very difficult to maintain innovative
productive performance.49  For this reason and because of the hypothesis - suggested by the
history of New Zealand rail - in that public enterprise improvements in productivity are not
sustainable we consider the counterfactuals of 1993, and 1993 returning to the state of 1989 in
1997.  The changes of welfare are:
1993: $0.9b
1993 and deterioration to 1989 from 1997 $5.4b.
as of 1997. Both sets of privatisation welfare gains are important. Based on our reading of the
literature and on the history of New Zealand rail it would seem that the 1993 counterfactual
would be the lower bound for welfare gains from privatisation. It is not just that it entails
maintenance of the 1993 position in absolute terms, but the productivity of the position must be
maintained against that of other modes of transport. Rail has not achieved this in its history of
government ownership. These results will reflect productivity that continued to improve under
privatisation, with the exception of 1996.
                                           
48 Interestingly, Friedlaender, Berndt and McCullough (1991) report that the initial response of U.S.
railroads to de-regulation was to diversify. They too returned to focus on the core rail business after their
diversification experience.
49 This has been emphasised to us by certain SOE CEOs in the course of our SOE performance study.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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These quantitative results are based upon the evidence between 1983 and 1997.  The negative
economic surplus over this period renders problematical the sustainability of the
counterfactual situations over time and the stability of the 1997 performance into the future.
Mention has been made that it is unlikely that the 1989 situation would have persisted for a
long period, and the same may be true of the 1993 counterfactual and 1997 performance.
Nevertheless they are reasonable estimates for the period of our data.
The SOE model that was established under the 1986 SOE Act arguably represents New Zealand
governments' best attempt at commitment to state-owned entities that perform to the standards of
private firms.  It is, however, new and untested.  The study in-progress of certain of New
Zealand's SOEs will provide information about their performance.  It will be useful over time to
compare these performances with New Zealand rail's performance as a public entity.  The
comparison of the counterfactual of SOE performs with that of rail in private ownership will
provide additional information about privatisation.
The welfare assessments are a quantitative indication of the impact of privatisation on economic
efficiency: and hence of economy-wide performance. They reflect the history of public
enterprise that has no effective bankruptcy constraint and which has operated only with very
substantial transfers from taxpayers. We calculate the economic loss, at replacement capital
value, between 1983 and 1997 to be $4.5b, excluding measures designed to shore up rail that
affected other industries.  Taxpayers are major gainers from the privatisation because of the
elimination of their commitment to funding rail losses under public ownership.
The returns to the private owners depend on when that calculation is made, but indications are
that they have not benefitted nearly to the extent of taxpayers: as of 1998 their ex post return was
approximately 11% in nominal terms which is less than the ex ante cost of capital.  Although the
returns to different investors may have been quite different because of variation in the share
price, since the inception of private ownership the compound return has not exceeded what
could have been expected on average, from other investments.
10.3 Dynamic Efficiency
Dynamic efficiency is a critical element of the performance of an economy and the economic
efficiency of ownership forms in particular.  It is our assessment that Tranz Rail has been
maintaining its core-business capital assets and modernising them to lower costs and to meet
customer requirements.  Indeed, investment in the last two years has been in core–long-distance
freight capital goods as well as in the renewal of the InterIsland ferries.  For these actions to be
dynamically efficient requires that the economic surplus derived from them be positive, at least
prospectively.  The long-term trend for rail and our analysis both strongly suggest that this test
of dynamic efficiency has not been met, either in public or yet in private ownership.
Given the long history of public ownership, privatisation might be assessed as an attempt to
provide the ultimate test of the economic viability of rail.  In this context, and given uncertainty
about productivity of rail in private ownership, an entirely reasonable strategy would have been
to take time to improve productivity in order that a better assessment of the economic position of
rail could be made.  Taking stock now, it would seem that further productive gains, relative to
other modes of transport, are required if all traditional rail services are to be economically
sustainable.  In the event that these are not possible, and the relative prices of all modes of
transport properly reflect social costs,50 it would be in the public interest that some businesses
of rail are restructured.
                                           
50 This would require that road and shipping transport infrastructure and other inputs are priced at a
level that covers their full social cost.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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If relative prices of competing modes of transport do reflect social costs then public and private
interests will coincide.  Given these prices, the history of rail in New Zealand suggests that there
has been enormous government and social cost incurred in the past in retaining rail as a state-
owned entity. The record suggests that appropriate investment and dis-investment decisions are
more likely now that rail is in private ownership.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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APPENDIX 1 : THE COST MODEL
Estimates of Incremental Costs
As was noted earlier estimates of average incremental costs (AIC) for the rail freight system in its
entirety are derived from Tranz Rail’s cost models and we are satisfied that they adequately
represent economic costs.  It is important to understand the cost structure of the rail system, in
particular which costs are variable to volume changes and which are shared or common.  The
following table describes the cost structure as used in this analysis and expands on the brief
discussion that is in section 5.
Table A1.1
Cost Aggregation - Stage 2 Productivity Analysis
Freight Segments
BulkFlow
CargoFlow Revenues ) Shared
)
Forestry less ) Contribution freight
)    = by
Kombi Variable ) freight management
)s e g m e n t s
Refrigerated Costs ) costs
Distribution





Revenues ) Shared IT,
TransMetro AK ) rail pass'gr
less ) Contribution passenger other.
TransMetro WN )    = by costs
Variable ) passenger management
InterIslander ) segments Shared
Costs ) ferry costs
Trucks costs
Variable = $/volume = AIC
Hillside  Revenue and Expenses 
Hutt are excluded where they
Passenger Charters are able to be identified.
Shared costs is the total of these cost levels.
·  The variable portion of the freight costs is calculated by the freight cost models.  The
models simply estimate by segment, the costs of providing the freight network to move the
annual freight capacity in NTK’s.  The individual unit costs are averaged by their shares in
total freight NTK’s to give a “total” freight variable cost, which is subtracted from total
freight revenue to show contribution (to shared costs) from freight segments.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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·  In the absence of passenger cost models, total passenger variable costs are converted to AIC
by dividing the total variable cost by units of output.  By deducting variable cost from
revenues gives the contribution or economic profit for passenger segments.
·  A number of shared costs are excluded from the analysis of economic profit by segment,
fixed freight and passenger costs which are not volume sensitive, shared passenger
management costs, corporate costs and the costs associated with the construction and
maintenance activities at the workshops.  These costs are summed to provide total are these
your corporate shared cost shared costs that are included at the aggregate Tranz Rail level to
calculate overall Rail profit.
·  Also, as was noted earlier there are a number of miscellaneous revenue sources that are
excluded from the segment analysis but are also included because their costs cannot be
distinguished from the aggregate shared costs.
This approach was able to be used in the period 1990 to 1997 only; because economic costs by
freight and passenger segments were not estimated prior to 1990.  For the period 1983 to 1989 the
1990 estimates of cost were rolled back or adjusted each year using the average year on year cost
change for actual costs.  This is, the average variable costs in year x were changed in the
proportion TC(t-x)/TC(t) where TC is total cost.  This process should provide a reasonable
estimate of segment costs simply because NZ Rail Corp were slow to respond to the changes in
their markets prior to 1988, which meant cost levels were not significantly affected by technology
and process changes, though the collapse in their market share meant that they had spare capacity
in the network for much of the period.  While this means that variable costs probably fell faster
than our estimates indicate, this point is minor and is offset to a large degree by the lower network
capacity used for the initial 1989/90 cost estimates.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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APPENDIX 2 : CAPITAL STOCK AND WACC
Estimation of Capital Stock - Replacement Value
This section describes the process used to estimate the gross replacement cost of the capital used
by Tranz Rail to deliver its outputs.  Replacement value is used as the maximum value of the
resources tied up in the rail business, and in this analysis is expressed in constant 1997 $. The
normal series has been deflated using the PPI for inputs, except where values are estimates (4,5
and 6 below).
·  Tranz Rail’s accounts do not have an accurate current record of the book value (where
historical cost less depreciation = book value), with the best view of book value being back
in 1983 prior to a series of events that confounded the view, e.g.:
·  North Island Main Trunk Electrification was added in the 1980’s at a cost far above
its economic value. (ref: Coopers & Lybrand 1989 review of this project)
·  Rolling stock values in the 1980’s were way above replacement costs. (values were
significantly reduced in 1990)
·  In 1990 book values were reset to market (cash generating) value.
·  In 1990 approx. $900m of asset values were written off.
·  In 1993 book values were arbitrarily reset by the new owners.
·  In 1993 a new RoW asset was added.
·  The usual problem of estimating replacement capital values is overcome by using the
RailCost average incremental cost model developed for NZ Rail by Travers Morgan/BCG
in 1989.  This model calculates the replacement value, and annual costs, of the freight
system on a standalone basis.  It uses engineering rules to size and scope the network and
activity analysis to operate it.  It uses annual capacity requirements and current costs to
estimate network unit costs and then calculates financial performance by segment based on
revenue/price decisions at that time.  Replacement capital costs are reconciled by Tranz Rail
to current book values and the model “run” is done each year 1990 to 1996.  We do not
make this adjustment.
·  The gross capital value of the freight network is converted to an annual “charge” by
recovering the cost of the assets over their economic lives.  The average recovery rate in the
model was 13.6% in 1996, though each type of asset has its own recovery rate.  To reverse
engineer a gross value, the annual capital charge is “marked up” by this rate to derive an
aggregate capital value for the freight system.
·  Standalone rail passenger assets were assessed by Tranz Rail for replacement value in 1993
and, on the basis that little change has occurred to passenger capital costs those figures are
used in each of the years 1990 to 1997.  Any investments in Tranz Scenic assets in recent
years are thought to be minor quantitatively.
·  Cook Strait ferries have been valued by Tranz Rail at their 1997 replacement cost of $390m.
Examination of the capital goods index for the period 1990 to 1997 indicates that the cost of
goods of this type have dropped only a minor amount through the period and the 1997
replacement cost is therefore used throughout.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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·  An amount of $150m has been added in each year to account for IT, motor vehicles,
buildings, trucks and other assets needed and owned by Rail in the productive process.  This
is purely an estimate and is about 10% of the total replacement value of capital.
·  Nominal replacement values for the period 1990 to 1997 are estimated using the following
approach for the 1983 to 1989 period when there was no cost model.  The 1990 gross
“closing” capital is rolled back to the 1980s using the “closing value + depreciation - capex
= opening value” calculation.  The assumption here is that accounting depreciation rates in
the 1980’s were a fair representation of the economic lives of the assets.  If this is not the
case however, and verifying it is difficult, then the sensitivity to this assumption is very
minor in the assessment of capital.  Nominal values are then converted to constant 1997$
using the PPI for inputs.
By way of comparison, capital stock for Rail has been estimated by Professor Brian Philpott.  His
estimates give a gross capital stock of $2720m for 1983, expressed in 1997$.  This compares
closely with the $2450m of gross stock that we have estimated in this analysis.  The Philpott
analysis is made up of $2853m of building and construction (50% is land) and $1291m of plant
and equipment.  Right-of-way land is excluded in the model and is also excluded from the Philpott
estimate.  His most recent estimate was for 1987, at $1950m, which again is close to our 1987
figure of $2080m.
Figure A2.1
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Estimation of the WACC
The weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is required in order to annualise the aggregate
capital stock in the calculation of capital’s contribution to productivity growth as well as the
annual cost of the capital resource used in producing the economic surplus that we calculate for
Rail. The WACC can be viewed as the appropriate hurdle for investment and thus it plays the
same role as ex ante user costs (see Lawrence and Diewert (1999)) in productivity studies. We
accept the argument that the WACC should be the same ceteris paribus for Rail as an SOE as a
privatised firm (see Hathaway (1994)).
The key features of our Rail analysis for the WACC calculation are that the analysis is conducted
in real terms, thus a real WACC is required; and the cash flows being discounted are pre-tax rather
than post-tax.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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Incorporating these features, the cost of equity capital is
re = rf + beMRP
where rf  is the risk free rate of interest and MRP is the pre-tax market rate of return. The nominal
WACC is then
WACCN = r d(D/V)+ re(E/V)
where rd is the interest rate on debt and the value of debt (D) plus equity (E) equals the value of
the company (V). We then subtract the expected rate of price increase from WACCN to obtain
WACC.
We seek an expected real cost of capital for the entire period, rather than attempt to calculate a
WACC for each period. Thus the components of the formulae are long term in nature. Our starting
point for the calculation is the post-tax WACCN of the report of CS First Boston of July 1992.
Upon adjusting back to a pre-tax basis (except the MRP) their estimate of pre-tax WACCN would
be 14.7% to a close approximation.
The conversion to the real WACC requires subtracting from NWACC the appropriate rate of
inflation. If rail’s output and input prices were expected to grow at the same rate, this rate would
be the appropriate rate at which to adjust NWACC. Nominal output prices hardly changed over the
period of this study.  According to the Statistics New Zealand wage rate index nominal wages
grew over the period to the early 1990’s but have changed little since that time: over the full
period they averaged 3% annual growth. Their nominal transport capital prices index grew
approximately 1.5% annually between 1989, when it was introduced, and 1997; but it has declined
in the period since 1993.  These price data suggest that nominal prices facing Rail either did not
grow over the period of the analysis or grew to the early 1990s when they have changed little or
declined.  Where these prices are static WACC=NWACC. We adopt a very conservative position
on the WACC and use 12% for all our analysis. This represents a considerable allowance for
expected inflation and/or uncertainty about other components of the calculation.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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APPENDIX 3 : SALVAGE VALUE
Estimation of Capital Stock - Salvage Value (1997)
This section describes the approach to estimating the salvage value of Rail assets.  In the same
way that current replacement value represents the maximum economic value of the assets, the
Tranz Rail assets also have a minimum value that is represented by their scrap or net salvage
value.
1. In 1989 Rail management commissioned an analysis of the net liquidation value of the core
business, just prior to the 1990 restructure.  The NLV report was prepared by Beca Carter as
professional plant and building valuers with ferry valuations from marine surveyors,
contractual obligations valued by Rail’s lawyers while property and redundancy costs were
internally assessed.  Despite being prepared in a short space of time the exercise was a
complete review of the rail business.  The NLV was assessed as follows in 1989;
NZRC assets excluding ferries and land $305m
Ferries $  20m
Land  $  81m
Total $406m
less:
Assets :  those already sold $135m
Capex committed $  61m
Salvage value of assets $210m
Liquidation costs $112m
Contract obligations $  95m
Severance costs $313m
Net liquidation value ($310m)
2. When reporting to Treasury in 1992 advisors did not have the time to repeat the exercise but, in
view of the structural changes to NZRL in 1990, they estimated the NLV to be at worst half the
1989 amount.
3. The 1989 asset valuation exercise cannot be sensibly updated without significant effort
however because we need to provide a point estimate of the salvage value of the assets to
establish the minimum capital of Tranz Rail in 1997, a salvage value for this year could be
estimated as follows;
1989 Asset values $305m
less: assets since sold & liquidation costs $153m
plus: 30% of gross capex since 1989 + ferries $246m
Total salvage value $398mThe Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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APPENDIX 4 : SENSITIVITY OF ECONOMIC SURPLUS TO WACC
As discussed in Appendix 2., the estimation of WACC in real form is subject to some
uncertainties.  Our adopting 12% as a conservative estimate prompted sensitivity tests on Tranz
Rail's economic profit as follows:




A lower bound of 8% is seen as a minimum.  It is the weighted average of Tranz Rail's debt rate.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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APPENDIX 5 : EXTERNALITIES
In any welfare calculation, it is important to include external benefits and costs.  These are the
components of total social benefits and costs that are not accounted for by the private market.  In
our calculation, the crucial externalities to consider are related to (i) road safety, (ii) road
congestion, and (iii) the environment.  When a driver considers travelling an additional kilometre
on a roadway, she does not take into account the accident risk that she imposes on other drivers,
the additional time delays she causes for other drivers if the roadway is congested, and the
additional environmental harm caused by emissions from her vehicle.  Rail transport can reduce
these external costs by diverting travel from roads.  Rail has some externalities associated with it
as well – primarily environmental externalities – so we need to consider the net effect of diverting
travel from roads.  We will consider the impacts from a scenario in which we have the status quo,
a privatised Tranz Rail, versus no rail system at all.  This provides an upper bound on an estimate
of the externalities from privatisation.
Environmental externalities.  Petrol-powered vehicles emit hydrocarbons (HCs), nitrogen oxides
(NOx), and carbon monoxide (CO).51  HCs and NOx react in the atmosphere, in the presence of
heat and sunlight, to produce a variety of damaging oxidants, the most important being ground-
level, or tropospheric, ozone (O3).  They also produce secondary carbon, a component of
particulate matter (PM).  Diesel-powered vehicles emit some PM directly and also emit sulfur
oxides, primarily sulfur dioxide (SO2) which contributes to particulate formation.  NO2, which is
formed in the atmosphere from other NOx emissions, also contributes to particulates.
Evidence on ambient air pollution conditions in New Zealand is limited.  The evidence that does
exist suggests that ozone, CO, and particulates are problems in some urban locations at some times
of the year.  It is well-known, for example, that Christchurch has a fairly pronounced CO and
particulate problem during the winter months and that vehicle emissions are a major contributor.52
CO readings from monitors on busy roadways in Christchurch and Auckland are above acceptable
levels – i.e., levels that the international community have designed to protect human health.  The
Ministry of Transport (1997) estimates that total CO emissions would need to fall by over 80% in
those “hotspots” to obtain acceptable air pollution levels.  Evidence on ozone is extremely limited
but it is thought that some problem exists in some areas of Auckland during the warm summer
months.  Because of the strong winds it often experiences, Wellington probably does not have a
CO or ozone problem, but the Hutt Valley experiences an occasional problem during the winter
months and roadside particulate emissions in Wellington city could be a problem. Meteorological
conditions suggest that Hamilton, Rotorua, and the Napier/Hastings area are also candidates for
CO problems at certain times of the year. Again, more monitoring is needed.
Recent research on the health effects of various pollutants suggests that particulates are of the
gravest concern, particularly those emissions less than 10 microns in diameter, PM10 (Schwartz,
1994).  A recent study by Kenneth Small and Camilla Kazimi (1996) summarises evidence on the
health benefits of reducing HC, NOx, and PM emissions from motor vehicles in the Los Angeles
area.  These benefits are reduced mortality, in the case of PM emissions, and reduced morbidity
from PM and ozone reductions.  As explained above, HC and NOx emissions combine to form
ozone, and PM results from direct emissions of particulates and also from HC, NOx, and SOx
emissions.  The Small and Kazimi study accounts for all of these effects.
                                           
51 Vehicles running on leaded petrol also emit lead but with the gradual reduction of lead content and
then the introduction of lead-free fuel, this problem has become less important.
52 Burning of wood and coal in open fires is a more important contributor, accounting for 90% of
particulate emissions – specifically PM10 – and 50% of CO emissions during the peak pollution events in
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We use the benefit numbers in the Small and Kazimi study, and we confine our results here to
these health benefits.  We ignore non-health benefits, because such estimates are more speculative.
There are no studies of the health benefits of CO reductions so we ignore CO here (as do Small
and Kazimi).  We also ignore any direct benefits from reducing emissions of carcinogens such as
benzene and 1,3-butadiene.  Although the Ministry of Transport (1996a) presents some evidence
on this, we do not have information about emissions of these pollutants from locomotive engines
making it impossible to calculate a net external benefit number.  We focus our attention on local
air quality and ignore greenhouse gas emissions.  Greenhouse gas emissions are a serious global
problem, but we feel they should be ignored in our calculations since any change in New Zealand
would have no discernible impact on global warming.  Air emissions can settle on roads and run
off into waterways, causing damages in the form of aesthetics, harm to aquatic life, and possible
health effects.  We present some evidence on the externalities associated with run-off from
Ministry of Transport (1996a), but the estimate is very rough.
We assume that only emissions in urban areas impose a cost on society.  This is an important
assumption because it means that most emissions – those that take place in rural areas from either
trucks or rail – impose no costs.  In assessing the air pollution benefits of rail, we assume that all
Tranz Metro passengers would travel by car if suburban rail were unavailable, and we assume that
all freight would be moved by trucks if rail were not available.53
Table A5.1 below shows emissions from cars, heavy-duty diesel trucks, and diesel locomotives, in
grams per gallon.  Truck and locomotive engines are designed differently and thus have quite
different emissions per unit of fuel consumption, despite the fact that both engines run on diesel.
Locomotive engines drive electrical generators and the electrical generators produce the power to
actually drive the locomotive down the tracks.  Moreover, trucks and locomotives have different
operating patterns to which their respective engines have to respond.   Another point worth making
is that these are emissions per unit of fuel, not emissions per tonne-kilometre.  The Association of
American Railroads reports that, on a tonne-kilometre basis, locomotives emit one-tenth the
hydrocarbons and particulates of trucks and one-third the nitrogen oxides and carbon monoxide.
Table A5.1 - Emissions from Cars, Trucks, and Locomotives
(in grams/gallon)
Cars Heavy-duty trucks Locomotives
Hydrocarbons 128.8 19.59 10.83
Nitrogen oxides 56.25 132.68 276.90
Particulates 1.21 24.87 6.89
Carbon monoxide 1167.25 81.70 27.46
Note: Car emissions from Ministry of Transport (1996a), Appendix F, converted to grams/gallon assuming an averag
fuel efficiency of 25 miles per gallon; heavy-duty truck emissions from U.S. EPA (1998), converted to grams/gallo
assuming an average fuel efficiency of 6.18 miles per gallon (see Small and Kazimi, Table 4); locomotive emission
from U.S. EPA (1997).
Gross benefits from suburban passenger rail.  We know the number of passenger trips each year
on Tranz Metro.  We assume that the average trip length is 10 kilometres to come up with an
estimate of the annual kilometres diverted from roads. Using the Small and Kazimi benefit
numbers (in U.S. dollars per tonne of emissions), we calculate the gross environmental benefits of
suburban passenger rail as $3.0377 million (U.S.) in 1994 and $3.3084 million (U.S.) in 1997.
Gross benefits from freight services.  To obtain the kilometres diverted from roads by rail, we
assume that an average truck carries 20 tonnes and travels 300 kilometres.  Combining that
information with the actual tonnes moved by rail in 1994 and 1997, we obtain an estimate of the
kilometres of travel that would have taken place by trucks in those years if there were no rail.  We
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assume that 14% of that travel would be in urban areas.54  Combining this with the Small and
Kazimi benefit numbers and U.S. EPA (1998) estimates of truck emissions, we calculate a gross
environmental benefit of $8.79 million (U.S.) in 1994 and $10.74 million (U.S.) in 1997.
Net benefits.  To obtain the net air quality benefits of rail in the two years, we need to subtract the
cost of emissions from locomotive engines in urban areas from the gross benefit estimates above.
We again use the Small and Kazimi numbers, combined with fuel consumption figures from Tranz
Rail for 1994 and 1997 and the locomotive engine emissions estimates from U.S. EPA reported in
Table A1 above.  Our estimates of the environmental cost of rail are $9.24 million (U.S.) in 1994
and $10.68 million (U.S.) in 1997.
This means that the net environmental benefits of rail in 1994 and 1997 were $2.59 million (U.S.)
and $3.37 million (U.S.), respectively.  Using a current exchange rate of $0.45(NZ)/$1(US), these
benefits are $5.76 million and $7.49 million, in New Zealand dollar terms.
Additional benefits from reduced road run-off.  Emissions from motor vehicles can settle onto
roadways and eventually run off into waterways.  This can cause damages from increased
sedimentation and increases of metals and other toxic inorganic substances in bodies of water.
There can also be problems specific to transport of certain materials such as livestock and
hazardous substances.  There are numerous studies looking at how air emissions can affect water
quality, but no study of the benefits of reducing such impacts.  The Ministry of Transport (1996a)
relies on mitigation costs as a measure of these benefits and concludes that a best estimate is $0.3
cents/vehicle-kilometre.  If we use this estimate with our estimate of kilometres diverted from
urban roads by suburban passenger rail and rail freight, we get a gross benefit estimate for rail of
$0.363 million in 1994 and $0.403 million in 1997 (in New Zealand dollars).55
We are unable to come up with a formal estimate of the damages to waterways from locomotive
emissions, but we are reasonably certain that the damages are much lower than from road travel.
The reason is that impacts are greatly mitigated if the run-off is conveyed through an area of land
rather than a hard surface such as pavement.  Ministry of Transport (1996a) reports from a U.S.
Federal Highway Administration study that states that there are virtually no impacts if the run-off
is conveyed through 60 metres of vegetation.
If we assume that locomotive emissions cause damages to waterways that are approximately half
of those from travel on roads, then our gross benefit numbers above are reduced by half to $0.182
million in 1994 and to $0.201 million in 1997.  In fact, the rail-bed provides an effective filter as
compared to the hard surface of roads.
Caveats.  There are several reasons why are net benefit estimates for air quality should be viewed
with caution.  First, they include health benefits only; no effects on agricultural productivity,
visibility, damage to buildings, aesthetics, etc., are included.  Second, CO is omitted and this is an
important pollutant in many locations in New Zealand.  These facts mean that our estimates are
likely to understate the true environmental externalities associated with both road and rail.  On the
other hand, the benefit numbers in the Small and Kazimi study are based on U.S. studies and in
particular, based on studies of health effects in the Los Angeles area.  Los Angeles has by far the
worst air quality of any American city and surpasses anything in New Zealand by a wide margin.
This may mean that our estimates overstate the environmental health externalities associated with
road and rail.  Finally, our estimates of how much travel would take place on roadways in urban
                                           
54 This estimate is rough and is based on numbers from the trucking association.  Most rail hauling is long
distance and thus rural, so if it took place on roads instead, most of it would still be in rural areas.  This is
the reason for the 14 percent figure.
55 We continue to use urban travel rather than total travel because water quality impacts are minimal if
daily traffic flows are low and the ratio of road area to catchment area is low (see Ministry of Transport,
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areas in the absence of rail are very rough.  We have no way of knowing exactly how much rail
freight hauling currently takes place in urban areas, nor do we know exactly how many kilometres
a Tranz Metro passenger would travel by car in the absence of rail.  We have had to make
informed guesses about these things.
In 1996, the Ministry of Transport conducted a large study of environmental externalities
associated with transportation for the Land Transport Pricing Study.  Estimates of externalities
from air pollution were limited to health damages from particulates and carcinogenic
hydrocarbons, benzene, benzo(a)pyrene, and formaldehyde; no estimates were generated for ozone
or CO.  We chose not to rely on the numbers in this study because we feel they underestimate the
true externalities from motor vehicles.  The estimates are based only on direct emissions of
particulates and not the contribution to particulates from HCs and NOx, as explained above. And
they include only excess mortality from particulates exposure and no morbidity effects.
Moreover, the estimates exclude ozone costs.
Safety externalities.   A comprehensive study of the social costs of road crashes in New Zealand
was also part of the Land Transport Pricing Study (Ministry of Transport, 1996b).  It estimates the
medical costs, temporary loss of productive output, values of loss of life and permanent disability,
property damage, and legal costs associated with accidents.  The study takes the view that the
external component of these social costs are minimal because they are internalised through ACC
charges and road user charges.  An appendix to the report takes a contrary view and estimates that
25% of total social costs are external costs – i.e., costs “suffered by road users not at fault (p. 96).”
This yields a road safety externality estimate of $720 million per year.  We believe that this is the
appropriate view of externalities, not an ex post assessment after accounting for ACC.  ACC
necessarily covers the costs since these are, for the most part, real monetary costs (e.g., medical
costs) that must be paid by someone and ACC is the mechanism in place for doing so.  In addition,
we want to know the external costs avoided by the use of rail, thus this estimate is appropriate for
our purposes.
A total of 34.2 billion kilometres were travelled by all vehicles in 1995 (Ministry of Transport,
1996a).  This yields a safety externality cost of $0.0211 per kilometre.  Multiplying this cost by
the estimated reduction in kilometres due to the presence of rail – and now using all rail
kilometres, not simply those in urban areas – yields an external benefit from rail due to reduced
vehicle crashes of $5.249 million in 1994 and $6.105 million in 1997.
Although there are safety issues associated with rail and costs from accidents involving trains, we
do not feel that there are significant rail safety externalities.  An externality occurs when the
actions of one party affect the well-being of another without those actions being taken into account
by the first party.  In the case of road safety, each individual driver does not consider the costs he
imposes on other drivers in the form of increased risk of a crash when he takes to the road.
However, an extra passenger on a train or an extra tonne of freight to be moved by rail does not
impose any extra risk for other passengers or freight or, for that matter, pedestrians.  The
difference arises from the fact that each passenger or tonne is on the same train, not in an
individual vehicle, as in the case of cars and trucks.
Furthermore, available evidence suggests that most rail-related accidents are the fault of other
parties.  The Association of American Railroads (1999) reports that 92% of the rail-related
fatalities in the United States in 1996 involved either grade crossings or trespassers.  These are
primarily accidents whereby a pedestrian or motorist does not move out of the way of an
oncoming train.  On a kilometre basis, rail is far safer than roads.56  Thus, we assume that our
estimated external benefit numbers above are the net safety benefits from rail.
                                           
56 The AAR reports that in 1995, four times as many people died in truck-related accidents as those
involving railroads.  In that year, 41 percent of all inter-city tonne-miles of freight was moved by rail versus
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Congestion externalities.  In the same way that a driver does not consider the accident risk that he
imposes on others when he takes to the road, he also does not consider the increased congestion
costs he imposes if he takes to the road in congested conditions.  By adding to the number of
vehicles on the road during peak periods, a given driver increases the waiting time of all other
drivers.
Any congestion benefits provided by rail come primarily from suburban passenger rail.  Many of
these people are commuting to work and would be driving in their cars if the train were not
available.  Trucks, on the other hand, tend to avoid driving during peak periods, for the most part.
Thus rail freight probably does not confer significant congestion benefits by diverting travel from
trucks.  In order to estimate the congestion benefits from rail, we would need to have several
pieces of information that we do not have:  an estimate of baseline congestion on Wellington and
Auckland roadways; an estimate of the reduction in congestion from passengers who take rail; and
an estimate of the average value of drivers' time spent waiting in traffic.  Instead of undertaking
this sizeable task, we have assumed that the subsidy provided to Tranz Rail by the regional
councils is a reasonable estimate of these congestion externalities.
Externalities summary.  We estimate that the total external benefit from rail in 1994 was $11.19
million and in 1997 was $13.80 million.  Slightly more than half of the benefit in each year is due
to environmental benefits, $5.94 million in 1994 and $7.69 million in 1997.  These are estimates
of the health benefits from improvements in local air quality due to reduced levels of particulates
and ozone.  The remaining external benefits come from reductions in vehicle crashes on roads.
Trains are inherently safer in moving both people and goods and this is reflected in the large
benefits, $5.25 million in 1994 and $6.11 million in 1997.The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail - Part 2 - Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis
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